Henderson v. Phila. Hous. Auth. "PHA"

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YUZZA HENDERSON, Plaintiff, v. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY “PHA, et al”, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-CV-129

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

January 26, 2022

MEMORANDUM

JOEL H. SLOMSKY, J.

In this civil action, pro se Plaintiff Yuzza Henderson alleges that the Philadelphia Housing Authority (“PHA”), terminated her employment in violation of federal law prohibiting employment discrimination harassment, and retaliation. Henderson seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Henderson leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss her Complaint without prejudice. Henderson will be granted the option of filing an amended complaint to attempt to cure the defects discussed below.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Henderson used the Court's form Complaint for filing an employment discrimination action. Therein, she checked boxes indicating that she asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). (ECF No. 1 at 1.)^[1] For discriminatory conduct alleged, Henderson checked boxes for “failure to hire, ”^[2] “termination of [her] employment, ” “failure to promote, ” “failure to stop harassment, ” and “retaliation.” (Id. at 2-3.) Henderson also avers that there were “unequal terms and conditions of [her] employment” and that the PHA “[v]iolated [her] Constitutional Rights to Due Process” prior to her termination and used “falsified documentation” to terminate her. (Id.) She attached to her Complaint a Notice of Right to Sue Letter issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) dated October 18, 2021.

The Complaint lacks factual allegations. There are no allegations concerning when Henderson began working at the PHA, the length of her employment, the nature of her employment, or what discriminatory or retaliatory acts took place. Henderson did not identify any membership in a protected class, and instead of listing the facts of her case in the section provided, she typed the words “Request for legal Counsel/Representation.” (Id. at 3.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court grants Henderson leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that she is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). “At this early stage of the litigation,' ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as (ECF No. 3 at 2.) Nonetheless, Henderson has not set forth a plausible claim that she was discriminated against in connection with an alleged failure to hire. true,' ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff's] favor,' and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.'” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). “[T]he plausibility paradigm announced in [Bell Atl. Corp. v.] Twombly[, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), ] applies with equal force to analyzing the adequacy of claims of employment discrimination.” Fowler v. UMPC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Henderson is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019). To conform to Rule 8, a pleading must contain a short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Travaline v. U.S. Supreme Court, 424 Fed.Appx. 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit has explained that in determining whether a pleading meets Rule 8's “plain” statement requirement, the Court should “ask whether, liberally construed, a pleading ‘identifies discrete defendants and the actions taken by these defendants' in regard to the plaintiff's claims.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted). A pleading may still satisfy the “plain” statement requirement “even if it is vague, repetitious, or contains extraneous information” and “even if it does not include every name, date, and location of the incidents at issue.” Id. at 93-94. The important consideration for the Court is whether, “a pro se complaint's language . . . presents cognizable legal claims to which a defendant can respond on the merits.” Id. at 94.

However, “a pleading that is so ‘vague or ambiguous' that a defendant cannot reasonably be expected to respond to it will not satisfy Rule 8.” Id. at 93; see also Fabian v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Civ. A. No. 16-4741, 2017 WL 3494219, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2017) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that pleadings provide enough information to put a defendant on sufficient notice to prepare their defense and also ensure that the Court is sufficiently informed to determine the issue.”) (quotations omitted). Dismissals under Rule 8 are “‘reserved for those cases in which the complaint so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 94 (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Claims^[3]

Federal law prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, and disability. See E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448-49 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623; 42 U.S.C. § 12112). In general, to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position in question; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and; (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003). A plaintiff must allege these same elements in order to set forth a plausible claim under the PHRA. See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that Pennsylvania courts “generally interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal counterparts”). Although a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, she still must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotations omitted).

For a plaintiff to establish that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her membership in a protected class, she “must show that (1) [s]he suffered intentional discrimination because of [her membership in a protected class]; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) it detrimentally affected [her]; (4) it would have detrimentally affected a reasonable person of the same protected class in [her] position; and (5) there is a basis for vicarious liability.” Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 260 (3d Cir. 2001). Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing any act made unlawful by the employment discrimination statutes, or because she made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the employment discrimination statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. A plaintiff states a retaliation claim if she “pleads sufficient factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the following elements: (1) she engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse action against her; and (3) a causal link exists between her protected conduct and the employer's adverse action.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).

Here, Henderson failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim for discrimination or retaliation under Title VII. The Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations.

There is no information concerning Henderson's employment, her membership in a protected class, or what discriminatory or retaliatory acts allegedly took place. The Court is unable to evaluate Henderson's claims because it is not clear what happened to her, when it happened, and why she believes she was discriminated against or retaliated against.

There are no facts to indicate that the PHA discriminated against or harassed Henderson based on her race, color, gender/sex or membership in another protected class. The same is true for Henderson's retaliation claim. For Henderson to state a claim, she must describe the events that happened to her so it is clear why she believes she was discriminated against, forced to endure a hostile work environment based on harassment, and/or terminated because of her race, color, or gender, or as a result of retaliation. Henderson's Complaint does not do this. Accordingly, Henderson has failed to state a claim. See, e.g., Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th...