Henry Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. S.G.

337 Ga.App. 260

786 S.E.2d 907

Henry County Board of Education

v.S.G.

A16A0201

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

May 31, 2016

A.J. Welch Jr., Megan Murren Pearson, Smith, Welch, Webb & White, for Appellant.

Phyllis J. Holmen, Lisa Jane Krisher, Michael Joseph Tafelski, Robert L. Ashe III, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, for Appellee.

Peterson, Judge.

Following a hearing, the Henry County Board of Education (the “Local Board”) expelled S.G. from a county high school for fighting on school grounds in violation of the student handbook. The State Board of Education (the “State Board”) affirmed the Local Board's ruling, but the superior court reversed, finding that S.G. was justified in using force because she acted in self-defense. We granted the Local Board's application for discretionary review, and on appeal, the Local Board argues that the superior court failed to apply the proper standard of review and erred by substituting its judgment for that of the Local Board. We affirm the superior court's ruling because the Local Board abused its discretion by failing properly to apply self-defense standards when expelling S.G. for fighting on school grounds.

On appeal from the superior court's review of a local board's student disciplinary action, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the Local Board's decision. See C.P.R. v. Henry County Bd. of Educ. , 329 Ga.App. 57, 59, 763 S.E.2d 725 (2014). So viewed, the record shows that S.G. was a student at Locust Grove High School, where her mother was an employee. At the end of a school day in January 2014, S.G. went to her mother's vehicle and, as she was walking back toward the school, she and another student had a verbal confrontation. A video recording shows the other student following S.G. until S.G. stopped at a brick pillar near the building's entry. S.G. and the other student continued to argue. The other student briefly stepped toward S.G. and came very close to touching S.G. before stepping back. S.G. then punched the other student, grabbed the student, and took the student to the ground. Once on the ground, S.G. sat astride the student and punched her until S.G. was pulled off by her mother. The other student then got off the ground and again moved toward S.G.; S.G. again threw the student to the ground, sat on top of her, and remained over her for more than 15 seconds before being pulled off a final time. Following the fight, the School Resource Officer (SRO) charged S.G. with an unspecified misdemeanor.¹

A hearing officer subsequently held a disciplinary hearing. At the hearing, S.G. testified to events that transpired before those captured in the video recording. S.G. testified that the other student had taunted her and yelled, “Let's fight now.” S.G. testified that she walked away, at which point the other student continued to yell at her and followed her, as displayed in the video recording. A school secretary who witnessed the fight testified that she believed the other student was the aggressor, because the other student followed S.G. and made comments like “If you want to do something, do it now,” or “We'll do it now.” Based on viewing a video recording of the fight, the hearing officer decided to expel S.G. for being involved in a fight on school grounds.

S.G. appealed to the Local Board, arguing that the other student was the aggressor and S.G. acted in self-defense. The Local Board adopted the hearing officer's findings, the entirety of which are as follows:

[S.G.] was involved in a fight on school grounds. The other female moved towards [S.G.] and [S.G.] hit the girl and the fight ensued. [S.G.] threw the other student to the ground and began hitting her in the face numerous times. The fight was broken up and the other female walked toward [S.G.] and the fight continued. The other student received a busted lip and blood on her face. The SRO charged [S.G.] with a misdemeanor under Georgia law. Based on S.G.'s involvement in the fight, the Local Board concluded that S.G. committed two “Section 2 Offenses” from the Secondary Student Handbook—for physically abusing others and for violations that constitute a misdemeanor. The Local Board expelled S.G. from her high school and allowed her to attend an alternative school.²

The State Board affirmed the Local Board's decision, finding that the video recording and other record evidence supported the Local Board's decision that S.G. did not act in self-defense because, although she had the opportunity to retreat, she stopped at the pillar and threw the first punch. S.G. then sought review in the superior court.

Following a hearing, the superior court concluded that the State Board misapplied the law regarding self-defense by requiring S.G. to show that she had no ability to retreat before using force. The superior court concluded that S.G.'s actions were justified because the other student lunged at S.G. before S.G. responded with force. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the Local Board argues that the superior court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the Local Board in resolving S.G.'s claim of self-defense and by failing to apply the “any evidence” standard in reviewing the Local Board's decision.

In reviewing the disciplinary decisions of the Local Board, we apply the “any evidence” standard of review. See C.P.R. , 329 Ga.App. at 62(1), 763 S.E.2d 725. Under this standard, we accept factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See Reed v. State , 291 Ga. 10, 1(3), 727 S.E.2d 112 (2012) ; Patel v. Patel , 285 Ga. 391, 392(1)(a), 677 S.E.2d 114 (2009). As to the Local Board's ultimate decision, i.e., whether and what type of sanction to impose, “[c]ourts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of a school board where its exercise of judgment does not violate the law. We presume that the actions of the board are not arbitrary and capricious, but are reasonable unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.” Brawner v. Marietta City Bd. of Educ. , 285 Ga.App. 10, 15, 646 S.E.2d 89 (2007) (citation omitted). Thus, in reviewing the Local Board's decision to expel S.G., we are required to affirm absent an abuse of discretion, which would be present if the Local Board misapplied the relevant law or if its rulings are not supported by the evidence. See Clinch County Bd. of Educ. v. Hinson , 247 Ga.App. 33, 36, 543 S.E.2d 91 (2000) ; Lewis v. Lewis , 316 Ga.App. 67, 68, 728 S.E.2d 741 (2012). Central to this appeal is whether the self-defense standards under OCGA § 16–3–21 apply to school disciplinary hearings and, if they do, whether the Local Board properly applied the statute in expelling S.G.

1. Self-defense law and its application to non-criminal proceedings

“A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force[.]” OCGA § 16–3–21(a). As the Local Board argues happened here, a person is not justified in using force when she engages “in a combat by agreement unless [s]he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person [her] intent to do so and the other, notwithstanding, continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force.” OCGA § 16–3–21(b). Any ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, or policy of any county or other political subdivision of the state that conflicts with OCGA § 16–3–21 “shall be , void, and of no force and effect.” OCGA § 16–3–21(c). The Local Board is a political subdivision of the state, and thus its rules are subject to this Code section. See Coffee Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Snipes , 216 Ga.App. 293, 294, 454 S.E.2d 149 (1995). This provision of OCGA § 16–3–21, although appearing in the Criminal Code, applies in other contexts as well. See Allen v. City of Atlanta , 235 Ga.App. 516, 517–18, 510 S.E.2d 64 (1998) (holding that a municipality's workplace rule precluding the use of force, regardless of whether such use was in self-defense, was invalid because it conflicted with OCGA § 16–3–21 ). Accordingly, we now consider whether the Local Board applied those standards in this case.

2. The Local Board's findings and application of self-defense standards

The Local Board made limited factual findings that consisted mainly of a determination that S.G. was involved in a fight on school grounds and caused physical injuries to the other student. The Local Board made no express finding related to S.G.'s justification defense, much less render an explicit decision on that defense, but argues that it implicitly did so. We ordinarily presume that public officials, which would include members of the Local Board, properly discharge their duties, but only in the absence of evidence to the contrary. See Bank of Clearwater v. Kimbrel , 240 Ga. 570, 572, 242 S.E.2d 16 (1978). We cannot indulge in that presumption here because the Local Board's express findings do not support an implicit rejection of S.G.'s self-defense claim; its arguments advanced subsequent to making these express findings for an “implicit rejection” of S.G.'s claim are not supported by the record evidence; and there is evidence that the Local Board has previously failed to consider properly other students' claims of self-defense.

(a) Evidence showing that the Local Board did not consider S.G.'s self-defense claim

The limited factual findings made by the Local Board, while supported by the evidence, do not support the Local Board's argument that it properly applied self-defense laws in expelling S.G. The Local Board expressly found that the fight started when the S.G. hit the other student after the student moved toward S.G. One could read this express finding as supporting an implicit finding that S.G. did act in self-defense. Such a finding would be supported by the record, because an eyewitness testified that the other student was the aggressor and the video...