Henry v. CMBB, LLC, Case No. 19-5296

HEATHER HENRY & SHAWN HENRY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CMBB, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

Case No. 19-5296

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

January 14, 2020

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 20a0019n.06

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

OPINION

BEFORE: McKEAGUE, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. If you're injured on the job, then workers' compensation is usually your only remedy. That's the case in Tennessee. But there is an exception: you can sue your employer in tort if the employer actually intended to injure you. Heather Henry tried to invoke this exception. In a tragic workplace accident, her arms were crushed by a 200-ton Bliss press. Henry alleged that her employer noticed that a safety mechanism in the press was not working, ordered replacement parts, but still sent her to work the machine. The district court dismissed her complaint, finding that she had not plausibly alleged that her employer actually intended to injure her. We agree. Noticing a defect and ordering replacement parts, while suggesting an awareness of the potential for injury, does not make it plausible that Ms. Henry's employer actually intended to injure her. We AFFIRM.

I. Background

We recite the facts as they are alleged in the complaint. Back in November 2017, Heather Henry was working for a temp agency called Personnel Placements, LLC. Personnel Placements brought her to Chicago Metallic, a manufacturer located in Humboldt, Tennessee and owned by the defendant, CMBB, LLC.

In her job at Chicago Metallic, Ms. Henry operated a 200-ton piece of industrial equipment called a Bliss press. She put pieces of metal into the press, and the press used hydraulic pressure to shape the metal. Of course, such a powerful machine presents safety risks for its operators. To prevent injuries, the Bliss press contains a safety mechanism known as a light curtain. A functioning light curtain will detect operators inside the press and prevent it from cycling while operators are reaching inside.

Prior to Ms. Henry suffering her injuries, while a different operator was working with the Bliss press, CMBB's employees noticed that the press's light curtain was not functioning properly. So CMBB took that operator off the press and put a more experienced operator on the job. CMBB also ordered new light curtains. It did not, however, take the Bliss press out of operation.

Two weeks later, on November 15, 2017, Ms. Henry was operating the Bliss press, but the new light curtains had not yet arrived. Disaster struck. The press cycled while Ms. Henry was placing aluminum parts into it. The 200-ton machine crushed her arms, which were amputated above the elbow.

Ms. Henry and her husband Shawn then sued in Tennessee state court, Ms. Henry for her injuries and Mr. Henry for his loss of consortium. CMBB removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, invoking the court's diversity jurisdictionunder 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The district court then dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim because it was barred by the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act. The Henrys then appealed.

II. Standard of Review

We review the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Linkletter v. W. & S. Fin. Grp., Inc., 851 F.3d 632, 637 (6th Cir. 2017). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint can be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court should disregard the complaint's legal conclusions, assume that the pleaded facts are true, and determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter" to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

III. Analysis

The only issue in this appeal is whether the Henrys' complaint is barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act. The "rights and remedies" given to an employee under the statute "on account of personal injury or death by accident . . . shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a). Thus, the workers' compensation statute "provides the exclusive remedy for an employee who is injured during the course and scope of his employment." Valencia v. Freeland & Lemm Constr. Co., 108 S.W.3d 239, 242 (Tenn. 2003).

Tennessee courts have recognized an exception to this exclusive-remedy provision, allowing employees to bring intentional-tort claims in which the employer actually intended to injure the employee. Id. at 242-43. "The theoretical basis for that result is that the employer cannotallege an accident when he has intentionally committed the act." Cooper v. Queen, 586 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). In other words, it is the "actual intention to injure that robs the injury of accidental character." King v. Ross Coal Co., 684 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (quotation omitted); see also Valencia, 108 S.W.3d at 242; Gonzales v. Alman Constr. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Mize v. Conagra, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). This theoretical justification tracks the statutory language, since by its terms the statute applies only to those injuries that occur "by accident." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a).

The intentional-tort exception is a narrow one. Rodgers v. GCA Servs. Grp., Inc., No. W2012-01173-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 543828, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2013). It requires a heightened showing of intent, higher than the showing typically required in tort law. In Valencia, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted how, in the usual tort context, the "intent" element can be satisfied if the tortfeasor believes "that the consequences are substantially certain to result from [his] actions." 108 S.W.3d at 243. But "that definition is not applicable in workers' compensation cases." Id. Instead, "the definition of actual intent is the actual intent to injure the employee." Id. Accordingly, it is not enough to show that the employer breached its duty to provide a safe workplace. Gonzales, 857 S.W.2d at 47. Nor is it enough to show that the employer knowingly ordered the employee to perform an extremely dangerous job. Id. at 48. The employer must have actually intended for the employee to be injured.

The Tennessee Supreme Court's application of this rule in Valencia demonstrates just how strictly it is construed. There, the employee was working in an open construction trench, a work environment that presents a rather obvious safety concern: collapse. Valencia, 108 S.W.3d at 241. Under Tennessee's safety regulations, construction companies like the defendant in Valencia are required to take steps to prevent collapse, either by sloping the sides of trenches or by using"trench-boxes." Id. & n.3. The employer's failure to take these steps was especially egregious for two reasons. First, it knew that its failure to reinforce the trenches was against the law: the employer had been cited twice for safety violations. Id. Second, the employer had trench boxes on site at the time of the accident, suggesting that it could have fixed the safety issues relatively quickly. Id. at 241 n.2. And yet, that conduct still was not enough to show actual intent to injure and escape the exclusive-remedy provision of the workers' compensation statute. Id. at 243. The court held that an employee cannot recover in tort for a workplace injury even if the employer's "conduct made injury substantially certain." Id.¹

Other states have reached similar results when applying the exclusive-remedy provisions of their workers' compensation laws to bar claims. For example, in one Maryland case, the employer was cited for a "serious violation" of state safety regulations for keeping dangerous and defective electrical connections to a sump pump. Johnson v. Montaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 503 A.2d 708, 709 (Md. 1986). After the citation, the employer reported back to the workplace safety administration that the violation had been corrected—only that wasn't true. Id. And two months later, a sixteen-year-old employee was electrocuted to death while using the exact same defective sump pump. Id. But the Maryland Court of Appeals barred his estate's wrongful-death claim because the alleged facts did not show that the employer had "deliberate intent" to injure the employee, so the exclusive-remedy provision of the workers' compensation statute applied. Id. at 712. For another example, one New York case involved an allegation that the employer deliberately removed the safety guards from the machine the plaintiff was operating. But even thatwas not enough to escape the exclusive-remedy provision of the workers' compensation statute, because the employer intended only to increase profits, not injure the plaintiff. Santiago v. Brill Monfort Co., 205 N.Y.S.2d 919 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960), rev'g 201 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd 176 N.E.2d 835 (N.Y. 1961). These states aren't outliers; requiring an actual intent to injure remains the majority rule. See 9 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 103.03 (2019). In short, in Tennessee and elsewhere, it's difficult to escape the exclusive-remedy provisions of workers' compensation statutes.

Against this backdrop, the question is whether the facts of this case, as alleged in the complaint, give rise to a reasonable inference of an actual intent to injure.² The Henrys argue that their case does give rise to such an inference. They argue that CMBB knew the press would injure Ms. Henry. Because CMBB noticed the defective light curtains and ordered replacements, so the...