Hensley v. Suttles

167 F.Supp.3d 753

Teresa Ann Hensley, Administrator of the Estate of David Lee Hensley, H.H., a minor, by and through her parent and next friend, Theresa Ann Hensley as General Guardian, Rachelle Ferguson, Individually, State of North Carolina ex rel., Estate of David Lee Hensley, H.H., and Rachelle Ferguson, Plaintiffs,

v.Bobby R. Suttles, individually and in his official capacity as former Sheriff of Haywood County, Larry Bryson, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy of the Haywood County Sheriff's Department, David Mitchell, individually and in his official capacity as Patrol Captain of the Haywood County Sheriff's Department, Michael Scott Price, individually and in his official capacity as Lieutenant of the Haywood County Sheriff's Department, Keith Allen Beasley, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of the Haywood County Sheriff's Department, The Ohio Casualty Insurancy Company, and West American Insurance Company, Corporate sureties on the official bond of the Sheriff of Haywood County, Defendants.

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:14-cv-00193-MR-DLH

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division .

Signed March 9, 2016

Russell L. McLean, III, McLean Law Firm, P.A., Waynesville, NC, for Plaintiffs.

Patrick Houghton Flanagan, Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., Charlotte, NC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

Martin Reidinger, United States District Judge

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is an excessive force case arising from two law enforcement officers shooting and killing David Lee Hensley in his front yard. Plaintiffs bring this action, asserting eight claims for relief in their Second Amended Complaint as follows: (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ Doc. 26 at 9 to 12]; (2) violations of North Carolina Constitutional rights [Id. at 12 to 13]; (3) assault [Id. at 13]; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress [Id. at 13 to 14]; (6) wrongful death [Id. at 15]; (7) a claim against the sureties for Haywood County and the Sheriff's office [Id. at 16]; and (8) punitive damages. [Id. at 17].

The Defendants, collectively, filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint raising various affirmative defenses and generally denying the material factual allegations. [Doc. 29]. The Defendants, collectively, have filed a motion for summary judgment on all of the Plaintiffs' claims. [Doc. 39]. The Plaintiffs have responded thereto. [Doc. 47].

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the case.” N & O Pub. Co. v. RDU Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir.2010). A “genuine dispute” exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed must support its assertion with citations to the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “Regardless of whether he may ultimately be responsible for proof and persuasion, the party seeking summary judgment bears an initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir.2003). If this showing is made, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must convince the court that a triable issue exists. Id. Finally, in considering a party's summary judgment motion, the Court must view the pleadings and materials presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant as well. Adams. v. UNC – Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 556 (4th Cir.2011).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The central question underlying Defendants' motion is whether the named officers are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. Analyzing the applicability of qualified immunity in the context of the claiming officers' summary judgment motion is a two-step process. First, the Court must determine the factual scenario, that is the facts taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs based upon the forecasts of evidence presented. Second, in a case where a plaintiff alleges that a police officer has unconstitutionally used deadly force, the officer's actions are judged on a standard of objective reasonableness. Thus, the Court must apply that objective standard to the factual scenario properly determined and consider whether “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If a reasonable jury could so find, summary judgment must be denied.

The forecasts of evidence presented by the Plaintiffs and by the Defendants are remarkably in conflict with one another regarding the facts surrounding the critical issue of qualified immunity. Proceeding with a view of the evidence in the manner as described above, however, the evidence would allow a rational jury to find that the following events occurred.

At 6:18 a.m. on August 9, 2012, Lt. Michael Price and Deputy Keith Beasley of the Haywood County Sheriff's Department, received a call over the radio regarding a civil disturbance at the home of David Lee Hensley (“Hensley”), the decedent in this matter. [Doc. 47-8 at 3 to 4]. They traveled in separate patrol cars to the scene arriving about 6:36 a.m. [Id. at 4]. Hensley was inside the home with his daughters Rachelle Ferguson and minor daughter H.H. [Doc. 47-4 at 2]. Rachelle was with her father in the kitchen. [Doc. 40-3 at 10 to 11]. H.H. was dressing and getting ready for school. [Doc. 47-4 at 4]. Decedent's wife, Teresa Hensley, was away from the home at the time, working the third shift at the Haywood County Hospital. [Doc. 47-7 at 4]. Mrs. Hensley was, however, expected back home at any moment and the decedent would look out the front windows of the home periodically anticipating her arrival. [Doc. 47-2 at 4]. When the deputies drove up in their vehicles, the decedent looked out the front windows. [Id.]. Decedent saw the police cars and then walked from the front room of the house into his bedroom followed by Rachelle. [46 - 1 at 2]. H.H. was already in decedent's bedroom. [Doc. 46-2 at 2].

Both daughters testified that they watched their father retrieve something from underneath the mattress of the bed. [Doc. 46-1 at 2; Doc. 46-2 at 2]. Rachelle did not know what her father was digging for until he came out with the keys to his gun safe. [Doc. 47-2 at 4]. Decedent then walked over to the “shoe box” sized gun safe located under the television [Doc. 47-2 at 4] and removed a pistol. [Doc. 40-3 at 13; Doc. 46-2 at 3]. Rachelle and H.H. tried to grab the pistol from their father's hand but were unsuccessful. [Doc. 40-3 at 13; Doc. 40-5 at 5]. Hensley and his two daughters then left the bedroom and made their way to the front porch of the home. [Id.]. When they arrived on the porch, the two girls saw the deputies' vehicles, one parked in front of the other, in the driveway facing the house. [Doc. 40-3 at 16]. Rachelle was standing in front of her father on the porch, H.H. was standing to the side of her father and sister, and all three were facing forward looking off the porch in the direction of the deputies' cars. [Doc. 40-3 at 17; Doc. 46-2 at 5 to 6]. Rachelle described the two deputies as just sitting in their patrol cars. [Doc. 47-2 at 4]. On the porch, the decedent began striking Rachelle in the back of the head with the butt of the pistol which he held in his right hand. [Doc. 40-3 at 17; Doc. 40-5 at 7]. At this point, H.H. attempted to push her father's right arm, which held the gun, away from Rachelle [Doc. 40-5 at 8 to 9] while Rachelle began screaming for the officers to come help her. [Id.; Doc. 40-3 at 19]. Despite Rachelle's calls for help, H.H. stated the deputies “just sat there.” [Doc. 47-4 at 2].

The decedent then left the porch and walked down the front steps. [Doc. 40-3 at 19; Doc. 40-5 at 9]. H.H. observed the decedent walk down the steps of the porch with the gun in his right hand. [Doc. 47-4 at 3]. According to H.H., the decedent held the gun by his side and not pointed at anyone and, she stated, her father was “not acting aggressive.” [Id.]. From the bottom of the stairs, the decedent walked a short distance on the walkway that was parallel to the front of the house and then veered off the walkway at a right angle walking into the front yard in the direction of the deputies' cars. [Doc. 46-1 at 3; Doc. 46-2 at 9]. H.H. testified that as the decedent walked across the yard, the pistol was no longer in his right hand. [Doc. 46-2 at 9]. She stated that, due to the angle at which the decedent walked across the yard, she could not see the gun in his left hand but she further stated that both of decedent's arms were down by his sides. [Doc. 47-3 at 2]. At one point, the decedent turned his head toward H.H. and mouthed the words “I love you” and then turned his head back to face the deputies. [Doc. 46-2 at 10]. H.H. testified the deputies began firing upon her father, shooting him in the head, as soon as he turned back to face them. [Id.]. “At no time,” according to H.H., “did my father raise either arm and point a gun towards anybody, including the police officers.” [Doc. 47-3 at 2; Doc. 46-2 at 17 to 18].

Rachelle testified in a similar manner. [Doc. 47-1 at 2]. She described her father walking off the porch and down the stairs at a normal pace. [Id.]. According to Rachelle, he had the gun by his side and did not say anything while he kept both arms down. [Id.]. She testified that “[a]t no time did I ever see him raise his arms or his hands from his side.” [Id.]. As he got close to the first deputy's car, Rachelle stated the car door...