Henson v. Daimler Truck N. Am.

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ROBERT HENSON, Plaintiff, v. DAIMLER TRUCK NORTH AMERICA LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL No. 22-cv-6479 (RBK/MJS)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Camden Vicinage

April 25, 2023

OPINION

ROBERT B. KUGLER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Daimler Truck North America LLC's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 6). For the reasons set forth below Daimler's Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint, which we accept as true for the purpose of deciding this Motion. Plaintiff Robert Henson was employed by Defendant as an order selector beginning around March 2019. (ECF No. 1 Ex. A (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 5-6). On November 16, 2021, Plaintiff was involved in a two-person accident while operating a company vehicle. (Id. ¶ 9). The coworker involved in the accident admitted being primarily at fault. (Id.). No individuals were injured in the accident. (Id.). At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was not under the influence of any substance and he was not suspected of being under the influence by any manager or supervisor. (Id. ¶ 10). However, in accordance with Daimler's safety policy, both parties who were involved in the accident were subjected to a drug test. (Id. ¶ 11). Prior to taking the drug test, Plaintiff informed his manager that he had engaged in recreational use of cannabis outside the workplace two weeks earlier, and therefore he expected his drug test to show a positive result. (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff's manager told him that he must still take the drug test or face immediate termination. (Id.). Plaintiff participated in the drug test and tested positive for marijuana. (Id. ¶ 13). Because of this result, Plaintiff was immediately suspended without pay. (Id.).

On November 18, 2021, Plaintiff learned that marijuana had been decriminalized in the State of New Jersey and that, under the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernizaiton Act (“CREAMMA”), it is unlawful for an employer to subject an employee to adverse action based solely on the presence of cannabinoid metabolites in the employee's bodily fluid. (Id. ¶ 15) (citing 2021 N.J. ALS 16, 2021 N.J. Laws 16, 2021 N.J. Ch. 16, 2020 N.J. A.N. 21). Upon learning this, Plaintiff called his manager to voice his concerns about the legality of his suspension and stated that he believed the adverse action against him was contrary to CREAMMA. (Id. ¶ 16). Plaintiff followed up the phone call with an email, in which he linked to an article outlining the CREAMMA statute and its implications for employees. (Id.).

Due to his suspension without pay, Plaintiff submitted a claim for benefits with the New Jersey Department of Labor. (Id. ¶ 18). His claim was denied on December 20, 2021, on the basis that his suspension was due to misconduct. (Id. ¶ 19). On January 5, 2022, Plaintiff received a termination letter from Daimler stating that he had been terminated as of November 30, 2021. (Id. ¶ 20).

Plaintiff appealed the decision denying his claim for benefits. On January 24, 2022, the Appeal Tribunal reversed the earlier determination, finding that “[a]lthough employers may maintain Drug and Alcohol Free Workplace policies including prohibiting the use of marijuana products during work hours or being under the influence of marijuana at the workplace..., a positive result for marijuana alone, does not allow for adverse action by the employer.” (Id. ¶ 21).

Plaintiff commenced the instant action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County, on October 4, 2022. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1). The Complaint raises two causes of action: (1) violation of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. § 34:19, et seq. and (2) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. (Compl. ¶¶ 30-42). The Complaint also includes a third count in which Plaintiff requests equitable relief. (Compl. ¶¶ 4350). On November 11, 2022, Defendant removed the action to this Court. (Id.). Defendant now moves to dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 6 (“MTD”)).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court limits its review to the face of the complaint. Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 835 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Phillips v. Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). In other words, a complaint is sufficient if it contains enough factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The inquiry is not whether [a plaintiff] will ultimately prevail in a trial on the merits, but whether [he or she] should be afforded an opportunity to offer evidence in support of [his or her] claims.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Prop., Inc., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002). However, legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

To determine whether a complaint is plausible on its face, courts conduct a three-part analysis. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). This plausibility determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint cannot survive where a court can infer only that a claim is merely possible rather than plausible. Id.

“When deciding a motion to dismiss, a court typically does not consider matters outside the pleadings. However, a court may consider documents that are ‘integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint' or any ‘undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.'” Mills v. Ethicon, Inc., 406 F.Supp.3d 363, 372 (D.N.J. 2019) (quoting In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that, when “evaluating a motion to dismiss, [a court] may consider . . . any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim”). “Reliance on these types of documents does not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment,” since a “plaintiff obviously is on notice of the contents [of] the document, and the need for a chance to refute evidence is greatly diminished.” Mills, 406 F.Supp. at 372 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

A cause of action for wrongful termination under New Jersey common law requires a plaintiff to show that he was terminated “contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.” Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72 (1980). This requires the plaintiff to (1) “identify the clear mandate of public policy” and (2) show “that the discharge itself was in violation of that public policy.” Dillin v. Constr. & Turnaround Servs., LLC, 2015 WL 5545236, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2015) (quoting Brangan v. Ball Plastic Container Corp., 2012 WL 1332663, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr.17, 2012)); see also Daniels v. High Point Bd. of Educ., Dkt. No. A-1112-17T1, 2019 WL 166578, at *1, 3 (N.J.Super. App. Div. Jan. 11, 2019); Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 102 (2008).

The New Jersey Conscientious Employer Protection Act (“CEPA”) prohibits employers from taking “any retaliatory action against an employee” who “[d]iscloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer . . . that the employee reasonably believes . . . is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law ....” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3. To state a claim under CEPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate four elements:

(1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a “whistle-blowing” activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3 c; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action.

Young v. Twp. of Irvington, 629 Fed.Appx. 352, 356 (3d Cir. 2015). To meet the first element, the plaintiff must identify “the specific terms of a statute or regulation, or the clear expression of public policy, which would be violated if the facts as alleged are true.” Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 463 (2003) (emphasis in original).

A. Wrongful Termination

To state a claim for wrongful termination, Plaintiff must plead facts to show that his termination was in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. The Complaint asserts that Defendant violated the provision of CREAMMA that prohibits employers from taking any adverse...