Heotis v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ.

457 P.3d 691

Sharman M. HEOTIS, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.COLORADO STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent-Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0057

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division II.

Announced March 7, 2019

Kris A. Gomez, Brooke M. Copass, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellant

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Julie C. Tolleson, First Assistant Attorney General, Jenna M. Zerylnick, Assistant Attorney General, Sarah P. Roller, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee

Opinion by JUDGE FURMAN

¶ 1 Section 19-3-304(2)(l ), C.R.S. 2018, requires public school employees who have reasonable cause to know or suspect that a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect to report this fact to appropriate authorities immediately. This case requires us to determine whether a public school teacher must follow the reporting duties of section 19-3-304 despite the circumstances in which he or she learns of or suspects child abuse and neglect. We conclude that a public school teacher’s reporting duties do not cease when he or she leaves the classroom.

¶ 2 In this case, the district court reviewed and upheld a final order of respondent, the Colorado State Board of Education (Board), denying the teacher’s license renewal application of petitioner, Sharman M. Heotis. The Board denied Heotis’s renewal application because while she was employed as a public school teacher, she did not report to authorities that her then-husband had sexually abused their daughter from the time their daughter was three years old until she was eleven. The Board determined that her failure to report the abuse amounted to "unethical behavior because it offended the morals of the community" according to Colorado’s Teacher Licensing Act, section 22-60.5-107(4), C.R.S. 2018.

¶ 3 On appeal, Heotis makes two broad contentions in challenging the district court’s decision. First, she contends that the Teacher Licensing Act is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to her, because this Act does not provide for a range of sanctions for misconduct. Second, she contends that the evidence in the record does not support the Board’s conclusion that she "engaged in unethical conduct because it offended the morals of the community" on the ground that she learned of the abuse in her role as a parent. She thus contends that the Board’s denial of her license renewal application was "manifestly excessive" and a "gross abuse of discretion." Because we disagree with Heotis’s contentions, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. Heotis’s License Renewal Process

¶ 4 Several months before the expiration of her teacher’s license, Heotis submitted a renewal application to the Board. The Board voted to deny her application based on her "immoral conduct and unethical behavior regarding her failure to report the abuse of her daughter."

¶ 5 Heotis then filed a request for a hearing at the Office of Administrative Courts. Following a three-day hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an initial decision upholding the Board’s denial of Heotis’s teacher’s license renewal application. The ALJ determined that Heotis’s conduct offended the morals of the community, finding, in part, as follows:

• Heotis "testified that it was not important to her to know what had actually transpired between her husband and her daughter."

• Heotis "chose not to report the abuse."

• By not reporting the abuse of her daughter, Heotis placed her daughter "at risk of suffering further abuse at the hands of [the husband]," and "keeping the matter secret meant that [Heotis] took no steps to obtain any help" for her daughter.

• After learning about the abuse, Heotis permitted her husband "to teach music lessons to others, including children, in the home." "[T]hese lessons regularly occurred when [Heotis] was not at home."

• After her daughter’s friend’s mother reported the abuse, Heotis responded, "[W]hy are you trying to ruin my life?"

• Heotis pleaded guilty "to a misdemeanor count of child abuse" and received a deferred sentence.

• In retrospect, Heotis "wishes she had reported the abuse" and "acknowledged that she should not have been influenced by the request of an 11 year-old [sic] to keep the abuse a secret."

• Although an expert witness concluded that Heotis "suffered from [battered woman syndrome]," Heotis’s failure to report her husband’s abuse was not due to this syndrome but was "entirely due to [Heotis’s] own assessment of the damage that reporting would cause to her family life."

¶ 6 The Board adopted the ALJ’s initial decision in its final order denying Heotis’s license renewal application, determining that Heotis engaged in "unethical behavior because it offended the morals of the community," and that the ALJ’s findings and conclusions regarding why Heotis failed to report the abuse of her daughter were supported by substantial evidence. The Board reasoned that because Heotis failed to report the abuse, her daughter "remained in danger of continued abuse" by the husband and that Heotis’s failure to report "placed other children at risk" because the husband continued to teach children private music lessons in Heotis’s home after she learned of the abuse.

¶ 7 Heotis then brought an action for judicial review of the Board’s final order. In a detailed and reasoned decision, the district court upheld the Board’s order.

¶ 8 To address Heotis’s contentions, we first discuss the Board’s authority to deny a teacher’s license renewal application under the Teacher Licensing Act. We then consider the standard for judicial review of final agency actions. We last turn to Heotis’s specific contentions on appeal.

II. The Board’s Authority

¶ 9 The Board may deny an application for renewal of a teacher’s license when the Board determines that an applicant is "professionally incompetent or guilty of unethical behavior." § 22-60.5-107(4). The Board’s rules define "unethical behavior" as "immoral conduct that affects the health, safety, or welfare of children, [or] conduct that offends the morals of the community." Dep't of Educ. Rule 2260.5-R-15.02(10), 1 Code Colo. Regs. 301-37 (effective until Aug. 14, 2018) (rules renumbered effective August 14, 2018, but their content remains the same). To warrant denial of a license, the Board must find the teacher’s behavior to be "substantial or continued." Dep't of Educ. Rule 2260.5-R-15.01, 1 Code Colo. Regs. 301-37 (effective until Aug. 14, 2018).

III. Judicial Review of the Board’s Action

¶ 10 A court must hold unlawful and set aside an agency action for the following reasons:

[I]f ... the agency action is:

(I) Arbitrary or capricious;

(II) A denial of statutory right;

(III) Contrary to constitutional right ...;

....

(VI) An abuse or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion;

(VII) Based upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous on the whole record; [or]

(VIII) Unsupported by substantial evidence when the record is considered as a whole[.]

§ 24-4-106(7)(b), C.R.S. 2018. "Substantial evidence is probative evidence that would warrant a reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to the existence of contradictory testimony." Ward v. Dep't of Nat. Res. , 216 P.3d 84, 94 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 11 It is solely the province of the ALJ, as the trier of fact, to weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and make credibility determinations about witnesses. Charnes v. Lobato , 743 P.2d 27, 32 (Colo. 1987). Thus, we will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. See Colo. Real Estate Comm'n v. Bartlett , 272 P.3d 1099, 1103 (Colo. App. 2011). Indeed, neither the Board nor we, as a reviewing court, may set aside the ALJ’s findings of evidentiary fact "unless such findings of evidentiary fact are contrary to the weight of the evidence." § 24-4-105(15)(b), C.R.S. 2018.

¶ 12 We will presume that the Board’s proceedings are valid and resolve all reasonable doubts as to the correctness of administrative rulings in favor of the Board. Colonial Bank v. Colo. Fin. Servs. Bd. , 961 P.2d 579, 588 (Colo. App. 1998). Accordingly, a person who seeks to overturn the Board’s ruling bears the heavy burden to "overcome the presumption that the [Board’s] acts were proper." Wildwood Child & Adult Care Program, Inc. v. Colo. Dep't of Pub. Health & Env't , 985 P.2d 654, 655 (Colo. App. 1999).

¶ 13 We now turn to Heotis’s specific contentions on appeal.

IV. Due Process

¶ 14 We conclude that the Teacher Licensing Act is not unconstitutional either facially or as applied to Heotis.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 15 A statute is unconstitutional if it deprives a person of a property interest without due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ; Colo. Const. art. II, § 25. "The essence of procedural due process is fundamental fairness," which embraces protections such as "adequate advance notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to state action resulting in deprivation of a significant property interest." Colo. State Bd. of Nursing v. Lang , 842 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Colo. App. 1992).

¶ 16 We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. See Coffman v. Williamson , 2015 CO 35, ¶ 13, 348 P.3d 929. In so doing, we presume a statute to be constitutional, and we will so construe a statute whenever a reasonable and practical construction allows. Morris-Schindler, LLC v. City & Cty. of Denver , 251 P.3d 1076, 1084 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 17 In both facial and as-applied challenges, the challenging party must prove that a statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g. , Barber v. Ritter , 196 P.3d 238, 247 (Colo. 2008) (facial challenge); Dami Hosp., LLC v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office , 2017 COA 21, ¶ 42, 457 P.3d 621 (as-applied challenge) (cert. granted in part sub nom. Colo. Dep't of Labor & Emp't v. Dami Hosp. Sept. 11, 2017).

¶ 18 As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether Colorado law affords a person with an educator’s license a property interest in the renewal of that...