Hernandez v. Helix Energy Sols. Grp.

GERALD HERNANDEZ, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. HELIX ENERGY SOLUTIONS GROUP, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-18-1588

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

April 29, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

Gerald Hernandez, Christopher Smith, George Sowell, Larry Sowell, and Paul Flaharty sued Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., alleging a failure to pay the overtime wages required under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (Docket Entry No. 1). The plaintiffs have moved for partial judgment on the pleadings and for partial summary judgment, denying Helix relief on the affirmative defenses it asserts. (Docket Entry Nos. 54, 55). Helix has responded, and the plaintiffs have replied. (Docket Entry Nos. 57, 58, 61, 62). Based on the motions, the responses, the record, and the applicable law, the court denies the motions.

The reasons are explained below.

I. Background

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Helix provides offshore-drilling construction, inspection, maintenance, repair, and salvage services to the oil and gas industry. (Docket Entry No. 1 at ¶ 11). Hernandez began working for Helix as a refrigeration mechanic in late 2008. He was later promoted to an HV electrician position. He worked for Helix until December 2017. (Docket Entry No. 1 at ¶ 12; Docket Entry No. 12 at ¶ 12).

In May 2018, Hernandez filed this collective action against Helix under the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Docket Entry No. 1). Hernandez alleges that Helix HV electricians work on electrical and refrigeration systems on offshore oil and gas rigs and are paid on a day-rate basis. (Docket Entry No. 24 at 7). Hernandez alleges that Helix HV electricians regularly work more than 40 hours per workweek, but Helix does not pay them overtime for the hours over 40. Instead, "they get the same amount of money for each day of work regardless of the number of hours actually worked in a day or week." (Entry No. 1 at ¶ 28).

In November 2018, the court conditionally certified a class of "all current and former electricians who worked for Helix during the last three years and who were paid on a day-rate basis." (Docket Entry No. 26 at 11 (brackets omitted)). Smith, Flaharty, and the Sowells opted-in as plaintiffs. (Docket Entry Nos. 3, 4, 20, 30). The plaintiffs moved for partial judgment on the pleadings and for partial summary judgment on the affirmative defenses Helix had asserted. (Docket Entry Nos. 54, 55). Helix has responded, and the plaintiffs have replied. (Docket Entry Nos. 57, 58, 61, 62).

B. The Summary Judgment Record

The summary judgment record consists of the following exhibits:

• the deposition of Gerald Hernandez, (Docket Entry Nos. 55-1, 58-3);

• the deposition of George Sowell, (Docket Entry No. 55-2);

• the deposition of Curt Sowell, (Docket Entry No. 58-4);

• an informational pamphlet about Helix's Q4000 DP3 and Q5000 DP3 Well Intervention Vessels, (Docket Entry Nos. 55-4, 55-5);• Helix's offer letters to Gerald Hernandez, Christopher Smith, George Sowell, Larry Sowell, and Paul Flaharty, (Docket Entry Nos. 55-6, 55-7, 55-8, 55-9, 55-10);

• the plaintiffs' daily-activity reports, (Docket Entry Nos. 55-13, 55-14, 55-15, 55-16, 55-17);

• Helix's job description for an "Electrician" position, (Docket Entry No. 55-3);

• Helix's objections and responses to the plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories, (Docket Entry Nos. 55-11, 55-12);

• Helix's first amended objections and responses to the plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories, (Docket Entry No. 58-5);

• Helix's objections and responses to the plaintiffs' first requests for production, (Docket Entry No. 55-18);

• Helix's Rule 26 disclosures, (Docket Entry No. 55-19);

• the declaration of Kenric McNeal, Helix's director of human resources, and accompanying exhibits, (Docket Entry No. 58-1); and

• the declaration of Dan Loebel, captain of the Q5000 vessel, (Docket Entry No. 58-2).

II. The Legal Standards

A. Judgment on the Pleadings

"A motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). The Rule 12(c) standard is the same as that under Rule 12(b)(6). Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir. 2010). Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court confirmed that Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires "a short and plain statementof the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office, 530 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court explained that "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

B. Summary Judgment

"Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Vann v. City of Southaven, Miss., 884 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could enter a verdict for the non-moving party." Doe v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2020). The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of . . . demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," Jones v. United States, 936 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted), and "identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

"Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial." Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 301-02 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted). While the party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate the absence of a genuine and material factual dispute, it does not need to negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. Austinv. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). "A fact is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the motion [for summary judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response." Pioneer Expl., L.L.C. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

When the moving party has met its burden, "the nonmoving party cannot survive a summary judgment motion by resting on the mere allegations of its pleadings." Duffie v. United States, 600 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 2010). The nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate how that evidence supports that party's claim. Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014). "This burden will not be satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence." Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).

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III. Analysis

A. The Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings

In its answer, Helix asserts the following affirmative defense:

Any acts or omissions by Helix with respect to the payment of wages were undertaken in good faith reliance on the regulations and interpretations of the Wage Hour Administration of the United States Department of Labor and/or legal advice or opinions from outside counsel and were based on long-standing industry standards and practices.

(Docket Entry No. 12 at ¶ 4). The plaintiffs argue that the court should dismiss this defense under Rule 12(c) because Helix has not pleaded sufficient facts under Iqbal and Twombly. (Docket Entry Nos. 54, 61).

As an initial matter, whether or how Iqbal and Twombly apply to affirmative defenses is unclear. The Fifth Circuit previously stated that affirmative defenses are subject to the same pleading requirements that apply to complaints. Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999). At that time, pleadings had to provide "fair notice." Id. The Supreme Court later clarified in Iqbal and Twombly that the pleading standard for complaints is higher than "fair notice," and that a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Since then, the Fifth Circuit "has not addressed whether Twombly and Iqbal effectively overruled Woodfield." Morgan. v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., No. 4:19-CV-00850, 2021 WL 1169390, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:19-CV-00850, 2021 WL 1166756 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2021). The...