Hernandez v. Singh

Alejandro Hernandez, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Lakhvir Singh, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-17-08091-PCT-DWL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

January 30, 2019

ORDER

INTRODUCTION

In this diversity action, Alejandro Hernandez, Jr. and Alejandro Yanez (collectively, "Plaintiffs") allege they sustained injuries when their car was rear-ended on the highway by a semi-truck that was being driven by Lakhvir Singh ("Singh") and that was owned by Mann Carrier, Inc. ("Mann") (collectively, "Defendants"). (Doc. 1-1.) The complaint asserts four causes of action: (1) negligence against Singh; (2) vicarious liability against Mann; (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and training against Mann; and (4) negligent entrustment against Mann. (Id.)

Now pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the third and fourth causes of action, which Plaintiffs oppose. (Docs. 70, 78, 83.) As explained below, the motion will be granted.¹

BACKGROUND

I. The Collision

On March 20, 2015, at approximately 9:26 p.m., Singh was driving a 2010 Kenworth T660 semi-trailer truck eastbound on I-40 in or around Kingman, Mohave County, Arizona. (Doc. 79 ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs were also driving on the I-40 in a 2006 Dodge Durango SLT 4-Door Wagon. (Id. ¶ 5.) At some point, Singh's truck collided with the rear end of Plaintiffs' vehicle. The parties dispute who was at fault for the collision.

II. Singh's Experience

Singh attended and graduated from Sunny Truck Driving School ("Sunny") in Flushing, New York in 1999. (Doc. 71 [Singh Dep.] at 23:25-24:24 [pp. 34-35].)² Singh has not taken any truck driving classes since attending Sunny. (Doc. 79-2 [Singh Dep.] at 26:19-25.)

Singh has been an over-the-road truck driver since 2003 and was issued a commercial driver's license in February 2008 by the state of California, which was valid at the time of the collision in this case. (Doc. 79 ¶¶ 12, 13 [Plaintiffs' concession that these points are undisputed].)

Singh has worked for Mann since approximately 2007 as an over-the-road truck driver. (Doc. 79 ¶ 14.) When Singh was hired by Mann, he received only a 30-minute safety orientation, and he has never participated in any safety training classes whileemployed by Mann. (Doc. 79-2 at 79:3-20.)

The only evidence in the record regarding Singh's motor vehicle collision history comes from Singh's deposition. Before the collision at issue in this case, Singh had been involved in three or four collisions. (Doc. 79-2 at 43:6-14.) One of those occurred while he was working for Mann, and the other two or three occurred while he was driving a taxi. (Id. at 43:15-44:3, 45:8-14.) He was also involved in two truck collisions after the one at issue here; in one of those, the other driver was cited, and in the other, cows had come onto the road. (Id. at 45:15-47:15.) None of these collisions was Singh's fault. (Id. at 47:4-7.)

III. Mann's Employment Documents

In response to a request for production of Singh's "employment file," Defendants produced only drug and alcohol testing records and a California Department of Motor Vehicle Driver History. (Doc. 79-9 at 7-8.) Defendants could not produce any written employee manuals, policies, or procedures or any other writings pertaining to Singh's employment with Mann in effect at the time of the collision. (Doc. 79-9 at 6-7.)

In response to a separate document request, Defendants also could not produce any policies or procedures regarding training or supervising Mann's employees in operating its vehicles from March 20, 2014 onward. (Id. at 9.) And Defendants could not produce any employee manuals or handbooks provided to Singh during his employment with Mann. (Id. at 10.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "In order to carry its burden of production, the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial."Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). "If . . . [the] moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense." Id. at 1103.

"Summary judgment is appropriate when 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Rookaird v. BNSF Ry. Co., 908 F.3d 451, 459 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). "A genuine dispute of material fact exists if 'there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.'" United States v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Account No. Ending 8215 in Name of Ladislao V. Samaniego, VL: $446,377.36, 835 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). The court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inference in the nonmoving party's favor." Rookaird, 908 F.3d at 459. Summary judgment is also appropriate against a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

ANALYSIS

I. Negligent Entrustment

Defendants³ seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs' negligent entrustment claim onthe ground that Plaintiffs do not have any admissible evidence to support "several essential elements" of that claim, including that: (1) "Singh, by virtue of his physical or mental condition, was incompetent to drive safely"; (2) "Mann Carrier knew or should have known that Mr. Singh, by virtue of his physical or mental condition, was incompetent to drive safely"; and (3) "any entrustment caused the accident." (Doc. 70 at 4-5.) As explained below, although it is unclear whether Plaintiffs must establish that Singh had a "physical or mental condition" that rendered him incompetent to drive—some Arizona courts have suggested the incompetence may arise from other factors, such as youth, inexperience, driving habits, and poor character—the Court nonetheless agrees that Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence to establish some elements of this claim.

"Arizona recognizes a cause of action for negligent entrustment as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts . . . § 390 (1965) . . . ." Verduzco v. Am. Valet, 377 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016). Section 390 provides:

One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.

In Verduzco, the court stated that the elements of a claim for negligent entrustment of a vehicle in Arizona are:

(1) "that Defendant owned or controlled a vehicle"; (2) "Defendant gave the driver permission to operate a vehicle"; (3) "the driver, by virtue of his physical or mental condition, was incompetent to drive safely"; (4) "the Defendant knew or should have known that the driver, by virtue of his physical or mental condition, was incompetent to drive safely"; (5) "causation"; and (6) "damages."

377 P.3d at 1019 (citation omitted). However, other Arizona courts have suggested negligent entrustment is not restricted "to cases in which the owner entrusts a vehicle to one known to be incompetent or inexperienced," but rather extends to cases "where the 'third person's known character or the peculiar circumstances of the case are such as to give the actor good reason to believe that the third person may misuse [the instrumentality].'" Tellez v. Saban, 933 P.2d 1233, 1239 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (quotingRestatement (Second) of Torts § 308, cmt. b (1965)); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965) (emphasis added) (negligent entrustment cause of action exists where "supplier knows or has reason to know [entrustee] [is] likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use [the instrumentality] in a manner involving unreasonable risk"). Thus, it seems that a claim for negligent entrustment of a vehicle can be "predicated on [the owner's] knowledge of [the driver's] driving habits at the time that she gave him permission to drive the [vehicle]." Acuna v. Kroack, 128 P.3d 221, 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted); see also Alosi v. Hewitt, 276 P.3d 518, 526 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added) ("[N]egligent entrustment is based on direct liability of the person authorizing use of the vehicle to a person she knew or should have known was a risky driver.").

Nevertheless, even accepting the expansive definition of incompetence suggested in some of the cases identified above, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether Singh was incompetent or otherwise unfit to drive when Mann entrusted the vehicle to him. Plaintiffs proffer the following evidence on this issue: (1) Singh attended truck driving school for only 20 hours (if at all) and does not remember much of what he learned; (2) Singh gave an inaccurate answer when asked during his deposition to calculate how many seconds it would take for a similarly sized truck traveling at the same speed to stop after the brakes were applied; (3) Singh was involved in at least four motor...