Hernandez v. State

134 Conn.App. 124

38 A.3d 191

Roberto HERNANDEZ

v.STATE Of Connecticut et al.

No. 32872.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 30, 2011.Decided March 6, 2012.

A. Paul Spinella, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Linsley J. Barbato, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).

LAVINE, ROBINSON and BISHOP, Js.

ROBINSON, J.

The plaintiff, Roberto Hernandez, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss the complaint as moot filed by the defendants, the state of Connecticut, Richard Blumenthal, then attorney general, and William H. Carbone, the executive director of court support services division.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court improperly determined that his claims did not fall within the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff alleged the following in his complaint. The plaintiff is an indigent resident of the state of Connecticut. On February 7, 2005, the plaintiff was arrested in connection with a robbery that had taken place on January 26, 2005. During his arraignment, the bail commissioner indicated that the plaintiff had “ ‘no means of support’ ” but proceeded to recommend a bail amount of $25,000. The court set the plaintiff's bail at $100,000 cash or surety. On April 6, 2005, the plaintiff submitted an application to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 54–69 seeking a reduction in bail to as low as the court deemed appropriate. Such request was denied by the court. The plaintiff was unable to post the $100,000 bail and was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee for approximately one year. On February 3, 2006, before the commencement of the criminal trial, all charges against the plaintiff were dismissed and the plaintiff was released. ²

The plaintiff filed the present action on September 23, 2008, and later filed an amended complaint on February 23, 2009. The amended complaint alleged four counts, all of which are premised on the contention that the Connecticut statutes governing pretrial release, set forth in General Statutes § 54–63a et seq., violate both the federal and state constitutional rights of indigent detainees.³ The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the Connecticut laws that govern bail are unconstitutional under the federal and/or state constitutions, a permanent injunction and any equitable relief the court deemed appropriate. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that, although the plaintiff is no longer a pretrial detainee, his challenges to the bail system are not moot because they are capable of repetition, yet likely to evade judicial review. The plaintiff asserted that “[u]pon information and belief, approximately one hundred forty (140) indigent [detainees] per year are unable to secure pretrial release under Connecticut's bail system because financial conditions are set for bail and/or bail is determined by the ‘no greater amount than necessary’ to secure appearance standard, which does not properly consider financial mean[s] for actually securing release, and, like the plaintiff, all of the approximately one hundred forty (140) indigent [detainees] unable to secure bail had their charges dropped or nolled before trial.”

On December 5, 2008, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendants contended that the plaintiff's claims were moot, the plaintiff lacked standing and the plaintiff's claims for equitable relief were barred because he had an adequate remedy at law. The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motion to dismiss, contending that he had standing and that he had no adequate remedy at law to bring his equitable claim for injunctive relief. The plaintiff also argued that the issue of whether the bail system is unconstitutional satisfies the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine.⁴ The court heard argument on the motion to dismiss on June 28, 2010.

The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on September 22, 2010. In its memorandum of decision, the court first set out the statutory scheme that governs pretrial release in Connecticut. It then discussed the defendants' contention that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert his claims. The court determined that the plaintiff satisfied the two-prong test for classical aggrievement and, therefore, had standing to bring the suit.

The court next addressed the defendants' contention that the plaintiff's claims were moot, and whether the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception applied. The court determined that “the plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine. The complaint does not state facts which if proven could establish that pretrial detention is of such a limited duration that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about the validity of the bail system would become moot before litigation could be concluded.... There is nothing to indicate that such a constitutional challenge will evade review in future cases.” The court noted that different cases will involve varying lengths of time between arrest and trial, so that some pretrial detainees may have sufficient time to mount a meaningful challenge to the statutes governing pretrial release. Further, the court addressed the plaintiff's contention that a constitutional challenge could not be brought while a detainee was incarcerated pretrial because an accused has a right to a speedy trial under article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut and the sixth amendment of the federal constitution. In response, the court asserted that “[e]ven though our judicial system seeks to resolve matters expeditiously, it is axiomatic that for various reasons, including delays attributable to the defense, some suspects may experience a longer time between their arrest and their trial than others.... Because the right to a speedy trial translates to various periods of time between arrest and trial and may be waived in its entirety, it does not present an inherent time constraint on the constitutional issue asserted in the present case.” The court found that the plaintiff's claims were moot and did not fall within the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine, and accordingly, dismissed the plaintiff's claims.⁵ This appeal followed.

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of review. “A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.... A motion to dismiss tests ... whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... When a ... court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light.... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... The motion to dismiss ... admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone.... [O]ur review of the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [grant] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.... Factual findings underlying the court's decision, however, will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.... The applicable standard of review for ... a motion to dismiss, therefore, generally turns on whether the appellant seeks to challenge the legal conclusions of the trial court or its factual determinations.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Peruta v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 128 Conn.App. 777, 782–83, 20 A.3d 691, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 919, 28 A.3d 339 (2011).

“Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction.... The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time ... [a]nd the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention.... The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings....

“Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates [a] court's subject matter jurisdiction.... Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ... (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ... (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power ... and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dean–Moss Family Ltd. Partnership v. Five Mile River Works, Inc., 130 Conn.App. 363, 370, 23 A.3d 745 (2011).

“Our cases reveal that for an otherwise moot question to qualify for review under the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ exception, it must meet three requirements. First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority...