Herrick Dist. Library v. Library of Michigan

293 Mich.App. 571

810 N.W.2d 110

HERRICK DISTRICT LIBRARY

v.LIBRARY OF MICHIGAN.

Docket No. 300393.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 12, 2011, at Lansing.Decided Aug. 16, 2011, at 9:15 a.m.

Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, P.C., Grand Rapids (by Michael D. Homier and Laura J. Garlinghouse), for the Herrick District Library.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, David H. Goodkin, Assistant Attorney General, for the Library of Michigan and the Department of Education.

Law Weathers, Grand Rapids (by Richard W. Butler, Jr., and Crystal L. Morgan), for the Lakeland Library Cooperative, the Woodlands Library Cooperative, the White Pine Library Cooperative, and the Superiorland Library Cooperative.Dykema Gossett PLLC, Lansing (by William J. Perrone and Courtney F. Kissel) for the Ann Arbor District Library.

Before: METER, P.J., and SAAD and WILDER, JJ.

SAAD, J.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

The Michigan Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether citizens who pay taxes to support their local library are obliged by the Michigan Constitution to provide identical services or library privileges to citizens of another jurisdiction who do not pay any taxes or fees for these library services. Goldstone v. Bloomfield Twp. Pub. Library, 479 Mich. 554, 737 N.W.2d 476 (2007). In unambiguously answering this question in the negative, our Supreme Court interpreted our Constitution's library provisions and constitutional history to say quite the opposite. That is, our Supreme Court held that the framers of Michigan's Constitution clearly expressed their intent that citizens whose tax dollars support their local public library should not have to provide these library services for free to people who do not contribute to the financial upkeep of the library.

Yet defendant Michigan Department of Education (DOE), by promulgating the rules at issue here, attempts to force by regulation the very result our Supreme Court says is contrary to the framers' intent and the Constitution's provisions concerning local control of libraries. The DOE's position is particularly untenable because it rationalizes its administrative overreach on the ground that the legislation regarding state funding of libraries gives the DOE this power by implication, notwithstanding that the relevant legislation neither mentions nor hints at such an unprecedented and coercive objective.

For the reasons articulated herein, we agree with Herrick District Library, which challenges the authority of the DOE to promulgate these rules, and hold that the DOE has no authority, express or implied, to force this unprecedented result upon local public libraries by issuing rules that have no basis in the enabling legislation and that our Supreme Court has said run contrary to the letter of our Constitution and the clear intent of its framers.

Indeed, the powers of administrative agencies such as the DOE are limited to those expressly granted by the Legislature. And though an agency may have implied powers, our caselaw narrowly restricts such authority to that “ ‘necessary to the due and efficient exercise of the powers expressly granted’ ” by the enabling statute. Ranke v. Corp. & Securities Comm., 317 Mich. 304, 309, 26 N.W.2d 898 (1947) quoting California Drive–in Restaurant Ass'n v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287, 302, 140 P.2d 657 (1943). The State Aid to Public Libraries Act (State Aid Act), MCL 397.551 et seq. , does not expressly grant the DOE the power to promulgate new rules and regulations for the distribution of state aid to public libraries. Nor does the legislation provide that additional eligibility requirements are necessary for the State Aid Act's administration. Accordingly, the DOE lacks the authority to promulgate the rules at issue in this case. If the Legislature had intended that the DOE be able to write new eligibility requirements, it would have included authorizing language in the State Aid Act.

Further, we reiterate that these challenged rules expressly repudiate and violate the intent of the drafters of our state Constitution, as explained recently by the Supreme Court in Goldstone. Indeed, despite our Supreme Court's analysis of Michigan's Constitution and its rejection of the policy of providing the same services to all library patrons, regardless of their financial contribution to that library, this is exactly what the DOE seeks to accomplish by what it regards as its implied rulemaking authority. Because such a policy conflicts with our state Constitution as interpreted by Goldstone, it is indeed questionable whether even the Legislature would have the ability to enact such a statute. Thus, it strains credulity, at best, to suggest, as the DOE does, that an administrative agency has an implied power to do the same by issuing regulations. This effort by the DOE—which ignores the will of the drafters of our Constitution and the Michigan Supreme Court's recent interpretation of our state Constitution, illustrates why our courts have historically strictly constrained the implied authority of administrative agencies. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's grant of summary disposition to plaintiff, the Herrick District Library.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. HOW LIBRARIES ARE FUNDED AND HOW THEY OPERATE

Plaintiff, the Herrick District Library, is a public library located in Holland, Michigan. It was established pursuant to the District Library Establishment Act, MCL 397.171, et seq. Public libraries in Michigan provide services to individuals who live in one of two areas: (1) the library's jurisdictional service area and, if it chooses to create one, (2) the library's contractual service area. A jurisdictional service area encompasses the territory within a library's legal boundaries where the electors are authorized to vote on library millage and may be eligible to be library board members. A contractual service area is created by the library and a municipality outside the library's jurisdictional service area and provides residents of that municipality with some level of library services, typically for an agreed-upon fee. Michigan's Legislature has passed numerous statutes allowing these arrangements to promote the “establishment of a system in which communities with public libraries can enter into agreements with communities without public libraries in order to extend access to such libraries.” ¹ Goldstone, 479 Mich. at 562, 737 N.W.2d 476. Also, district libraries, like Herrick, are expressly authorized to enter into library-service contracts with municipalities not located in the library's jurisdictional service area. MCL 397.182(g).

Though jurisdictional and contractual service areas are similar because both expand library access, the two arrangements entail different responsibilities for the residents of each respective area. Residents of a library's jurisdictional service area are always a library's prime financial benefactors—they pay the taxes that provide their local library its essential funding. Individuals who live in contractual service areas have no such financial obligation—they simply pay an agreed-upon amount to secure specific services outlined in the agreement.

Accordingly, residents of a contractual service area typically have different—and often less comprehensive—library privileges than those who live in the library's jurisdictional service area. Because they pay taxes to fund the library, residents in the jurisdictional service area are entitled to full library services. Individuals residing in the contractual service area may receive full library services or partial library services, depending on the level of services specified in the contract. In brief, residents in the jurisdictional service area pay taxes for their library, and people in the contractual service area pay for specific services according to the contract. ²

Like many other libraries in Michigan, Herrick serves individuals living in its jurisdictional area and maintains outside-service contracts with outlying municipalities. In some cases, Herrick offers different library services to residents of the contractual service areas than those provided to residents of its district.

B. STATE AID

To offer its patrons additional library services, Herrick belongs to the Lakeland Library Cooperative, a network of libraries in Western Michigan that agree to share books, periodicals and other media. As a member of a library cooperative, Herrick is eligible for state funding under the State Aid Act and has received state aid for some time.

The state-aid program is managed by defendant Library of Michigan, a subsidiary agency of the DOE.³ Section 17 of the State Aid Act requires that each “cooperative library and public library” conform to “ certification requirements for personnel as established by [the Michigan Department of History, Arts and Libraries (HAL) ] in order to qualify for state aid.” MCL 397.567 (emphasis added.) In 2009, HAL promulgated the rules challenged in this case (State Aid Rules), which aimed to create further, nonpersonnel related eligibility requirements for public libraries to receive state funds. These new requirements sparked a public outcry, as libraries across the state challenged the authority of HAL to involve itself in their day-to-day operations and force citizens who pay taxes for their local library to give identical services to people who do not.⁴

Two rules—3(d) and 31(1)(b)—were particularly controversial. Mich. Admin. Code, R. 397.03(d) and 397.31(1)(b). Together, they require that, in order to receive state aid, a public library must provide equal library services to each individual within the library's “legal service area population.” Rule 3(d) defines “legal service area population” as “the total population residing within an area designated for and served by a public library, including the jurisdictional area and any contractual service area.” Mich. Admin. Code, R. 397.03(d)...