Herrmann v. Superior Court of Imperial Cnty.

75 Cal.App.5th 535

290 Cal.Rptr.3d 597

Anna Von HERRMANN, Petitioner,

v.The SUPERIOR COURT OF IMPERIAL COUNTY, Respondent;

Management & Training Corporation, Real Party in Interest.

D079157

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed February 24, 2022

Law Office of Abenicio Cisneros and Abenicio Cisneros for Petitioner.

Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Susan E. Coleman, San Diego, and Mark J. Austin, Santa Ana, for Real Party in Interest.

No appearance for Respondent.

HALLER, Acting P. J.

The California Public Records Act (CPRA) generally applies only to government agencies. ( Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq. ) However, with respect to facilities that detain noncitizens as they await federal civil immigration proceedings, the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 1670.9, which provides (in part) that "[a]ny facility that detains a noncitizen pursuant to a contract with a city" is subject to the CPRA. ( Civ. Code, § 1670.9, subd. (c).)¹ We consider here whether, under section 1670.9(c), the CPRA applies to a private entity that operates an immigration detention facility, even when the operator is not a direct party "to a contract with a city." ( § 1670.9(c).)

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) entered into a contract with the City of Holtville (City) to detain noncitizens at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility (Facility). The City did not own the Facility, so the City subcontracted its detention responsibilities to the Facility's owner. The owner did not operate the facility, so the owner subcontracted its responsibilities (with ICE's approval) to a private operator, real party in interest Management & Training Corporation (Operator).

Petitioner Anna Von Herrmann (Petitioner) served the Operator with a CPRA request regarding the Facility. Operator refused to comply, reasoning it was not subject to the CPRA because it did not have a contract directly with the City, and, thus, the Facility was not one that "detains a noncitizen pursuant to a contract with a city. " ( § 1670.9(c), italics added.) Alternatively, Operator maintained several CPRA exemptions applied. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the trial court compelling Operator to comply with the CPRA request, but the court agreed with Operator's interpretation of section 1670.9(c) and denied the petition without reaching Operator's CPRA exemption claims.

Petitioner contends the trial court construed section 1670.9(c) too narrowly as applying the CPRA only to an entity that contracts directly with a city to detain noncitizens. We agree. As we will explain, the plain meaning of section 1670.9(c), and the structure of section 1670.9 as a whole, indicate the Legislature intended for the CPRA to apply to immigration detention facilities on a facility-wide basis rather than an entity-specific basis. Accordingly, we will issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the petition and to enter a new order granting it, subject to resolution of Operator's CPRA exemption claims.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Facility and Related Entities and Contracts

The Facility is an immigration detention facility in Calexico.

The Facility was constructed and is privately owned by Imperial Valley Gateway Center, LLC (Owner).

Effective September 12, 2014, ICE and the City entered into a contract (the ICE–City Contract) under which the City agreed to "provide detention services for detainees" at the Facility as they awaited federal administrative immigration proceedings.² It appears from the appellate record that the ICE–City Contract terminated on September 21, 2019.

The ICE–City Contract allowed the City, with ICE's approval, to "subcontract[ ] the detention and care of detainees to another entity." In such an event, the contract provided that ICE would deem the new entity a subcontractor, and the subcontractor would be "subject to the terms and conditions of" the ICE–City Contract.

The City has never owned, operated, or managed the Facility. Consequently, the City and Owner entered into a contract (the City–Owner Contract) under which Owner agreed to detain detainees at the Facility. The City–Owner Contract is not itself in the appellate record, but Operator's trial counsel and the City's City Manager acknowledged it exists.³

Owner does not operate the Facility. Instead, from June 2013 through September 22, 2019, Operator operated the Facility under a contract with Owner (the Owner–Operator Contract).⁴ Operator acknowledged in its return to the petition that, to "be permitted to operate the Facility," Operator "sought and obtained the approval of ICE." Operator's submissions to ICE included cost information provided by the City. The Owner–Operator Contract required Operator to "operate, maintain, and manage the Facility in accordance with all Operating Standards," which the contract defined to "include the terms and conditions of" the ICE–City Contract, a complete copy of which was attached to the Owner–Operator Contract.

The Owner–Operator Contract also required Operator to "use its best efforts to pursue Governmental Housing Agreements," which the contract defined as agreements between other governmental entities and the City, "who then subcontracted to [Owner] to have ... Detainees housed at the Facility." Operator then "assumed" all of Owner's responsibilities under such agreements "in connection with the housing of detainees/offenders." The Owner–Operator Contract gave Operator the right to approve the terms of Governmental Housing Agreements, and to direct Owner to "cause the City ... to execute" such agreements.

After the Owner–Operator Contract terminated in September 2019, Operator contracted directly with ICE to operate the Facility.

Operator has never had a contract directly with the City to detain noncitizens at the Facility.

B. The CPRA Request

In January 2019, while Operator was still operating the Facility under the Owner–Operator Contract, Petitioner served on Operator a CPRA request seeking various records relating to the Facility dating back to 2014. The request sought the following:

"1. Copies of [Operator]'s contracts with the [C]ity ... and with [ICE] for the [Facility].

"2. Any reports from the US Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General (or its contractors) regarding the [Facility].

"3. Any communications ... between anyone at the [Facility] and anyone at DHS's Office of Inspector General (or its contractors).

"4. Any reports from the California Department of Justice regarding the [Facility].

"5. Any communications ... between anyone at the [Facility] and anyone at the California Department of Justice.

"6. Any records of or related to complaints against any employees or other staff at the [Facility]."

Operator believed it was not subject to the CPRA and informed Petitioner she should submit her request to the federal government under the federal Freedom of Information Act. Operator did not produce any records in response to Petitioner's request.

C. Trial Court Proceedings

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court seeking to compel Operator to produce the requested records.⁵ She asserted that Operator was subject to the CPRA under section 1670.9(c) because the Facility detained noncitizens pursuant to the ICE–City Contract. Petitioner mistakenly alleged the City owned the Facility and contracted directly with Operator.

In opposition, Operator argued it was not subject to the CPRA because Operator had no direct contract with the City. Alternatively, Operator maintained that even if the CPRA applied, Operator either had no responsive documents, or any responsive documents were covered by a CPRA exemption.

After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The court agreed with Operator that section 1670.9(c) did not apply to the Facility because there was no direct contract between Operator and the City. The court did not address Operator's alternative arguments.

D. Proceedings in This Court

Petitioner filed a petition in this court seeking a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying her petition, and to enter a new order finding the CPRA applies to Operator with respect to the Facility. At our request, Operator filed an informal response.

We then issued an order to show cause "why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted." We also directed the parties "to explain the relationship between [Operator], the City ..., and [Owner]" with respect to the Facility, and to provide copies of pertinent agreements.

Operator filed a return to the petition. Regarding our request for copies of the agreements, Operator (1) confirmed that the ICE–City Contract was included in Petitioner's appendix; (2) represented that it did not possess, nor was it "aware of ever having" possessed, the City–Owner Contract; and (3) produced a copy of the Owner–Operator Contract, which included the ICE–City Contract as an attachment.

Petitioner filed a reply.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Principles

1. The CPRA

"The [CPRA] and the California Constitution provide the public with a broad right of access to government information. [Citation.] The [CPRA], enacted in 1968, grants access to public records held by state and local agencies. ( [Gov. Code], § 6250 et seq. ) Modeled after the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 522 et seq.), the [CPRA] was enacted for the purpose of increasing freedom of information by giving members of the public access to records in the possession of state and local agencies. [Citation.] Such ‘access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business,’ the Legislature declared, ‘is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.’ " ( Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 290, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 107, 386 P.3d 773 ( Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors ); see Voice of San Diego v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 669, 683, 280...