Hester v. Pierce

CORNELL HESTER, Petitioner, v. DAVID PIERCE, Warden, and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Respondents.

Civ. Act. No. 13-812-LPS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

September 28, 2016

Cornell Hester. Pro se Petitioner.

Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

September 28, 2016

Wilmington, Delaware

STARK, U.S. District Judge:

Pending before the Court is an Application For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 ("Petition") filed by Petitioner Cornell Hester ("Petitioner"). (D.I. 1; D.I. 17) For the reasons discussed, the Court will dismiss the Petition and deny the relief requested.

I. BACKGROUND

As set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in Petitioner's direct appeal, the facts leading to Petitioner's arrest and conviction are as follows:

On December 16, 2009, Valerie Wilkins was home alone. At about 8:00 p.m., she heard a knock at the door and found [Petitioner], her ex-boyfriend, on her doorstep. [Petitioner] asked her to open the door. Wilkins told [Petitioner] that if he did not leave, she would call the police. Wilkins then called her mother and told her that [Petitioner] was at the door. As she retreated upstairs, [Petitioner] kicked in the front door and chased her. Wilkins attempted to hide in her daughter's room. [Petitioner] broke through the bedroom door and grabbed Wilkins by the shirt, demanding her mobile phone, which she had dropped as she was fleeing upstairs. [Petitioner] took Wilkins room to room with him in search of the mobile phone, which was ringing. After finding the phone on the stairs, Wilkins pleaded with [Petitioner] to leave because her children would be returning home from church soon. [Petitioner] eventually allowed Wilkins to answer her mobile phone and speak with her daughter. Wilkins' mother and step-father arrived at her house a short while later along with Wilkins' three children. [Petitioner] fled.

Hester v. State, 27 A.3d 551 (Table), 2011 WL 3717051, at *1 (Del. 2011).

On February 1, 2010, Petitioner was indicted on one count of first degree burglary, one count of aggravated menacing, one count of offensive touching, one count of harassment, two counts of criminal mischief, one count of second degree unlawful imprisonment, and one count of malicious interference with emergency communications. (D.I. 54, App. to Appellant's Br. Under Rule 26(c) in Hester v. State, No. 587, 2010, at A7-A9) On May 11, 2010, Petitioner filed a motion seeking to dismiss his court-appointed counsel and asking for new counsel to be appointed; hewithdrew that motion at his final case review on May 24, 2010. See Hester, 2011 WL 3717051, at *2. The case proceeded to trial on June 2, 2010. Id. During a trial recess, Petitioner informed the trial court that he had filed a federal lawsuit against his defense counsel and the public defender's office, and he moved to dismiss defense counsel. The trial judge denied the motion. Id.

In June 2010, a Superior Court jury acquitted Petitioner on the charge of aggravated menacing, but convicted him of second degree burglary (lesser included offense of first degree burglary), second degree unlawful imprisonment, harassment, two counts of criminal mischief, and malicious interference with emergency communications. See State v. Hester, 2012 WL 5364690, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2012). The Superior Court sentenced him on September 10, 2010 as a habitual offender to a total period of fourteen years and nine months at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after twelve years for probation. Id.

Petitioner represented himself on direct appeal, arguing that the trial judge was biased against him, there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, and defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. See Hester, 2011 WL 3717051, at *1 n.1. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions after holding that his first two claims were meritless and that it could not review the third claim because ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot be considered on direct appeal in Delaware. Id. at *3.

On October 12, 2010 and October 29, 2010, Petitioner filed motions to reduce/modify his sentence, asserting, inter alia, that the trial judge was biased against him, there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, the trial court violated his right to be protected against double jeopardy, and defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. (D.I. 54, Commr's Rep. & Rec. in State v. Hester, Cr. ID No. 0912010604, at 3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2012)) The Superior Court denied the two motions to reduce/modify sentence on November 22, 2010. Id. Petitioner appealed,and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. See Hester v. State, 16 A.3d 937 (Table), 2011 WL 1167064, at *2 (Del. Mar. 29, 2011).

Petitioner filed three more motions to correct sentence between April 23, 2012 and August 15, 2012. (D.I. 54, Commr's Rep. & Rec. in State v. Hester, Cr. ID No. 0912010604, at 4 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2012); D.I. 75 at 98-99) The Superior Court denied all three motions. (D.I. 54, Commr's Rep. & Rec. in State v. Hester, Cr. ID No. 0912010604, at 4 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2012); D.I. 75 at 98-99) Petitioner did not appeal any of those decisions.

On September 19, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Court Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion"). (D.I. 75 at 95) The Delaware Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion on November 21, 2012. (D.I. 75 at 100) Petitioner appealed. On March 12, 2013, the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. See Hester v. State, 62 A.3d 1223 (Table), 2013 WL 994062 (Del. Mar. 12, 2013).

Petitioner timely filed the instant habeas Petition and subsequent amended Petition (hereinafter referred to as "Petition"). (D.I. 1; D.I. 17) The State filed an Answer asserting that the Court should deny the Petition because the claims asserted therein are either meritless, procedurally barred, or not cognizable on federal habeas review. (D.I. 52)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") "to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences . . . and to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism." Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only "on the ground that he is in custody in violation of theConstitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). AEDPA imposes procedural requirements and standards for analyzing the merits of a habeas petition in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); see also Woodford, 538 U.S. at 206.

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-44 (1999). AEDPA states, in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that —

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or

(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

The exhaustion requirement is based on principles of comity, requiring a petitioner to give "state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844-45; see also Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by demonstrating that the habeas claims were "fairly presented" to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997); Coverdale v, Snyder, 2000 WL 1897290, at *2 (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2000). "Fair presentation of a claim means that the petitioner must present a federal claim's factual and legal substance to thestate courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted." Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 714 (3d Cir. 2004).

A petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies will be excused if state procedural rules preclude him from seeking further relief in state courts. See Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989). Although technically exhausted, such claims are nonetheless procedurally defaulted. See Lines, 208 F.3d at 160; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991). Similarly, if a petitioner presents a habeas claim to the state's highest court, but that court "clearly and expressly" refuses to review the merits of the claim due to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, the claim is exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-64 (1989).

Federal courts may not consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom. See McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 1999); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51. To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, a petitioner must show that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to...