Heuton v. Ford Motor Co.

930 F.3d 1015

Jeremy HEUTON Plaintiff - Appellant

v.FORD MOTOR COMPANY Defendant - Appellee

No. 18-2130

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 16, 2019

Filed: July 23, 2019

Rehearing Denied August 30, 2019

Luke Andrew Demaree, James A. Kessinger, LAW OFFICE OF JAMES A. KESSINGER, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kirti Datla, Jessica Lynn Ellsworth, HOGAN & LOVELLS, Washington, DC, Timothy Scott Millman, Kirk A. Peterson, BERKOWITZ & OLIVER, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Jeremy Heuton appeals the district court’s¹ adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of Ford Motor Company on his claims of disability discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.010-.137. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I.

Heuton was born without a left forearm and hand. But his left arm extends approximately three to four inches below his left elbow, so he has adapted to using that portion of his left arm to perform some of the functions of his missing left hand. He applied for an entry-level assembler position at Ford’s Kansas City Assembly Plant (KCAP), where Ford makes vehicles on a moving assembly line. There are over 700 such positions at KCAP.

After Heuton disclosed to Ford that he was born with one hand, Barbara Patton, a nurse at Ford’s medical department, instructed Heuton to provide a doctor’s note stating that he was unable to grip anything with his left hand. Heuton told Patton he "[did not] have a left hand" but obtained the note anyway because Patton told him that, if he provided the note, Ford was "going to give [him] a [chance.]" Subsequently, Heuton submitted two doctors’ notes to Ford. The first note provided that Heuton was "cleared to work" and that he was "unable to grip" with his left hand. The second note was from Dr. Stephanie Davis, which provided that Heuton "has a congenital defect of his left upper extremity[,]" that "[h]is only limitation is an inability to grip with his left upper extremity[,]" and that "[h]e has an impressive ability to adapt and performs many tasks, jobs etc without difficulty."

After receiving these notes, Ford’s medical department listed Heuton’s restrictions as "Left hand: No gripping" on his Medical Examination Request Form. Dr. Kyla Kutch, the head of the medical department, then forwarded the Form to the labor relations department, headed by Ashlie O’Reilly. Eventually, Ford decided not to hire Heuton. O’Reilly noted on Heuton’s Medical Examination Form that "[m]ost jobs @ KCAP require the use of both hands/arms (hand-start bolts, grab stock, position job elements, etc.)" and that KCAP was "unable to accommodate a one-hand restriction @ this time."

Heuton sued Ford for disability discrimination and retaliation under the MHRA in Missouri state court. The matter was removed to federal district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Both parties moved for summary judgment. After the summary judgment briefing had completed, the district court requested supplemental briefing over whether the 2008 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) affected the relevant standards under the MHRA, and the court subsequently concluded that they did not. The court then scheduled oral argument on whether Heuton had shown that Ford regarded Heuton as significantly restricted from performing either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.

After oral argument, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of Ford. Heuton v. Ford Motor Co., 309 F. Supp. 3d 714, 719 (W.D. Mo. 2018). On Heuton’s disability-discrimination claim, the court determined that Heuton, despite having a "full opportunity" to do so, failed to show Ford, "at the time of his rejection, had an opinion that he was unemployable elsewhere at a broad range of jobs." Id. at 715-18. On Heuton’s retaliation claim, the court found that Heuton "barely [went] through the motions to save this count of his petition" but determined that he failed to show "an adverse action taken because of [his] opposition to a prohibited activity[,]" and found no evidence that Ford’s failure to hire him was in any way retaliatory. Id. at 718. The court concluded that Ford’s request for a doctor’s note was neither an adverse employment action nor evidence of hostility. Id. Heuton appeals.

II.

"We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo[,] ... viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may reasonably be drawn." Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2003). The "moving party is entitled to summary judgment if ... there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

A.

We begin with Heuton’s disability-discrimination claim under the MHRA. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(1)(a) (prohibiting an employer from refusing to hire or discriminating against an individual on the basis of disability). We primarily apply Missouri law but may also apply federal employment discrimination law to the extent federal law is "applicable and authoritative under the MHRA." Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co., 171 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Missouri courts follow federal law so long as it is "consistent with Missouri law." Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101.4.

A disability-discrimination claim under the MHRA requires Heuton to show that (1) he has a disability, (2) Ford "took an adverse action against him," and (3) "his disability was a factor in the adverse action." Markham v. Wertin, 861 F.3d 748, 756 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, as a threshold matter, we must determine whether Heuton has a disability.

Under the MHRA, a disability is defined, in relevant part, as "a physical ... impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person’s major life activities," and this definition includes "being regarded as having such an impairment[.]" Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 821 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(4) ).² Heuton does not contend that he has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities. Instead, he alleges that he was not hired because Ford regarded him as having such an impairment. Under such a theory, Heuton "must prove that [Ford] either: (1) wrongly believed that he had an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities or (2) wrongly believed that an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limited one or more major life activities." Id. (citing Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(E) ).

Heuton is considered "substantially limited in performing a major life activity for purposes of the MHRA if he [is] unable to perform or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which he could perform a particular major life activity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "Employment is a ‘major life activity[.]’ " Id. at 821 n.9 (citing Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(C) ). Heuton’s "inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a "substantial limitation on the major life activity of working means that an individual must be significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes ." Id. at 821-22 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1.

Heuton argues that the district court erred in using the broad-range-of-jobs standard discussed in Daugherty because the district court, sua sponte, addressed his disability-discrimination claim as "an impairment from working or gripping" and not as an "actual impairment of an anatomical loss of his left forearm and hand, affecting his musculoskeletal functions." Appellant’s Br. 36. Citing State ex rel. Sir v. Gateway Taxi Management Co., 400 S.W.3d 478 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), Heuton argues that "when the claim is that the applicant’s impairment, other than working , affects employability, the MHRA does not require the applicant to provide evidence of the employer’s perception that the applicant is restricted from performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes." Appellant’s Br. 30 (emphasis added).

Heuton’s reliance on Sir is misplaced. The court in Sir explained that " ‘working’ or ‘employment’ are not the only major life activities that affect employability" because " ‘ambulation’ " is also a major life activity under the MHRA. 400 S.W.3d at 490. The court concluded that "evidence that complainant’s stroke had impeded his ability to ambulate was sufficient evidence that complainant was substantially limited in performing the major life activity of ambulation and was sufficient standing alone to support the finding that complainant was statutorily disabled." Id. However, Heuton does not allege that he is substantially limited in performing the major life activity of ambulation. Nor does he identify a major life activity other than working or employment that would be sufficient, standing alone, to support his claim that he is statutorily disabled under the MHRA. Based on the applicable regulation, the most applicable major life activity in this case is employment. See Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 8, § 60-3.060(1)(C) ("Major life activities means those life activities which affect employability such as communication, ambulation, self-care, socialization, education, vocational training, employment and transportation[.]").

While the ADA protects the loss of the operation of musculoskeletal functions for purposes of a major life...