Higgins v. MetLife Inc.

687 F.Supp.3d 644

Matthew HIGGINS, Plaintiff, v. METLIFE INC., MetLife Group, Inc., and MetLife Investment Management, LLC, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-3714

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Filed August 17, 2023

Laura Carlin Mattiacci, Lauren C. Bateman, Katherine Oeltjen, Console Mattiacci Law, LLC, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Michael Burkhardt, Sean R. Caulfield, Morgan Lewis and Bockius LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WENDY BEETLESTONE, District Judge

Plaintiff Matthew Higgins sued Defendants MetLife, Inc., MetLife Group, Inc., and MetLife Investment Management, LLC after he was terminated from his job with Defendant MetLife Group, Inc. ("MetLife").¹ He brings claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 P.S. § 951 et seq., and Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance ("PFPO"), Phila. Code § 9-1101 et seq.

Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on all counts of Plaintiff's Complaint. For the reasons below, Defendants' motion shall be granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Matthew Higgins was born in 1966. Between roughly 2007 and 2017, he was an employee of non-party Logan Circle Partners. In 2017, Defendants acquired Logan Circle Partners, and Plaintiff thereby became an employee of MetLife.

At MetLife, Plaintiff worked as a research analyst on the Industrials Sector Team within the Credit Research department, which was within MetLife's Public Fixed Income Sub Line of Business ("PFI"). From 2010 or 2011 through his termination in 2021, Plaintiff covered the Aerospace & Defense and Airlines sectors, which fall under the Industrials Sectors Team.

In 2019 and 2020, Jude Driscoll, who was Head of PFI, began taking steps to expand PFI in certain areas. At the same time, Driscoll's manager, Steven Goulart, MetLife's Chief Investment Officer, informed him he needed to rationalize the business organization and cut costs. The Credit Research department was identified as an area for restructuring.

In November 2020, Driscoll prepared a preliminary list of potential positions to select for elimination, which included Plaintiff's position. Ultimately, four employees were terminated, including Plaintiff.

Plaintiff's last work day was December 3, 2020 and his employment was terminated effective March 2, 2021. After he was notified of his termination, Plaintiff raised several allegations to the effect he was being terminated due to his age. These allegations were investigated by MetLife's employee relations department, which did not find that his age discrimination allegations were substantiated.

In April and August 2021, respectively, Plaintiff dual-filed a Complaint and Amended Complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), asserting claims of age discrimination.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A party is entitled to summary judgment if it shows "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the evidential sources must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Peters Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 833 F.2d 32, 34 (3d Cir. 1987).

"A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof." Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505). "The non-moving party may not merely deny the allegations in the moving party's pleadings; instead he must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a material fact." Id. (citation omitted). A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the "nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

In that Plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, rather than direct evidence, of discriminatory animus to support his claims, the burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), applies to his ADEA, PHRA, and PFPO disparate treatment and retaliation claims. Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claims); Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA and PHRA retaliation claims); Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 183, 188 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); Smith v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 2006 WL 1887984, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2006) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to PFPO claims).

The first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework dictates that the plaintiff bears the burden of making out a prima facie case of discrimination. Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Hanafy v. Hill Int'l, Inc., 669 F.Supp.3d 419, 433-34 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2023). "To establish a prima facie case at summary judgment, 'the evidence must be sufficient to convince a reasonable factfinder to find all of the elements of [the] prima facie case.' " Burton, 707 F.3d at 426 (quoting Duffy v. Paper Magic Grp., 265 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis added)). If the plaintiff fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to any element of his prima facie case, summary judgment is warranted. See Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 580 (3d Cir. 1996).

Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to offer a "legitimate non-discriminatory [justification] for the adverse employment action." Burton, 707 F.3d at 426 (citing Smith, 589 F.3d at 690). If the defendant does so, the third step of the framework shifts the burden of production back to the plaintiff to "provide evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably infer that the employer's proffered justification is merely a pretext for discrimination." Id. (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1994)).

To make a showing of pretext, the plaintiff "must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Id. at 427 (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764).

III. DISCUSSION

A. PFPO Administrative Exhaustion

Plaintiff dual-filed administrative complaints with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He did not, however, file a complaint with the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations ("Philadelphia Commission").² On that basis, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to administratively exhaust his Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (PFPO), Phila. Code. § 9-1101, et seq., claims. Defendants further argue that, even if he had exhausted his PFPO claims, they are nonetheless precluded "by virtue of his pursuit of his PHRA claims."

The plain text of the PFPO does not include an administrative exhaustion requirement. See Ahern v. Eresearch Tech., Inc., 183 F. Supp.3d 663, 667-68 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ("The PFPO statute does not explicitly indicate that a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies to bring suit."). Nevertheless, every court to address the question of whether exhaustion is required has concluded that PFPO claims must be administratively exhausted before a party may pursue such claims in court. See, e.g., Hall v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 2000 WL 288245, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2000); Richards v. Foulke Assocs., Inc., 151 F. Supp.2d 610, 616 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Marriott Corp. v. Alexander, 799 A.2d 205, 208 (Pa. Commw. 2002) (relying on Richards); Wright v. Phila. Gas Works, 2001 WL 1169108, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2001) (relying on Richards); Ives v. NHS Hum. Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 4039644, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2016) (relying on Hall, Richards, and Marriott); Vandegrift v. City of Philadelphia, 228 F. Supp.3d 464, 481 & n.150 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (relying on Ives); Hudnell v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc., 537 F. Supp.3d 852, 858-59 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (relying on Richards and Marriott); Bowdren v. Cristo Rey Phila. High Sch., 2023 WL 3362580, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2023) (relying on Richards and Marriott); see also Vazquez v. Carr & Duff, Inc., 2017 WL 4310253, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2017); Rizzotto v. Quad Learning, Inc., 2019 WL 2766588, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2019); Rippy v. Pub. Health Mgmt. Corp., 2020 WL 832088, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2020); Williams v. Carson Concrete Corp., 2021 WL 1546455, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2021).

The rationale underpinning these courts' conclusion that PFPO claims must be exhausted is that, given prior case law determining that PHRA claims must be administratively exhausted, see Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 522 Pa. 86, 559 A.2d 917, 919-20 (1989), allowing PFPO claims to proceed directly to court without administrative exhaustion would...