Hill v. CBAC Gaming LLC, Civil Action No. DKC 19-0695

DR. MICHAEL HILL v. CBAC GAMING LLC d/b/a The Horseshoe Casino Baltimore, et al.

Civil Action No. DKC 19-0695

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

December 11, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil rights case are the motion for entry of default filed by Dr. Michael Hill ("Plaintiff"), (ECF No. 16), and the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Baltimore Police Department ("Defendant BPD"), (ECF No. 19). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion for entry of default will be denied and the motion to dismiss will be denied in part and granted in part.

I. Factual Background

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

This case arises out of a gambling dispute at the Horseshoe Casino Baltimore. The Horseshoe Casino Baltimore is the business name of Defendant CBAC Gaming LLC ("Defendant CBAC Gaming"). Defendant Caesars Baltimore Management Company, LLC ("Defendant Caesars") supervises, manages, and operates casinos throughout the United States, including the Horseshoe Casino Baltimore. Mr. Thomas Cassella ("Defendant Cassella") is the Director of Security and Mr. Jermaine Wright ("Defendant Wright") is the Manager of Security for the Horseshoe Casino Baltimore.

On March 6, 2016, Plaintiff visited the Horseshoe Casino Baltimore. Plaintiff and another individual, Mr. Stephen McLaurin, were pooling their money and placing bets together. When a casino employee ("the dealer") began to pay out the winning bets, one casino patron, an unidentified male, did not receive his winnings. The casino patron complained, and the dealer called for assistance. Another casino employee instructed the dealer to pay the last winning pile, which belonged to Mr. McLaurin and Plaintiff. Mr. McLaurin and Plaintiff divided their winnings and Plaintiff went for refreshments. Plaintiff's share totaled $105.

When Plaintiff returned to the table, an unidentified, uniformed Baltimore Police Department ("BPD") officer ("BPD Officer A") approached Plaintiff and instructed Plaintiff to accompany him to an office.¹ BPD Officer A indicated that his superior, later identified as Defendant Wright, instructed him to take Plaintiff to the office. Plaintiff asked "what he had doneto justify being detained, and [BPD Officer A] directed Plaintiff to go down a hallway into a back room[.]" (ECF No. 3, at 5 ¶ 18).

When Plaintiff reached the designated room, he encountered Defendant Wright and a second, unidentified, uniformed BPD Officer ("BPD Officer B").² Defendant Wright requested identification and Plaintiff produced his passport. Defendant Wright "accused Plaintiff of stealing another player[']s money." (ECF No. 3, at 5 ¶ 22). While Defendant Wright questioned Plaintiff, Plaintiff believed Defendant Wright had the authority to have him arrested based on BPD Officer B's presence and BPD Officer A's identification of Defendant Wright as a superior. Defendant Cassella subsequently entered the room and asked for Plaintiff's version of the events. Defendant Wright, through BPD Officer B, conducted a criminal warrant check on Plaintiff. Defendants Cassella and Wright left the room to review video tape footage, leaving Plaintiff with BPD Officer B. When Defendant Wright returned, he demanded that Plaintiff surrender his winnings and suggested Plaintiff "would have 'problems'" with BPD Officer B if he did not do so. (Id., at 6 ¶ 29). Plaintiff gave Defendant Wright his winnings.

Plaintiff asked to review the video tape footage, but Defendants Cassella and Wright refused his request. Plaintiffasked Defendants Cassella and Wright to accompany him to speak to Mr. McLaurin, but they refused. "Plaintiff was directed to go to a larger public room, that had a receptionist, security guard," and another BPD officer. (ECF No. 3, at 7 ¶ 32). In the larger room, Plaintiff observed "African American[]s being arrested[] by various Caucasian" BPD officers. (Id.).

Defendant Wright brought Plaintiff a letter, barring him from the Horseshoe Casino Baltimore, and asked Plaintiff to sign it. Plaintiff received a receipt for the money he relinquished to Defendant Wright, despite Defendant Wright's initial refusal to provide one. Defendants Cassella and Wright escorted Plaintiff to an exit, followed by two Caucasian BPD officers. While exiting, they encountered Mr. McLaurin. He attempted to explain the incident and asked that Defendant Wright speak to another couple that was present at the table. Defendant Wright continued to escort Plaintiff to the exit and Plaintiff left the building "around 4:50 a.m., without criminal charges, but with" a barring notice. (ECF No. 3, at 8 ¶ 37).

II. Procedural Background

On March 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant CBAC Gaming, LLC, Defendant Caesars, Defendant Cassella, and Defendant Wright (collectively, the "Casino Defendants"). (ECF No. 1). The complaint asserted nine causes of action. That same day, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint to addDefendant BPD as a defendant and to assert three additional causes of action. (ECF No. 3).

III. Motion for Entry of Default

On June 10, 2019, Plaintiff filed the presently pending motion for entry of default. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff contends that Defendant BPD "was served with the [s]ummons and [c]omplaint on May 17, 2019" and failed to file a responsive pleading by the due date - June 7, 2019. (Id., at 1).

On June 12, 2019, Defendant BPD responded to Plaintiff's motion. (ECF No. 18). Defendant BPD contends that Plaintiff's service was deficient because Plaintiff served the summons and complaint by certified mail return receipt requested and not by certified mail requesting restricted delivery, as required for serving local or state governmental organizations under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j)(2) and Md. Rule 2-121(a). (Id., at 1-2 ¶¶ 2-9). Defendant BPD elaborates that Plaintiff did not seek "a waiver of service[.]" (Id., at 2 ¶ 10). Nonetheless, Defendant BPD waived service and filed its motion to dismiss. (Id., at 2).

Plaintiff did not reply to Defendant BPD's response. The motion for entry of default will be denied. The court need not address Defendant BPD's argument regarding effectuation of service because Plaintiff seemingly concedes it. Moreover, even if Plaintiff did effectuate service properly, Defendant BPD filed its motion to dismiss only five days after the initial due date andthere is a "strong policy that cases be decided on their merits[]" within the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4^th Cir. 1993).

IV. Motion to Dismiss

On June 12, 2019, Defendant BPD filed the presently pending motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff filed a response, (ECF No. 35), and Defendant BPD replied, (ECF No. 36).

A. Standards of Review

Defendant BPD seeks dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), or alternatively, for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) should be granted "only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4^th Cir. 1991). In the context of such a motion, courts should "regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue," and "may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4^th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac, 945 F.2d at 768-69.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4^th Cir. 2006). In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal allegations need not be accepted. Revene v. Charles Cty. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4^th Cir. 1989). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events. United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4^th Cir. 1979); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4^th Cir. 2009). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Thus, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

"In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court will consider the facts stated in the complaint and the documents attached to the complaint." Abadian v. Lee, 117 F.Supp.2d 481, 485 (D.Md. 2000). The court may also consider documents referred to in the complaint and relied upon by plaintiff in bringing the action." Id. (citing Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 989 F.Supp. 748,749 (D.Md. 1997), aff'd, 151 F.3d 180 (4^th Cir. 1998)). When doing so, the court need not convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment so long as it does not consider matters "outside the pleadings." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) ("If, on a [12(b)(6) motion to dismiss], matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56."); Laughlin v. Metro. Washington Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61 (4^th Cir. 1998) (citing Rule 12(d)); Luy v. Balt. Police Dep't, 326 F.Supp.2d 682, 688 (D.Md. 2004) ("The court may consider a document submitted...