Hill v. FCI Mcdowell Warden

1

JOHN FARELIN HILL, Petitioner, v. FCI MCDOWELL WARDEN, Respondent.

No. 1:22-cv-00176

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Bluefield Division

December 5, 2024

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CHERYAL A. EIFERT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Petitioner John Farelin Hill's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241. (ECF No. 2). Respondent filed a response to the petition requesting that it be dismissed. (ECF No. 9). This case is assigned to the Honorable David A. Faber, United States District Judge, and was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge by Standing Order for submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition (“PF & R”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241 be DENIED; Respondent's request for dismissal be GRANTED; and this action be DISMISSED and removed from the docket of the Court.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 29, 2016, Hill pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan to one count of being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). United States v. Hill, No. 1:16-cr-121 (W.D. Mich., July 29, 2016), ECF No. 14. The underlying felony which made Hill subject to §922(g) was a conviction for second-degree murder, for which he spent twenty years in prison. Id., ECF No. 34 at 19. His guilty plea for the felon-inpossession charge included a waiver of his right to appeal or collaterally attack his conviction, except in the following circumstances: his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum; his sentence was based on an unconstitutional factor (race, religion, national origin, or gender); the District Court incorrectly determined the sentencing guideline range; the sentence was an unreasonable upward departure from the guidelines; his guilty plea was involuntary or unknowing; or his counsel provided ineffective assistance. Id., ECF No. 14 at 7. On December 7, 2016, Hill was sentenced to a 96-month term of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. (Id., ECF No. 28). Hill did not file a direct appeal or a timely motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Hill previously filed a §2241 petition in this District, raising the same issue he raises here; that his conviction should be overturned in accordance with Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019). In Rehaif, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §922(g), the government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he was a member of a relevant category of persons barred from possessing firearms. Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2200. Ruling on Hill's petition, this Court found that Hill could not challenge his conviction through §2241 because he was challenging the underlying conviction, not the execution of his sentence, and he did not meet the requirements of the savings clause found at 28 U.S.C. §2255(e). Hill v. Warden, No. 1:20-cv-00404, 2021 WL 5238210, at *3 (S.D. W.Va., Jan. 25, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4443068, (S.D. W.Va., Sept. 28, 2021). The Court dismissed the §2241 petition and declined to transfer the petition to the convicting court as a §2255 petition. Id.

In his instant petition, Hill repeats the same arguments as in his first petition. He asserts that his conviction should be overturned in accordance with Rehaif and that his petition is proper in a §2241 action because §2255 does not provide an adequate remedy. (ECF Nos. 2, 11). This second petition only differs from the first in that Hill cites a recent case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (“Sixth Circuit”), Conley v. United States, for the proposition that the savings clause applies and he can attack his conviction through §2241. (ECF Nos. 2, 11). In his response, Respondent argues that Hill's motion is a §2255 motion in disguise and does not meet the requirements of the savings clause. Respondent asks this Court to either dismiss Hill's petition or construe it as a §2255 petition and transfer the action to the Western District of Michigan. (ECF No. 9 at 4-7).

II. Standard of Review

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the exclusive remedy for challenging the validity of a federal conviction. See In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997). Although § 2241 provides a general grant of habeas corpus authority, the remedy under § 2241 is not an additional, alternative, or supplemental remedy to that prescribed under § 2255. To the contrary, “[i]t is only when ‘§ 2255 proves inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of detention,' that a federal prisoner may pursue habeas relief under § 2241.” Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that in “a limited number of circumstances,” § 2255 is inadequate to test the legality of the prisoner's detention, and accordingly, the prisoner may file a habeas petition under § 2241). The “savings clause,” found at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), occasionally allows a § 2241 petition to take the place of a § 2255 motion, but not “merely ... because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a Section 2255 motion,” In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194, nor simply because relief is unavailable due to the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255. Young v. Conley, 128 F.Supp.2d 354, 357 (S.D. W.Va. 2001). Rather, in the context of a challenge to the validity of a conviction, the savings clause creates a narrow opening for a petitioner to file a § 2241 petition when his claim contains all three of the following characteristics: (1) at the time of his conviction, the settled law of the circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of his conviction; (2) subsequent to his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which he was convicted is now deemed not to be criminal; and (3) he cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of constitutional law. In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that a §2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective by satisfying the In re Jones criteria. See Hayes v. Ziegler, No. 5:11-cv-00261, 2014 WL 670850 (S.D. W.Va., Feb. 20, 2014), aff'd, 573 Fed.Appx. 268 (4th Cir. 2014). The Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain § 2241 petitions that do not meet the savings clause requirements, and therefore dismissal on that basis is without prejudice. Moore v. Young, No. 22-6336, 2022 WL 2951749, at *1 (4th Cir. July 26, 2022).

III. Discussion

Hill's petition should be dismissed for two reasons discussed herein: 1) his petition is a challenge to his conviction which does not satisfy the requirements of the savings clause, §2255(e); and 2) his petition is a successive §2241 petition, giving this court discretion to dismiss it under 28 U.S.C. §2244(a).

A. Savings Clause

Hill's petition cannot satisfy the requirements of the savings clause and, as such, must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. When evaluating a habeas petition under the savings clause, the court applies the substantive law of the circuit in which the petitioner was convicted, and the procedural law of the circuit in which the petitioner is incarcerated. Hahn v. Moseley, 931 F.3d 295, 301 (4th Cir. 2019). Hill was convicted in Michigan and is housed in West Virginia; therefore, the substantive law of the Sixth Circuit and the procedural law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (“Fourth Circuit”) are applied.

The fact that a prisoner is procedurally barred from bringing a §2255 motion is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the savings clause, Young v. Conley, 128 F.Supp.2d 354, 357 (S.D. W.Va. 2001), as that would defeat the purpose of §2255's gatekeeping provisions. As stated above, a petition collaterally challenging a conviction falls within the savings clause if it satisfies all three requirements laid out by the Fourth Circuit in In re Jones, and the petitioner bears the burden of proving his petition meets those requirements. Hood v. United States, 13 Fed.Appx. 72 (4th Cir. 2001); McGee v. Hanberry, 604 F.2d 9, 10 (5th Cir. 1979). Respondent does not contest that Hill's petition satisfies the first and third requirements of Jones, but claims that the petition fails the second requirement, because there was not a change in substantive law that made Hill's conduct non-criminal. (ECF No. 9 at 3). The undersigned agrees with Respondent.

Hill has not met the second prong of the savings clause because Rehaif did not decriminalize the act of being a felon in possession of a firearm, as noted by courts in both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, which have examined this question at different levels of generality. Some of the district courts in these circuits have determined that, because being a felon in possession of a firearm remained a crime after Rehaif, Rehaif did not alter the substantive law, and so a Rehaif challenge could never satisfy the savings clause-meaning, a Rehaif claim could never be brought in a § 2241 petition. See Sandlain v. Warden, FCI McDowell, No. 1:20-00424, 2022 WL 4490188, at *3 (S.D. W.Va., Sept. 27, 2022) (“[Plaintiff] cannot satisfy the second prong of the savings clause test because [] being a felon in possession of a firearm is still a valid criminal offense.”); Hall v. Hudgins, No.: 3:19-CV-134, 2022 WL 313771, at *3 (N.D. W.Va., Feb. 2, 2022) (reasoning that Rehaif was...