Hill v. Governor of Commonwealth

309 A.3d 238

Dwayne HILL, Petitioner

v.GOVERNOR OF the COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania’s Board of Probation and Parole, Respondents

No. 311 M.D. 2022

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs December 4, 2023

Decided January 23, 2024

Original Jurisdiction

Dwayne Hill, Petitioner, Pro Se.

Karen M. Romano, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Harrisburg, for Respondent.

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge, HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge, HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER

Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections (PCs) of the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board)¹ (collectively, Respondents), to the petition for review in the nature of a complaint titled "Complaint in Equity" (Peti- tion) filed by Dwayne Hill (Petitioner), a pro se inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Phoenix and serving a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) for second degree murder.² Although Petitioner admittedly was 20 years old when he committed this crime, he avers in his Petition that he should have been viewed as a juvenile for whom the United States Supreme Court has deemed a LWOP sentence unconstitutional. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). He also claims that Section 6137(a)(1) of the Prisons and Parole Code (the Code) providing, in pertinent part, that "[t]he [B]oard may parole … any offender to whom the power to parole is granted to the [B]oard …, except an offender condemned to death or serving life imprisonment[,]" 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1), is unconstitutional. Petitioner further reasons that when he was sentenced to LWOP, he received an implied minimum sentence of one day of confinement and asks this Court to direct the Board to review him for parole. In their POs, Respondents allege lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, improper parties, and failure to exhaust a statutory remedy, and assert a demurrer.³ Upon our review, we sustain Respondents’ POs asserting this Court’s lack of jurisdiction and dismiss the Petition.

I. PETITION

The pertinent facts as asserted in the Petition are as follows. In October 1991, a jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder and related charges for which Petitioner was sentenced to LWOP on the second degree murder conviction along with concurrent sentences on the related charges. (Petition ¶¶ 5-7.) Petitioner maintains that Section 6137 of the Code is unconstitutional as violating his right to equal protection,⁴ to due process,⁵ to be protected from cruel and unusual punishments,⁶ and to protection under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165.⁷ In reliance on the , United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, wherein the Supreme Court held that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders," 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, Petitioner reasons that his sentence does not "bar him from review" as he had just turned 20 years old at the time of his arrest. (Petition ¶¶ 8-11, 15.) Petitioner, states his history of mental and emotional disorders, low intelligence quotient, and scientific research showing one’s brain continues to develop through early adulthood, qualify him as a "child" under a "strict … reading of the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act" (Juvenile Act)⁸ because he was under the age of 21when he was convicted of second degree murder and had committed a delinquent act before he was 18 years old. Petitioner contends that considering him a "child" under the Juvenile Act would further the Commonwealth’s goal of reforming and rehabilitating offenders and would be in line with other states wherein a sentence of LWOP is not imposed on those convicted of second degree murder. (Id. ¶¶ 15-19.) Petitioner also argues that, in light of Commonwealth v. Ulbrick, 462 Pa. 257, 341 A.2d 68 (1975) (per curiam), holding that an inmate had a presumed minimum sentence of one day of confinement where the sentencing court imposed a "flat sentence" of 20 years but failed to include a minimum sentence as required by law, id. at 69, "[b]ecause the [] sentencing [c]ourt failed to impose a minimum sentence, there should have been an implied minimum sentence of [one] day, making [Petitioner] eligible for parole as well." (Petition ¶ 13.) Petitioner asks this Court to hold that Section 6137 of the Code is unconstitutional and to declare that he is eligible for consideration for parole by the Board. (Petition, Wherefore Clause.)

II. POs

Respondents filed their POs asking this Court to dismiss the Petition with preju- dice, or in the alternative transfer it to common pleas, asserting this Court "lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s collateral attack on his sentence for murder via a strained argument about the constitutionality of 61 Pa.[C.S.] i 6137." (POs ¶ 5.) Respondents maintain Petitioner’s claims sound in the nature of an application for post-conviction relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),⁹ over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. See Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i) (excluding from this Court’s original jurisdiction "actions or proceedings in the nature of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief not ancillary to proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of the [C]ourt"). (POs ¶¶ 5-11.) In addition, Respondents argue the claims brought against them in the Petition should be dismissed, as they are not proper parties to the Petition because Petitioner presents a direct challenge to his LWOP sentence and alleges no adverse actions on the part of Respondents, (Id. ¶¶ 12-16.) Also, Respondents allege that Petitioner, who challenges the constitutionality of a LWOP sentence, for second degree murder under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b), failed to exhaust his statutory remedies under the PCRA, which is the sole means through which an individual convicted of a crime may seek collateral relief. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.) Finally, Respondents posit that even if this Court was to reach the merits of Petitioner’s claims, Petitioner has not stated a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, as the United States Supreme Court determined a sentence of LWOP does not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment for an adult offender. (Id. ¶¶ 20-22.) Respondents also point out that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently rejected a claim that "the General Assembly intended for second degree murder convictions to be parole eligible." (Id. ¶ 23 (citing Hudson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 651 Pa. 308, 204 A.3d 392 (2019)).)

III. DISCUSSION

[1–5] Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1516(b) authorizes the filing of POs to an original jurisdiction petition for review in this Court. Pa.R.A.P. 1516(b). In ruling on Respondents’ POs, we are mindful that

[this Court] must accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations in the [Petition], as well as all inferences reasonably deduced therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain [POs], it must appear with certainty that the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain them. A [PO] in the nature of a demurrer admits every well-pleaded fact in the [Petition] and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to the [Petition].

McNew v. East Marlborough Township, 295 A.3d 1, 8-9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (citations omitted).

A. Objection for Lack of Jurisdiction

In their first PO, Respondents contend this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Petition. In support of this contention, Respondents cite Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code which states, in pertinent part:

a) General rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, except:

(i) actions or proceedings in the nature of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief not ancillary to proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of the [C]ourt[.]¹⁰

42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i) (second emphasis added). The PCRA grants jurisdiction to the courts of common pleas over "action[s] by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief." Section 9542 of the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Moreover, the PCRA is "the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that existed] when [the PCRA took] effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis." Id. (emphasis added). In determining whether the Petition presents claims "in the nature of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief," 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i), not within our original jurisdiction, we are guided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which has explained that

the starting point for determining the "nature" of a given claim requires an examination of what effect the requested relief would have in light of the legal theories offered in support. In short, if the necessary consequence of granting relief based on the supplied arguments is that the conviction or sentence is undone or otherwise modified, then the claim is in the "nature of …a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief[.]"

Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, — Pa. —, 284 A.3d 178, 189 (2022) (Scott II) (emphasis...