Hill v. Haynes

DEMETRIUS HILL, Plaintiff, v. AL HAYNES, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:06-CV-136

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA MARTINSBURG

August 22, 2014

(JUDGE GROH)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On this day, the above-styled matter came before the Court for consideration of the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") of United States Magistrate Judge John S. Kaull. Previously, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded this case "for a determination whether the grievance procedure was 'available' to Hill within the meaning of [42 U.S.C.] § 1997e(a) so he could administratively exhaust his claim." Hill v. Haynes, 380 F. App'x 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2010). As such, the Court referred this matter to Magistrate Judge Kaull for submission of an R&R. In the R&R, he recommends granting the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment [Doc. 38] because the grievance procedure was available to Hill and Hill did not exhaust his claims.

I. Background

On December 15, 2006, Hill filed a Bivens civil rights complaint concerning his incarceration at USP Hazelton.¹ On April 2, 2007, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, arguing that Hill failed to exhaust hisadministrative remedies as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). On November 29, 2007, Magistrate Judge Kaull filed an R&R recommending that the Court deny this motion.

On March 5, 2008, this Court declined to adopt the R&R and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Hill appealed this decision to the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit found Hill had shown genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Defendants prevented him from exhausting administrative remedies. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit remanded this case "for a determination whether the grievance procedure was 'available' to Hill within the meaning of § 1997e(a) so he could administratively exhaust his claim." Id.

The Court then re-referred this matter to Magistrate Judge Kaull. After several continuances, Magistrate Judge Kaull conducted an evidentiary hearing over three days. On September 5, 2012, he entered his R&R recommending that the Court grant the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

On November 9, 2012, the Court adopted the R&R and dismissed the complaint because Hill had not filed objections. On December 7, 2012, Hill filed a motion for reconsideration, averring that he prepared a motion for extension of time but delays in the prison mail system caused it to reach the Court late. The Court granted this motion on December 17, 2012. The Court thereafter continued the objections deadline several times at Hill's request, ultimately setting an objections deadline of October 15, 2013. Hill timely filed his objections. The Defendants then moved to extend the response deadline. TheCourt granted this motion.² Hill then filed a reply and a surreply [Doc. 226].³

II. Standards of Review

1. R&R

This Court must make a de novo review of those portions of the magistrate judge's findings to which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of de novo review and the right to appeal this Court's Order. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984). Thus, the Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which Hill objects and the remainder of the R&R for clear error.

2. Motion to Dismiss

To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain "'detailed factual allegations,'" it must contain "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions'or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancements.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Twombly's plausibility standard applies to pro se complaints, Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008), but a court must construe such a complaint liberally. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

Additionally, when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must assume that the complaint's well-pleaded allegations are true, resolve all doubts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and view the allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). Only factual allegations receive the presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. A court may also consider facts derived from sources beyond the complaint, including documents attached to the complaint, documents attached to the motion to dismiss "so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic," and facts subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

3. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, a court determines "whether there is the need for a trial- whether, in other words,there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250.

The party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That is, once the movant has met its burden to show an absence of material fact, the non-moving party must come forward with affidavits or other evidence demonstrating there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-25; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted). A court should deny summary judgment "if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom, or if reasonable men might reach different conclusions." Phoenix Sav. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 381 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 1967); see also id. at 253 (noting "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge"). Additionally, in this case, "[b]ecause the prison employees bear the burden of exhaustion . . . , they must show that the evidence is so onesided that no reasonable factfinder could find that Hill was prevented from exhausting his administrative remedies." Hill, 380 F. App'x at 270 (citations omitted).

III. Discussion

Magistrate Judge Kaull recommends dismissing the complaint because the grievance procedure was available to Hill and Hill did not administratively exhaust his claims. Hill objects to this recommendation on three grounds.

1. Objection that Magistrate Judge Kaull Made Factual Determinations that Are a Jury Function and the Fourth Circuit Decision Requires a Trial

Hill first objects that Magistrate Judge Kaull made factual determinations that are a jury function. In that same vein, he also argues that he is entitled to a trial because the Fourth Circuit found genuine issues of material fact concerning the availability of administrative remedies.

The circuit courts of appeals have uniformly found that a judge can resolve factual disputes concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining judges should decide factual disputes concerning exhaustion); Messa v. Goord, 652 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding no right to a jury trial concerning PLRA exhaustion); Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 785 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that resolving whether a prisoner administratively exhausted his claims required judgment of the court); Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding "judges may resolve factual disputes concerning exhaustion" as "it is a threshold issue that courts must address to determine whether litigation is being conducted in the right forum at the right time"); Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 & n.15 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding court may decide factual disputes concerning PLRA exhaustion and finding no right to a jury trial on the issue); Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (setting forth a framework for cases where parties contest PLRA exhaustion that requires the court to hold a hearing and decide the issue). Consistent with this principle, the Fourth Circuit remanded this case for the Court to determine whether the grievance procedure was available to Hill. The Fourth Circuit did not hold that he was entitled to a jury trial on this issue. Indeed, allowing a jury to decide factual disputes overexhaustion would undermine the...