Hill v. Huddleston

1

ROBERT A. HILL, a married man, his sole as his sole and separate property, Respondent, v. MICHAEL EUGENE HUDDLESTON and SARAH HUDDLESTON, husband and wife, and the marital community thereof composed, and ALL OTHER UNKNOWN OCCUPANTS, Appellants.

No. 56811-0-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2

November 7, 2023

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Price J.

This is a case about a residential eviction. Robert Hill issued a 20-day notice terminating tenancy to Michael and Sarah Huddleston (the Huddlestons). Hill made several allegations including that Michael Huddleston (Huddleston) drove erratically late at night, law enforcement was repeatedly called to the residence in connection with domestic violence matters, and 60 to 80 inoperable cars were on the property without Hill's permission.

After Hill filed an unlawful detainer complaint and moved to show cause for a writ of restitution, Huddleston answered.^[1] Huddleston contested the factual allegations made in the complaint, raised two affirmative defenses, and asked for dismissal. After a show cause hearing, the superior court determined Huddleston's use of the property constituted a nuisance and issued a writ of restitution.

Huddleston appeals. Huddleston makes numerous arguments but essentially contends that Hill's notice terminating the tenancy was deficient and Hill failed to plead sufficient facts to be entitled to the writ on the basis of a nuisance. Huddleston also requests attorney fees and costs.

We reject Huddleston's arguments and affirm.

FACTS

I. Background

The Huddlestons began renting a home from Hill in October 2018 for $1,200 a month. There was no written rental agreement between the parties.

About three years later, Hill alleged problems with the tenancy. He issued a 20-day notice terminating the tenancy in September 2021. The notice alleged a "significant and immediate risk to the health, safety and property of other tenants on the premises" and cited several different legal authorities, specifically "RCW 43.06.220(1)(h), RCW 59.18 and Governor Inslee's Bridge Proclamation." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 5. Hill also attached his sworn affidavit to the notice, which alleged:

3. There have been a number of incidents in it has been reported that Mike Huddleston has driven erratically at night, endangering nearby residents. These incidents have caused continuous fear to the nearby residents and has endangered their safety and the safety of their personal property.

4. Law enforcement has been called to the residence a number of times in connection with domestic violence matters.

. . . .

6. Mike and Sara Huddleston have allowed or have agreed to allow storage of some 60 to 80 inoperable vehicles, without my permission and consent.

CP at 6.

Less than two months later, Hill filed a complaint for unlawful detainer alleging that Huddleston had not vacated the premises after being served with the 20-day notice. Hill's unlawful detainer complaint pleaded that the 20-day notice terminating the tenancy was

based on Defendants reckless and erratic driving in the neighborhood, endangering nearby residents, as well as a number of calls to the residence by local law enforcement for incidents involving domestic violence matters . . . .

CP at 3. The 20-day notice and affidavit were attached to the complaint, but the complaint did not repeat the allegation of 60 to 80 inoperable cars contained in the notice.

With the filing of his complaint, Hill moved for an order to show cause as to why a writ of restitution should not immediately be issued. Hill's declaration attached to his show cause motion repeated the allegations of domestic violence and Huddleston driving erratically through the neighborhood. But like his unlawful detainer complaint, the declaration omitted the allegation of the 60 to 80 inoperable vehicles on the property. Once again, however, a copy of the 20-day notice and affidavit containing that allegation was attached to the show cause motion.

Huddleston appearing through an attorney, answered the complaint and filed a motion to dismiss. Huddleston's answer denied the complaint's allegations of erratic driving and domestic violence. Huddleston filed his own declaration, which stated in relevant part,

3. I do not know where the allegations regarding reckless driving in the neighborhood in Mr. Hill's affidavit are coming from. I do not drive erratically or in a reckless way.

4. I do not know where the "domestic violence" allegations of Mr. Hill come from. I have not been arrested since 2018.

CP at 59. Huddleston's answer also raised two affirmative defenses. First, Huddleston alleged that Hill's 20-day notice failed to comply with any of the reasons specified in RCW 59.18.650- the statute that prohibits the termination of a tenancy unless there is cause to do so as defined in the statute. And second, Huddleston alleged that the 20-day notice failed to make allegations with enough specificity to enable him to respond and prepare a defense to the incidents alleged as required by RCW 59.18.650(6)(b).

II. Show Cause Hearing

The case proceeded to a show cause hearing.^[2] At the hearing, the superior court heard argument from the parties, including allegations about the junk cars. Hill argued that there was a "junk yard of derelict cars and automobile hulls to the tune of 50, 60, 70, I don't know the precise number." Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 5. Hill also argued that Huddleston had failed to refute his allegations. Hill contended there needed to be some specific and articulable allegations of fact rebutting his allegations of erratic driving and domestic violence. Hill also emphasized that the presence of junk cars was inconsistent with a residential neighborhood and Huddleston had failed to contest those allegations as well.

Huddleston's response focused on his two affirmative defenses. First, he argued that Hill's notice failed to comply with any bases for 20-day notices allowed under RCW 59.18.650. Huddleston further contended that the other authorities cited in Hill's 20-day notice, including the governor's Bridge Proclamation, did not allow for any new types of notices to be issued, but merely gave tenants protections from eviction based on the failure to pay rent.

Second, Huddleston contended that Hill's 20-day notice failed to comply with RCW 59.18.650(6)(b)'s requirement to allege specific facts in sufficient detail to permit Huddleston to respond. With respect to the erratic driving and domestic violence allegations, Huddleston argued that there were no details about precisely when or where the incidents occurred. And with respect to Hill's allegation of inoperable vehicles, Huddleston also argued the details were lacking and, in addition, he did not know that having inoperable cars on the property was "un-allowed activity" because there was no evidence that the inoperable cars were prohibited by the terms of a rental agreement.^[3] VRP at 12.

Huddleston requested that the superior court not issue the writ of restitution and dismiss Hill's unlawful detainer complaint. However, in the event that the superior court did not dismiss, Huddleston requested that the superior court set the matter for trial due to the existence of material issues of fact. Absent from Huddleston's argument was any mention of the failure of the complaint to plead nuisance or the issue of inoperable cars.

In rebuttal, Hill argued that Huddleston's response was essentially a concession of the existence of the junk cars:

[N]othing is said about the junk yard that surrounds and is part of the . . . residential premises the house now occupies. And from that, I'm thinking that even the -- even Counsel's Answer is to say that the junk yard still continues. I don't know the number of automobiles. I suspect that they come and go and there's no definite number, but it's being used as a junk yard.

VRP at 14. Hill concluded by arguing that the things about which he was complaining were "factors and matters that are within the ordinary compass of the [c]ourt to say that these are unacceptable nuisances." VRP at 17. Hill also stated that they had been served with notice from the county that there would be a daily assessment of a fine if the junkyard was not repaired or removed.

The superior court indicated that it would review the statute again and issue its decision. III. Superior Court's Orders and Huddlestons' Appeal

Later that day, the superior court issued its decision granting Hill a writ of restitution based on the existence of a nuisance. The superior court's order, entitled Order on Show Cause for Writ of Restitution, stated,

1. The Defendant was properly served a 20 day "Notice Terminating Tenancy" on September 29, 2021.

2. The affidavit of landlord in support of the notice terminating tenancy listed several nuisance violations: erratic driving at night endangering nearby residents, incidents of domestic violence resulting in law enforcement response, and the presence of 60 to 80 inoperable vehicles.

3. Pursuant to RCW 59.18.650(2)(c) at least a 3-day notice is required for eviction based on waste or nuisance.

4. Pacific County Board of Health Ordinance 9 Section 1(1.6) defines Public Nuisance to include: "To cause, permit, or allow the presence in the open, as opposed to an enclosed building, of any abandoned or discarded objects or equipment, such as automobiles . . . ."

5. The Defendant Michael Huddleston filed a declaration in which he defies several of the above allegations but makes no response to the presence of 60 to 80 inoperable cars on the property.

6. There is no right to cure a nuisance to avoid an eviction in Washington State. See Burgess v. Crossan, 189 Wn.App. 97, 358 P.3d 416 (2015).

CP at 61-62 (alteration in original).

In a separate...