Hilliard v. Twin Falls Cnty. Sheriff's Office

BRENT E. HILLIARD, an individual, Plaintiff, v. TWIN FALLS COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, a Public Entity, and TWIN FALLS COUNTY, a Public Corporation, Defendants.

No. 1:18-cv-00550-CWD

United States District Court, D. Idaho

October 14, 2021

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

HONORABLE CANDY W. DALE, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate Trial Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, Defendants' Motions in Limine, and Plaintiff's Motion to Supplement Discovery. (Dkt. 64, 68, 69, 71-77, and 88.) The parties filed responsive briefing and the motions are at issue. On October 13, 2021, the parties presented oral argument on the pending motions. This written order formalizes the Court's ruling on the various topics raised in the motions and as stated on the record during the hearing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Brent E. Hilliard filed a complaint on December 11, 2018 against his former employer, Twin Falls County Sheriff's Office and Twin Falls County, raising claims of employment discrimination. (Dkt. 1, 13.)^[1] Following decisions on Defendants' motion to dismiss and the parties' respective summary judgment motions, the claims proceeding to trial are: 1) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA); and 2) negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). (Dkt. 12, 56.)^[2] A jury trial is set to commence on November 1, 2021.

DISCUSSION

1. Motion to Bifurcate Trial

A. Standard of Law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) permits district courts to bifurcate trials “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” “It is clear that Rule 42(b) gives the courts the authority to separate trials into liability and damages phases.” Estate of Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592, 601 (9th Cir. 2016) (alteration omitted) (quoting De Anda v. City of Long Beach, 7 F.3d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1993)). The Court has broad discretion in determining whether to bifurcate a trial.

B. Analysis

Plaintiff moves to bifurcate the trial to separate the presentation of evidence regarding the liability determination from the causation and damages determinations. (Dkt. 64.) Plaintiff argues bifurcation would avoid undue prejudice, expedite and economize the proceeding, and avoid confusion. Plaintiff contends the only evidence relevant to the liability phase is the evidence that was actually available to Defendants and that they actually relied upon at the time they made the alleged adverse employment decisions. Namely, the intentional acts of discrimination that Plaintiff alleges occurred between June 6, 2017 and the early afternoon of September 7, 2017. Thus, Plaintiff asserts bifurcation would expedite and simplify the trial by limiting the first liability phase to the evidence and witnesses relevant to determining liability, if any, based on disability discrimination.

Plaintiff contends that evidence of his mental breakdown and DUI arrest during the evening of September 7, 2017, is highly prejudicial and relevant only to causation and damages. Thus, Plaintiff argues evidence of the mental breakdown and DUI arrest should be considered separately from the evidence relevant to the liability determination to avoid undue prejudice.

Defendants oppose bifurcation, arguing the evidence of Plaintiff's mental breakdown and DUI arrest are relevant to whether Plaintiff was a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions of his position, their affirmative defenses to the ADA and IHRA claims, and to the NIED claim. (Dkt. 66.) Further, Defendants maintain that bifurcation would result in duplication of witnesses and evidence, and waste judicial resources.

For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion to bifurcate. However, the Court will limit the scope and extent to which the evidence of Plaintiff's mental breakdown and DUI arrest on September 7, 2017, can be used during trial.

Plaintiff has put the September 7, 2017, mental breakdown and DUI arrest directly at issue in this case. The Amended Complaint contains allegations that Plaintiff is actually disabled by his physical and mental impairments - including his depression, PTSD, and mood disorder. (Dkt. 13.) In briefing on the motion to reconsider and the motion to bifurcate, Plaintiff has asserted that Defendants engaged in a “campaign of intentional discrimination” beginning June 6, 2017, that resulted in Plaintiff's mental breakdown on September 7, 2017. (Dkt. 61 at 6) (Dkt. 64 at 3.) Indeed, Plaintiff argued in his reply brief on the motion to bifurcate that Defendants' discriminatory actions were so “pervasive and open” that it “nearly caused him to take his own life.” (Dkt. 67 at 9.)

Similarly, on the present motions in limine, Plaintiff argues evidence of his medical conditions, including his mental health, is relevant and admissible to prove he was actually disabled, Defendants' discriminatory motivation, and the foreseeability of Hilliard's mental health crisis after receiving a text from Newman on September 7, 2017. (Dkt. 81.) Thus, the evidence and events surrounding Plaintiff's mental breakdown and DUI arrest are inexplicably intertwined with and make up part of Plaintiff's claims under the ADA, IHRA, and NIED. Plaintiff cannot cut off the presentation of evidence of Plaintiff's mental breakdown and DUI arrest as too prejudicial for some purposes, but not others.

Given the nature of the claims, the particular facts of this case, and the contentions made by Plaintiff, the Court finds bifurcation is not appropriate and not necessary to address the prejudicial versus probative value of the evidence related to Plaintiff's mental breakdown and DUI arrest. Plaintiff's argument during the hearing that the mental breakdown and DUI arrest have no probative value to determining liability, a.k.a., duty and breach, improperly compartmentalizes certain elements of Plaintiff's prima facie case to the exclusion of other elements, solely for the purpose of avoiding evidence Plaintiff believes is unfavorable to his claims.

As discussed above, however, the evidence of Plaintiff's mental breakdown and DUI arrest is directly relevant to Plaintiff's claims, in particular the NIED claim. Further, the evidence is necessary context to present a complete picture of the events at issue to the jury. Without this evidence, the jury would likely speculate improperly about Hilliard's departure from the Twin Falls County Sheriff's Office.^[3] Plaintiff's primary reason for requesting bifurcation is his concern regarding the potential prejudicial nature of the evidence of the mental breakdown and DUI arrest. While the evidence is undoubtedly emotionally charged, it is not unlike evidence presented in any other case involving a claim of emotional distress where a party engaged in ill-advised conduct allegedly as a result of the unfair treatment received. Any prejudice that may result will be addressed by a limiting instruction, if necessary.

Furthermore, the Court will limit the scope and extent to which the evidence of the mental breakdown and DUI arrest may be used during trial. Specifically, Defendants will not be allowed to argue that the mental breakdown and/or the DUI arrest disproves the second and third elements of Hilliard's ADA and IHRA claims.

The evidence is not relevant to disproving the second element of Plaintiff's prima facie case -- whether Plaintiff was a qualified individual under the ADA and IHRA. The ADA defines a “qualified individual” as “an individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position such person holds or desires, ” 29 C.F.R. § 1630(m), and “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see id.

An employee asserting an ADA claim must show he or she was qualified for the position at the time of the adverse employment action, rather than some earlier or later time. See Anthony v. Trax Int'l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)). Thus, evidence of Plaintiff's mental breakdown and DUI arrest that occurred after the discriminatory acts alleged in the ADA and IHRA claims is not relevant to whether Hilliard was a qualified individual at the time of the alleged adverse employment actions -- Defendants' failure to allow Plaintiff to return to work light duty and interference with the fitness for duty evaluations.

As to the third element, Defendants cannot avoid liability by using after-acquired evidence to establish a legitimate non-discriminatory justification or motivation for the alleged adverse employment actions. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995) (“The employer could not have been motivated by knowledge it did not have and it cannot now claim that the employee was fired for the nondiscriminatory reason.”); Anthony 955 F.3d at 1130-31. Thus, Defendants cannot rely on Plaintiff's mental breakdown and the DUI arrest to contest the third element of Plaintiff's prima facie case under the ADA and IHRA - that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of his disability. That is to say, Defendants cannot argue Plaintiff's mental breakdown and DUI arrest on September 7, 2017, were a legitimate basis for any of the alleged adverse employment actions that preceded the DUI. Just as Plaintiff has been precluded by prior rulings from asserting claims that his termination was unlawful, Defendants likewise cannot argue the lawful termination of Plaintiff's employment absolves Defendants of liability...