Hillman v. Austin

1

TORI A. HILLMAN, Plaintiff, v. LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III,^[1] Secretary of Department of Defense, Defendant.

No. 2:20-cv-03225-DCN-MGB

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division

September 27, 2022

ORDER

DAVID C. NORTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter is before the court on Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker's report and recommendation (“R&R”), ECF No. 77, that the court grant defendant Lloyd J. Austin, III's (the “Secretary”) motion for summary judgment, ECF No 69. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts the R&R and grants the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter arises out of alleged race-based discrimination retaliation, and creation of a hostile work environment. On September 26, 2011, plaintiff Tori A. Hillman (“Hillman”) began working for the Defense Commissary Agency (“DeCA”) at the Naval Weapons Station in Charleston, South Carolina. Hillman was a store worker at the Naval Weapons Stations until she resigned on July 13, 2018. During the relevant period, Hillman primarily reported to two individuals: Sandra Flynn (“Flynn”), a grocery manager and Hillman's first-level supervisor, and Earlene Mills (“Mills”), an assistant store manager and her second-level supervisor. ECF No. 72-5, Hillman Decl. at 3.

Hillman-who is a white female-claims that during her employment, Mills-who is black-discriminated and retaliated against Hillman and created a hostile work environment by, inter alia, “giving preferential treatment to [Hillman's] black coworkers” and retaliating against her after she complained of the treatment. ECF No. 72 at 1-2.

Namely, on September 17, 2014, Hillman allegedly suffered a work injury and sought Leave Without Pay (“LWOP”) with worker's compensation. According to Hillman, Mills made the decision to count Hillman's time off as sick leave rather than LWOP subject to workman's compensation. Hillman considered Mills's decision to be “unfair treatment” based on her belief that her black co-workers were not charged with sick leave when they arrived to work late. Hillman Decl. at 5. Additionally, Hillman believed that many of her black co-workers received preferential treatment because they “were invited for 2-3 hour lunches with management” that Hillman was not invited to, id. and that those co-workers were never charged sick leave for the lunches, ECF No. 69-1, Hillman Dep. at 62:3-16. On October 15, 2014, Hillman approached Mills to discuss the decision to charge Hillman with sick leave. During the meeting, Mills allegedly assaulted Hillman and left scratches and bruises on her neck and left shoulder. Hillman told Mills following the incident, “I am going to file an EEO complaint.” ECF No. 72 at 20.

On the same day as the incident, October 15, 2014, Hillman filed a workplace complaint with the store director at the time, Bruno Ortiz (“Ortiz”). Hillman claims that she did not hear back about her complaint, and after about a week, Hillman filed an incident report with the Joint Base Charleston police. On February 12, 2015, Hillman filed a complaint (“EEO complaint”) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Hillman alleges that Mills retaliated against her for engaging in those protected activities by subsequently ordering Flynn not to schedule Hillman for more than forty-eight hours in a pay period and to deny her computer-assisted ordering (“CAO”) training. Hillman had sought CAO training since 2013 as it was needed for her to qualify for a “[forty]-hour permanent GS-5 CAO position.” ECF No. 72-20, Hillman Decl. at 3. In late 2016, Hillman was assigned to work as an identification card checker at the ID desk in front of Mills's office. These actions allegedly resulted in decreased pay and lost job opportunities. Hillman further alleges that Mills and other managers engaged in other acts of workplace harassment on the basis of her race throughout the duration of her employment. On July 13, 2018, Hillman submitted her letter of resignation, wherein she wrote that the “working environment ha[d] become so hostile, intimidating[,] and intolerable that [she] ha[d] no choice but to resign.” ECF No. 72-20 at 18.

On September 9, 2020, Hillman, proceeding pro se, filed the instant action against the Secretary. ECF No. 1. On February 18, 2021, Hillman filed an amended complaint. ECF No. 22. The amended complaint, now the operative complaint, alleges discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge, and “request[s] all relief available . . . under Title VII” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”). Id. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rules 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C.), all pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to Magistrate Judge Baker.

On January 31, 2022, the Secretary filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 69. Hillman responded to the motion on March 7, 2022, ECF No. 72, and the Secretary replied on April 1, 2022, ECF No. 76. On July 22, 2022, Magistrate Judge Baker issued the R&R, recommending that the court grant the motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 77, R&R. On August 8, 2022, Hillman filed her objections to the R&R. ECF No. 79. The Secretary responded to Hillman's objections on August 22, 2022. ECF No. 80. Hillman did not file a reply, and the time to do so has now elapsed. As such, the matter is now ripe for the court's review.

II. STANDARD

This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the Magistrate Judge's R&R to which specific, written objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party's failure to object is accepted as agreement with the conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). The recommendation of the Magistrate Judge carries no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination rests with this court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge . . . or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portion of the R&R to which a specific objection is made. Id. However, in the absence of a timely filed, specific objection, the court reviews the R&R only for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[a] party's general objections are not sufficient to challenge a magistrate judge's findings.” Greene v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 455 F.Supp.2d 483, 488 (D.S.C. 2006) (citation omitted). When a party's objections are directed to strictly legal issues “and no factual issues are challenged, de novo review of the record may be dispensed with.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). Analogously, de novo review is unnecessary when a party makes general and conclusory objections without directing a court's attention to a specific error in a magistrate judge's proposed findings. Id.

Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248. “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249. The court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all inferences in its favor. Id. at 255.

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this case. Pro se complaints and petitions should be construed liberally by this court and are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970, 99 (1978). A federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint or petition filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). Liberal construction, however, does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

The Secretary moves for summary judgment in his favor on all of Hillman's claims, which the Magistrate Judge construed as claims for Title VII discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the court grant the Secretary's motion, finding that under each claim, Hillman failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to one element or more of each respective claim. Although Hillman purports to have three broad objections to the R&R, she ultimately provides specific objections under each claim that the Magistrate Judge analyzed. The court thus...