Hinds v. Bush

MICHAEL HINDS, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER BUSH, Defendant.

No. 20-12032

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

January 26, 2023

HONORABLE GEORGE CARAM STEEH

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT; AND SUA SPONTE DISMISS IN PART PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NOS. 38, 42]

ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Michael Hinds, a pro se prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1; ECF No. 43. The Honorable George Caram Steeh dismissed part of Hinds' initial complaint and referred the case to the undersigned for all pretrial matters under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 8; ECF No. 20. Pending before the Court are Defendant Christopher Bush's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and Hinds' motion for relief from the order partially dismissing his case.

ECF No. 38; ECF No. 42. For the reasons below, Bush's motion should be granted in part and denied in part, and Hinds' motion should be denied. Parts of Hinds' amended complaint should also be dismissed sua sponte.

II. Background

Hinds' initial complaint alleged that Bush and Officer Daniel Harnphanich violated his Fourth Amendment rights when conducting a warrantless search of his car and seizing his medical marijuana in November 2017. ECF No. 1, PageID.4. Hinds also alleged that Bush violated his due process rights by grabbing his penis. Id., PageID.5. On initial screening of Hinds' complaint,^[1] Judge Steeh dismissed the claim against Harnphanich and held that the warrantless search at issue did not violate Hinds' Fourth Amendment rights. ECF No. 8, PageID.27. To find that the search of Hinds' car was constitutional, Judge Steeh relied on the denial of Hinds' motion to suppress in his criminal case. Id., PageID.26-27 (citing United States v. Hinds, No. 18-20533, 2019 WL 1923254 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2019) (Roberts, J.)). But Judge Steeh found that Hinds' claim that Bush violated his due process rights by grabbing his penis survived initial screening. Id., PageID.27-28. Hinds filed two motions for reconsideration that were both denied. ECF No. 12; ECF No. 15; ECF No. 34; ECF No. 35.

After the Court ordered Bush to respond to the complaint, he moved for dismissal or summary judgment of Hinds' complaint, asserting that his claims are barred by the statute of limitations and that the search and seizure claims are barred by the Heck doctrine. ECF No. 35; ECF No. 38 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)). Hinds then moved for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), again asking to renew his claims against Harnphanich. ECF No. 42. He also filed an amended complaint making claims against Bush, Harnphanich, a prison warden, the city of Detroit, and the United States. ECF No. 43.

III. Analysis

A.

The Court first addresses the question of which of Hinds' complaints is operative. A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of course within 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). Hinds filed his amended complaint in less than 21 days after Bush moved to dismiss his complaint, so he did not have to move for leave to amend and his amended complaint is the operative one.

B.

The Court next addresses Hinds' motion for relief from judgment and the viability of the claims he makes in his amended complaint that Bush and Harnphanich violated his constitutional rights by racially profiling and selectively policing him. The viability of Hinds' amended complaint must be assessed now because he was granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee for this action due to his indigence. ECF No. 7. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must screen suits when the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and to dismiss the action sua sponte if it fails to state a claim, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from immune defendants. In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997). To survive scrutiny under § 1915(e)(2), “‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).

Hinds' Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the order dismissing Harnphanich should be denied and his racial profiling claims should be dismissed on initial screening.

Hinds asks for relief from the order because he made “several procedural errors” and has newly discovered bodycam evidence. ECF No. 42, PageID.156. Rule 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party of a final order because of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” and because of “newly discovery evidence that, which reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial.” Rule 60(b)(1) & (2). “[T]he party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of establishing the grounds for such relief by clear and convincing evidence.” Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008). Hinds falls well short of meeting this burden.

In his motion, Hinds does not specify any procedural errors that would change the reasoning for dismissing Harnphanich from this case. He also fails to explain why he could not have, with reasonable diligence, discovered the bodycam earlier, nor how that evidence would make his Fourth Amendment claims against Harnphanich or Bush viable. ECF No. 42.

Hinds states in his amended complaint that the bodycam evidence proves that Bush and Harnphanich engaged in racial profiling and selective policing when they searched his car and seized items in November 2017. ECF No. 43, PageID.163-164. He does not specify the constitutional grounds for these claims, but he does refer generally to the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Sixth Amendments in his amended complaint. Id., PageID.161. Hinds does not have a viable Fourth Amendment claim. As noted, Judge Steeh already found that the officers committed no Fourth Amendment violation during the November 2017 traffic stop. ECF No. 8, PageID.26-27. And Bush's and Harnphanich's “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also Cunningham v. Sisk, No. 1:01-CV-182, 2003 WL 23471541, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 4, 2003), aff'd, 136 Fed.Appx. 771 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The subjective intentions and motives of the arresting police officers are immaterial to a proper analysis of a Fourth Amendment claim of false arrest without probable cause.”).

A claim of racial profiling may be brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, Tennessee, 984 F.3d 1156, 1160 (6th Cir. 2021). But Hinds pleads no facts to support a viable equal protection claim. Id. (stating that the plaintiff “did not need to expressly plead legal theories; it needed to plead factual allegations that impliedly established at least one viable theory” to support an equal protection claim). Hinds says only this in his amended complaint: “Christopher Bush and Daniel Harnphanich [were] Racial Profiling and Selective policing me. There is body-cam video.” ECF No. 43; PageID.163.

Hinds' equal protection claim is not viable for another reason. Under the Heck doctrine, a plaintiff cannot bring an action “if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). As a result of the November 2017 arrest at issue, Hinds was convicted of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. ECF No. 38-1, PageID.117. A finding that the officers “violated the Constitution by arresting/charging Plaintiff based on his race would necessarily imply the invalidity of his continued confinement.” Watson v. Shumate, No. 3:18-CV-P460-GNS, 2018 WL 6728572, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 21, 2018).

Thus, Hinds' Rule 60(b) motion to renew his claims against Bush and Harnphanich challenging the constitutionality of the traffic stop should be denied.

C.

The next issue is Bush's motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests a complaint's legal sufficiency. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Iqbal Court explained, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint's allegations “must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original).

In deciding whether a plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and...