Hinkle v. Cont'l Motors, Inc., Case No: 8:16–cv–2966–T–36MAP

268 F.Supp.3d 1312

Robert HINKLE et al.,¹ Plaintiffs,

v.CONTINENTAL MOTORS, INC., Continental Motors Services, Inc., Cirrus Design Corporation, Cirrus Industries, Inc. and Kavlico Corp., Defendants.

Case No: 8:16–cv–2966–T–36MAP

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

Signed July 21, 2017

Mark H. Perenich, Perenich, Caulfield, Avril & Noyes, PA, Clearwater, FL, Michael S. Miska, Pro Hac Vice, The Wolk Law Firm, Philadelphia, PA, David I. Katzman, Katzman, Lambert & McClune, Troy, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Juan R. Serrano, Griffin & Serrano, PA, Ft Lauderdale, FL, Peter Joseph Lewis, Richards Goldstein LLP, Coral Gables, FL, for Defendants.

Edward M. Mullins, Ana M. Barton, REED SMITH LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendant Cirrus Design Corporation, Cirrus Aircraft Corporation and Ballistic Recovery Systems, Inc.

John M. Murray, Esq., Andrew M. Brown, Esq., Murray, Morin & Herman, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Defendant Lending Edge Aviation Services, Inc.

ORDER

Charlene Edwards Honeywell, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants Cirrus Design Corporation and Cirrus Industries, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction [against the Hinkles] (Doc. 66), the Hinkles' response (Doc. 74), Cirrus Design Corporation and Cirrus Industries, Inc.'s reply (Doc. 87), Defendant Kavlico Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint [against the Hinkles] (Doc. 78), the Hinkles' response (Doc. 86)² and Kavlico Corporation's reply (Doc. 92). Also before the Court are Defendants Cirrus Design Corporation and Cirrus Industries, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction [against the Skinners] (Doc. 27), the Skinners' response (Doc. 36)³ , and Defendant Kavlico Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint [against the Skinners] (Doc. 38).

This case concerns an aircraft purchased from a Minnesota corporation, sold by a Virginia salesperson, delivered in Minnesota, which crashed in South Carolina. The Court must decide whether the Florida long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permit it to exercise jurisdiction over the Defendants given the absence of any Florida connection to the accident and the related causes of action. Plaintiffs invoke both specific and general personal jurisdiction. They urge the Court to find that because the plaintiff, who purchased the aircraft, is a Florida resident and the Defendants engage in activities in Florida, this Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.

In their motions, Defendants argue that this Court should dismiss them from the case because the Plaintiffs do not establish personal jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute, or the due process requirements, particularly in light of recent case law from the United States Supreme Court. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017), the Supreme Court recently clarified the standard for general and specific jurisdiction. It reiterated that for general jurisdiction, the paradigm forum for a corporation is an equivalent place where the corporation is fairly regarded as "at home;" and for specific jurisdiction the suit must arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum. Neither standard is met in this case. The Court, having considered the motions and being fully advised in the premises, will grant both motions.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS⁴

a. Factual Background

On November 28, 2014, Plaintiffs Robert Hinkle, Brenda Hinkle, Dawn Skinner and Michael Skinner departed from Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport in a Cirrus S22T aircraft, bearing registration number N227RR (the "Aircraft"). Skinner Compl. at ¶¶ 17, 18; Doc. 20 at ¶¶ 17, 18. The Aircraft crashed in South Carolina. Skinner Compl. at ¶¶ 23, 36; Doc. 20 at ¶¶ 23, 36. Mr. Hinkle, the pilot, was unable to restore power to the Aircraft, and the engine failure required a forced landing, causing injuries to everyone on board. Skinner Compl. at ¶ 36; Doc. 20 at ¶ 36. The post-accident testing showed the oil transducer was faulty and the engine did not produce the required power to function properly. Skinner Compl. at ¶¶ 38–40; Doc. 20 at ¶¶ 38–40. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Defendants Cirrus Design Corporation and Cirrus Designs, Inc. (collectively "Cirrus") and Kavlico Corporation, Inc. ("Kavlico") (collectively the "Defendants"), among other parties. Plaintiffs allege generally that Kavlico manufactured a defective sensor in the Aircraft which contributed to the loss of engine power; Skinner Compl. at ¶¶ 49–51; Doc. 20 at ¶¶ 49–51; and Cirrus manufactured a defective Aircraft and misrepresented its airworthiness. Skinner Compl. at ¶¶ 42–48; Doc. 20 at ¶¶ 42–48.

b. Jurisdictional Allegations

Plaintiffs allege that this Court has in personam jurisdiction over Cirrus and Kavlico because they do the following in Florida: conduct business within the state of Florida, avail themselves to business opportunities, advertise the availability of parts and information, ship parts and literature, and receive money from businesses which order goods, services, and parts from them. And they supply literature to aircraft owners, mechanics, fixed base operators, and others who perform aircraft maintenance located within the state. Skinner Compl. at ¶ 12; Doc. 20 at ¶ 12. Plaintiffs also allege that Cirrus and Kavlico provide information and knowledge regarding aircraft parts that entities can purchase for repair and replacement of the aircrafts and their components. Id . They further allege that Cirrus and Kavlico routinely sell their products to Florida and the Aircraft was sold to Mr. Hinkle, who was in Florida when he placed his order.⁵ Skinner Compl. at ¶¶ 13–14; Doc. 20 at ¶¶ 13–14. Plaintiffs also allege that "[a]ll defendants maintain systematic and continuous contacts with Florida and/or have registered agents here[,] [and] [j]urisdiction is proper under the Florida long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution." Skinner Compl. at ¶ 15; Doc. 20 at ¶ 15.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). A court must dismiss an action against a defendant over which it lacks personal jurisdiction. Smith v. Trans–Siberian Orchestra , 689 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (citing Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1999) ). To withstand a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant. See id. at 1313 ; Virgin Health Corp. v. Virgin Enters. Ltd ., 393 Fed.Appx. 623, 625 (11th Cir. 2010). The district court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, to the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc ., 216 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2000). If the defendant is able to refute personal jurisdiction by sustaining its burden of challenging the plaintiff's allegations through affidavits or other competent evidence, the plaintiff must substantiate its jurisdictional allegations through affidavits, testimony, or other evidence of its own.

Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys. , 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000).

The district court must construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff when dealing with conflicting evidence. PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Const., N.V. , 598 F.3d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 2010) ; Consol. Dev. Corp ., 216 F.3d at 1291. To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state defendant, courts undertake a two-step analysis. Verizon Trademark Servs . v. Producers, Inc. , 810 F.Supp.2d 1321, 1324 (M.D. Fla. 2011).

First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to subject the defendant to the forum state's long-arm statute. See Future Tech. Today , 218 F.3d at 1249. Second, if the court determines that the forum state's long-arm statute has been satisfied, the court must then decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id . In determining whether jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause, the court must ask "(1) whether [the] defendant has established sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with the [forum state]; and (2) whether the exercise of this jurisdiction over [the] defendant would offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ " Id . (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Kavlico and Cirrus move to dismiss all the claims against them on the grounds that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them.

Specifically, Kavlico argues that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida because it is not essentially "at home" in this state under the due process analysis. It is incorporated and maintains its principal place of business in California, and does not maintain any manufacturing or design facilities, offices, sales representatives, mailing addresses or bank accounts in Florida. Based on the foregoing, it argues that no specific or general jurisdiction exists. Further, to the extent that Kavlico engages in limited business activities here, it argues that the claims in this case do not arise from any of the business activity it conducts in Florida. It is undisputed that the accident did not occur in Florida, the oil pressure transducer (alleged to be defective) was manufactured in Mexico, and sold from Kavlico to Cirrus in California and delivered in Minnesota. And the Aircraft crashed in South Carolina. Under these circumstances, Kavlico argues, it would be improper to confer personal jurisdiction over it under the Florida long-arm stat...