Hinrichs-Cady v. Hennepin Cnty., A19-1561

943 N.W.2d 417

Whitney HINRICHS-CADY, Appellant,

v.HENNEPIN COUNTY, Respondent.

A19-1561

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed April 20, 2020

Granted June 30, 2020

Christopher J. Heinze, Kirsten J. Libby, Libby Law Office, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Beverly J. Wolfe, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.

RODENBERG, Judge

Appellant Whitney Hinrichs-Cady appeals from the district court’s rule 12 dismissal of her claims alleging violations under the Pregnancy and Parental Leave Act (PPLA) and the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA). Appellant argues that the district court erred by determining that (1) she was not an "employee" as defined by Minn. Stat. § 181.940, subd. 2, for purposes of the PPLA at the time she requested the pregnancy accommodations; and (2) her PPLA and MWA claims are preempted by the exclusivity provision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). We reverse and remand.

FACTS¹

Respondent Hennepin County hired appellant as a social worker on September 19, 2016. Appellant was pregnant. Appellant was initially placed with the induction unit, and she was assigned to a field-team unit in November 2016. Appellant’s responsibilities included investigating cases of child abuse and neglect. This sometimes included visiting children in their homes. Appellant claims that, during some of these home visits, she was exposed to unhealthy and unsafe conditions, including exposure to cigarette smoke, marijuana smoke, and other drug use.

During her pregnancy, appellant developed an iron deficiency which caused her to faint during an in-home visit in February 2017. Appellant’s doctor subsequently provided appellant with a list of job restrictions for the last seven weeks of her pregnancy. These restrictions included not working for more than one hour without rest, not lifting more than ten pounds, not driving if she felt dizzy, and not being exposed to environments deemed unsafe or unhealthy for appellant or her unborn child.

Appellant claims that she met with her direct supervisor on February 10, 2017, "to request that [respondent] allow her to work within the restrictions set forth by her doctor." Appellant alleges that her direct supervisor told her that the supervisor had herself "done this job pregnant" and that appellant cannot use her "pregnancy as a disability." Appellant alleges that her direct supervisor required appellant to perform her work as usual until a decision on the requested accommodations was made.

Appellant further alleges that, after she met with her direct supervisor, she went to meet with the director of the department to discuss her accommodations request and to request a new direct supervisor. Appellant’s direct supervisor was already in the department director’s office when appellant arrived.

Appellant claims she received a phone call from her direct supervisor, the department director, and respondent’s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) coordinator on February 14, 2017. During that phone call, the ADA coordinator told appellant that her requested accommodations "would prevent her from successfully completing her job and [respondent] could not provide her with such accommodations."

Respondent placed appellant on unpaid leave that appellant did not request. On June 5, 2017, appellant returned to work after giving birth to her child. That same day, appellant’s direct supervisor and the department director gave appellant a letter notifying her that her employment was terminated.

On October 26, 2017, appellant and respondent unsuccessfully participated in mediation. Appellant asked whether respondent would agree to another formal mediation. On February 26, 2018, respondent declined to enter into formal mediation and instead made a settlement offer to appellant. Appellant did not reply to respondent’s settlement offer.

On January 11, 2019, appellant sued respondent, asserting (1) violation of the PPLA; (2) an MWA claim; and (3) an MHRA claim.

On January 30, 2019, respondent moved to dismiss appellant’s complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). On May 8, 2019, respondent requested that the district court convert respondent’s motion to dismiss the MHRA claim to a motion for summary judgment. At the close of the motion hearing, the district court allowed the parties to file post-hearing letter briefs, and both parties made post-hearing submissions.

On July 31, 2019, the district court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss appellant’s PPLA and MWA claims under rule 12.02(e). The district court also granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed appellant’s MHRA claim. Judgment dismissing all claims was entered on August 1, 2019.

This appeal followed. On appeal, appellant challenges only the rule 12 dismissals of her PPLA and MWA claims. Appellant has abandoned her MHRA claim.

ISSUES

I. Does the PPLA require that appellant have been employed by respondent for 12 months in order to be entitled to its pregnancy protections?

II. Are appellant’s claims under the PPLA and the MWA preempted by the exclusivity provision of the MHRA?

ANALYSIS

Appellant challenges on appeal the district court’s dismissal of her PPLA and MWA claims under rule 12.02(e). Appellate courts "review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e)." Sipe , 834 N.W.2d at 686. In this posture, we "consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true." Id. (quotation omitted). We therefore do not evaluate the merits of appellant’s claims but only whether appellant’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e).

I. The district court erred by concluding that appellant was not an "employee" entitled to the protections of the PPLA.

Appellant argues that the district court erred by concluding that she is not entitled to the protections of the PPLA because she had not yet been employed by respondent for 12 months and therefore did not meet the definition of "employee" under Minn. Stat. § 181.940, subd. 2, at the time she requested pregnancy accommodations. Appellant argues that the definition of "employee" provided in Minn. Stat. § 181.940 (2018), which contains a requirement of 12 month’s employment, does not apply to her request for pregnancy accommodations under Minn. Stat. § 181.9414. Respondent disagrees and argues that the section 181.940 definition applies to the PPLA. We are therefore presented with an issue of statutory interpretation.

Appellate courts review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Cocchiarella v. Driggs , 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). "The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous." State v. Thonesavanh , 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017). "A statute is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." State v. Pakhnyuk , 906 N.W.2d 571, 576 (Minn. App. 2018), aff'd , 926 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2019).

On Mother’s Day in 2014, the Minnesota legislature made changes to the laws concerning the rights of pregnant women by enacting the Women’s Economic Security Act. 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 239, art. 1. The Women’s Economic Security Act added section 181.9414—the PPLA—to Minnesota’s employment laws. 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 239, art. 3, § 4. It placed the PPLA within a group of statutes that at the time related only to parenting leave. See Minn. Stat. § 181.940 -.944 (2012).

The 2014 PPLA, providing for pregnancy-accommodations, states that "[a]n employer must provide reasonable accommodations to an employee for health conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth if she so requests." Minn. Stat. § 181.9414, subd. 1. The statute further requires the employer to "engage in an interactive process with respect to an employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation." Id. The statute prohibits retaliation by an employer against an employee who requests or obtains a pregnancy accommodation. Id. , subd. 3. Finally, the statute provides that an employer "shall not require an employee to take a leave or accept an accommodation." Id. , subd. 4.

"Employee" is defined for purposes of the group of statutes pertaining to parenting leave and accommodations in Minn. Stat. § 181.940, subd. 2. That section provides that an "employee" is:

a person who performs services for hire for an employer from whom a leave is requested under sections 181.940 to 181.944 for:

(1) at least 12 months preceding the request; and

(2) for an average number of hours per week equal to one-half the full-time equivalent position in the employees job classification as defined by the employer’s personnel policies or practices or pursuant to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, during the 12-month period immediately preceding the leave.

Minn. Stat. § 181.940, subd. 2.

The definitions section of the parenting leave and accommodation statutes states that "[f]or the purposes of sections 181.940 to 181.944, the terms defined in this section have the meanings given them." Minn. Stat. § 181.940, subd. 1. The "pregnancy accommodations" section is numbered within the range of sections identified in section 181.940, subdivision 1. Subdivision 2 then defines "employee." The statute does not further define the term "leave." See Minn. Stat. § 181.940.

Respondent argues, and the district court concluded, that an "employee" for purposes of the PPLA must have worked for an employer for 12 months before the PPLA recognizes the employee as eligible for protection under it. In its order granting respondent’s motions to dismiss, the district court applied the section 181.940 definition of "employee," and determined that appellant was "not an eligible ‘employee’ covered by the PPLA" because appellant "had not performed services as an employee for at least 12 months preceding the...