Hinton v. Astrue

919 F.Supp.2d 999

Donna HINTON, Plaintiff,

v.Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 3:12–cv–00100.

United States District Court,

S.D. Iowa,

Davenport Division.

Jan. 25, 2013.

Gary L. Hayward, United States Attorney Second FLR Courthouse, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.

Steven C. Jayne, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

ORDER

ROBERT W. PRATT, District Judge.

Before the Court are two Motions filed by Donna Hinton (“Plaintiff”): 1) a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), filed November 21, 2012 (Clerk's No. 9); and 2) a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, also filed November 21, 2012 (Clerk's No. 8). The Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”) filed a resistance to the Motions on November 27, 2012. Clerk's No. 10. Plaintiff filed a Reply on December 7, 2012. Clerk's No. 11. The Court held a hearing on the Motions on January 14, 2013. Clerk's No. 14. The parties were additionally permitted to email supplemental authority to the Court following the hearing. The matters are fully submitted.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking judicial review of a decision by Defendant. Clerk's No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that: 1) she requested Social Security benefits; 2) her request was denied; 3) she timely requested reconsideration of the denial of benefits; 4) the request for reconsideration was denied; 5) she timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) by mailing the proper forms to Defendant in a prepaid envelope provided by Defendant; 6) upon checking on the status of her request a few months later, she discovered that Defendant had not received her request for hearing; 7) she resubmitted the request for hearing with an explanation about the “lost filing”; 8) the request for hearing was denied for failing to request a hearing in a timely fashion; 9) she timely requested review before the Appeals Council; and 10) the Appeals Council denied review. See generally Clerk's No. 1. Plaintiff requested that the Court overrule Defendant's prior decisions, find that her request for a hearing before an ALJ was timely, and remand the case for a proper hearing before the ALJ and a determination of benefits. See id.

On October 4, 2012, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and (h) because Plaintiff did not timely request a hearing before the ALJ following the reconsideration denial of her claim for disability benefits. Clerk's No. 4. Plaintiff resisted the Motion, contending that jurisdiction was proper for a variety of reasons. Clerk's No. 5. On October 26, 2012, the Court granted Defendant's request to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, concluding that jurisdiction was lacking because there was no “final decision” of Defendant that would be subject to judicial review under §§ 405(g) and (h). See Clerk's No. 6 (citing Sheehan v. Secretary, 593 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir.1979) and Smith v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 516, 518 (8th Cir.1985)).

Plaintiff's current Motion under Rule 59(e) alleges that the Court “did not address” Plaintiff's alternative bases for relief regarding a claim for mandamus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Plaintiff did not specifically plead mandamus in her Complaint, though she did allege therein that Defendant's holding that Plaintiff failed to submit a timely request for a hearing was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. See generally Clerk's No. 1. Moreover, Plaintiff argued in resistance to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that mandamus was an appropriate basis to overrule Defendant's Motion. See generally Clerk's No. 5. To further remedy any possible deficiencies in the Complaint, Plaintiff proffers a proposed Amended Complaint that specifically cites § 1361, the mandamus statute.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Rule 59(e)

Rule 59(e) motions are intended to “serve the limited function of correcting ‘manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.’ ” United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir.2006). The Court has “broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to 59(e).” Id.

B. Analysis

In the present Motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court rule on her request for mandamus, which she contends was implied in her initial Complaint, referenced in her resistance to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and explicitly asserted in the proposed Amended Complaint. The Court agrees that it did not address any implied or express request for mandamus in its October 26, 2012 Order. Accordingly, it is prudent to evaluate Plaintiff's arguments on this issue.

1. Jurisdiction.

Title 28, United States Code § 1361 provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to Plaintiff.” Here, Plaintiff argues that: 1) the ALJ lacked discretion to deny a timely request for a hearing; 2) Plaintiff timely placed her request for hearing in a United States Postal Service mailbox; 3) regardless of whether Defendant actually received the request, Plaintiff is entitled to a presumption that Defendant received it under the “mailbox rule”; 4) because there was no evidence rebutting the presumption that Defendant received the timely mailed request for hearing, Defendant's decision to dismiss Plaintiff's request for hearing on the basis of untimeliness was improper; and 5) an order of mandamus remanding the matter to the ALJ or Appeals Council for further consideration is the only remedy available to right the wrong inflicted on Plaintiff. See generally Clerk's No. 9.

Plaintiff cites Sandoval v. Astrue, No. CV–08–0041–CI, 2008 WL 3545760 (E.D.Wash. Aug. 8, 2008), in support of her request. In Sandoval, the court considered a matter substantially similar to the present action. See id. The plaintiff appealed an adverse decision by an ALJ by timely mailing a request for review to the Appeals Council. Id. at *1. For some reason, the Appeals Council did not receive the request, so the plaintiff resubmitted it by fax a few months later. Id. The Appeals Council, however, denied the request on the basis that it was not timely filed. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiff requested mandamus from the District Court, asserting that there was nothing to rebut the mailbox rule's presumption that a properly mailed document is timely received, and requesting that the District Court remand the matter to the Appeals Council for review. Id. at *1–2. The Social Security Commissioner moved to dismiss the action, contending that there was no “final decision” that would support jurisdiction under §§ 405(g) and (h).

The District Court accepted mandamus jurisdiction and denied the Commissioner's request to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to the mailbox rule's presumption of receipt. Id. at *3 (“[Defendant] does not dispute Plaintiff's assertion that the proffered evidence of timely mailing satisfies the filing requirement, and he does not offer sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of delivery and receipt. Applying the undisputed mailbox rule, the evidence before this court establishes Plaintiff timely filed his Request for Review by mailing.”). In so finding, the court stated that “allowing the Commissioner's simple denial of receipt by the Social Security Administration to rebut the presumption of receipt of a request for review is inconsistent with the agency's purpose to assist the disabled,” noting that the Commissioner's own rules provide that mailing is an acceptable method of filing. Id. The court further found that, “[b]ecause Plaintiff is challenging the Appeals Council's failure to follow the agency's substantive Regulation [regarding a duty to review after a timely filed request for review], as published in the Code of Federal Regulations, and is not appealing the ALJ's denial of benefits or other discretionary act, the court may assume mandamus jurisdiction to determine if the Appeals Council failed to perform a duty [that] was owed Plaintiff.” Id. at *5. The court then concluded that all requirements for mandamus were satisfied, and remanded the case to the Appeals Council “to perform its non-discretionary duty to review Plaintiff's request after a timely Request for Review.” Id. at *6.

Although the Government points out that Sandoval is mere persuasive, rather than binding, authority, the Court nonetheless finds it compelling. Indeed, there is substantial authority, both in the Eighth Circuit and elsewhere, supporting a conclusion that § 1361 mandamus is not barred by the language of § 405(h)¹ and “provides jurisdiction in cases challenging the procedures used in administering Social Security benefits but unrelated to the merits” of the benefits claim. Burnett v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 731, 737–38 (7th Cir.1987) (collecting cases). Indeed, in Belles v. Schweiker, the Eighth Circuit found that the exclusivity provision in § 405(h) does not present an obstacle to mandamus jurisdiction where the claims at issue are procedural in nature. 720 F.2d 509, 512 (8th Cir.1983) (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756–57, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) for the proposition that § 405(h) requires claims for benefits to be asserted only through § 405(g), but noting that § 405(h) is “not controlling” where a decision favorable to the plaintiff would entitle her only to certain procedural considerations and not to benefits); see also Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 766 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that “mandamus jurisdiction exists if the action is an attempt to compel an officer or employee of the United States or its agencies to perform an allegedly nondiscretionary duty owed to plaintiff”); Ganem v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 844, 850 (D.C.Cir.1984...