Hispanic Nat'l Law Enf't Ass'n NCR v. Prince George's Cnty.

HISPANIC NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION NCR,UNITED BLACK POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION,MICHAEL ANIS, MICHAEL BROWN, THOMAS BOONE,DANITA INGRAM, PAUL MACK, JOSEPH PEREZ,TASHA OATIS, CLARENCE RUCKER, CHRIS SMITH,RICHARD TORRES, SONYA L. ZOLLICOFFER,PATRICK MCCLAM, SHARON CHAMBERS and ADRIAN CRUDUP, Plaintiffs, v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, HENRY P. STAWINSKI, III, individually,MARK A. MAGAW, individually, CHRISTOPHER MURTHA, individually,and MAJOR KATHLEEN MILLS, individually, Defendants.

Civil Action No. TDC-18-3821

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

February 25, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs Hispanic National Law Enforcement Association NCR ("HNLEA") and United Black Police Officers Association ("UBPOA"), along with 14 of their members ("the Individual Plaintiffs") who are or were employed by the Prince George's County Police Department ("PGCPD"), have brought this civil rights action against Prince George's County, Maryland ("the County") and four PGCPD officials in their individual capacity, alleging a custom and practice of discrimination and retaliation against officers of color. Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which is now fully briefed. Having reviewed the Amended Complaint and the submitted materials, the Court finds no hearing necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

In the original Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for discrimination on the basis of race and color, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and retaliation, in violation of the First Amendment. One Plaintiff, Lieutenant Sonya Zollicoffer also asserted causes of action for discrimination on the basis of disability, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2018), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2018). After Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss ("the First Motion") seeking dismissal of certain Plaintiffs and causes of action, this Court issued a memorandum opinion on July 8, 2019, by which the First Motion was granted in part and denied in part. That opinion, and particularly its discussion of the general factual background of this case, is incorporated by reference. See Hispanic Nat'l Law Enf't Ass'n NCR v. Prince George's Cty., No. TDC-18-3821, 2019 WL 2929025, at *1-2 (D. Md. July 8, 2019).

While the First Motion was pending, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint in which they added causes of action, based on the same facts underlying the § 1983 claims, on behalf of five of the Individual Plaintiffs for discrimination on the basis of race and color, in violation of Title VIIof the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2018), and on behalf of four Individual Plaintiffs for retaliation under Title VII. The Amended Complaint also added three new individual Plaintiffs, Lieutenant Patrick McClam, Corporal Adrian Crudup, and Officer Sharon Chambers (collectively, the "New Plaintiffs"), all of whom are African American PGCPD police officers who assert discrimination and retaliation claims under § 1983. Lt. McClam alleges that he experienced a retaliatory transfer to a less favorable unit after cooperating with two civilian employees who filed Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaints, as well as discrimination and retaliation in the form of disparate discipline, delay of promotion, and denial of multiple requests to transfer to more desirable positions. Officer Chambers alleges that, after reporting her service weapon stolen in 2017, she was discriminated and retaliated against by being disciplined more harshly than other white officers for the same conduct, including being involuntarily transferred to a less desirable position and forced to pay a fine and provide a DNA sample. Cpl. Crudup alleges that after he complained about a white supervisor's racist remarks, the supervisor filed a retaliatory charge against him that resulted in a criminal investigation during which Crudup was suspended without pay. Although Cpl. Crudup was found not guilty, PGCPD continues to pursue internal charges and termination as punishment.

Finally, the Amended Complaint added, in Count VII, a common law claim of tortious interference with business relations on behalf of 11 Individual Plaintiffs against Defendants PGCPD Chief Henry P. Stawinski, III, PGCPD Deputy Chief Christopher Murtha, and PGCPD Internal Affairs Division Commander Major Kathleen Mills (collectively "the Individual Defendants"), for interfering with their employment opportunities inside and outside of PGCPD by causing them to be transferred to less desirable positions, preventing them from being transferred to desirable positions or to be promoted, and causing other law enforcement agenciesto decline to hire them. Relatedly, the Amended Complaint added, in Count VIII, a common law claim of civil conspiracy on behalf of all Plaintiffs against Chief Stawinski and Major Mills, for entering into an agreement with each other to engage in such interference with certain Individual Plaintiffs' employment opportunities both inside and outside the PGCPD.

DISCUSSION

In their Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint ("the Second Motion"), Defendants seek dismissal of certain individual claims of discrimination and retaliation brought by the New Plaintiffs and dismissal in their entirety of the tortious interference with business relations and civil conspiracy claims in Counts VII and VIII. As to the common law tortious interference and conspiracy counts, Defendants assert that: (1) they should be dismissed for failure to both plead and actually comply with the statutory notice requirement of the Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act ("LGTCA"), Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 5-301 to 5-304 (Supp. 2019); (2) the tortious interference with business relations count should be dismissed because Maryland law does not recognize tortious interference with business relations where the defendants are personnel of the employing entity, and the Amended Complaint has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish the elements of the tort; and (3) the civil conspiracy count should be dismissed because Maryland law does not recognize such an action absent a valid underlying common law tort claim.

I. Legal Standard

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Legalconclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice. Id. The Court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).

II. New Plaintiffs

As to the New Plaintiffs' claims, Defendants assert that to the extent that certain discrete instances of alleged discrimination or retaliation could be construed as individual causes of action, they must be dismissed as either time-barred by the statute of limitations or as failing to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief.

Fourteenth Amendment employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to § 1983 are evaluated under Title VII standards. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004). To establish a prima facie case of race, color, or national origin discrimination based on disparate treatment, a plaintiff must present facts demonstrating: (1) the plaintiff's membership in a protected class; (2) the plaintiff's satisfactory job performance; (3) that the plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment. White v. BFI Waste Svcs., Inc., 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004). Under the third prong, an adverse employment action is "a discriminatory act that adversely affects the terms, conditions, or benefits of the plaintiff's employment." Holland v. Washington Homes, 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). It may consist of discharge, demotion, a decrease in pay or benefits, a loss of job title or supervisory responsibility, reduced opportunities for promotion, or a reassignment resulting in one or more these consequences. See Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 252, 255-57 (4th Cir. 1999) (allowing for thepossibility that a reassignment with a significant detrimental effect could constitute an adverse employment action).

For claims of discriminatory non-promotion, a plaintiff must allege: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) that the plaintiff applied for the position in question; (3) that the plaintiff was qualified for the position; and (4) that the plaintiff was rejected for the position "under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 902 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Courts typically find "circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination" if the plaintiff can show that the position remained open or was filled by a similarly qualified applicant outside the protected class. See Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 229-30 (4th Cir. 1981). Although it is not strictly necessary for a plaintiff to establish all elements of a prima facie case in the complaint, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a plausible inference of discrimination and thereby raise a...