Hladis v. Byelick

CHARLOTTE HLADIS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COLIN BYELICK et al., Defendants and Respondents.

G055692

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE

November 18, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2015-00789520)

OPINION

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Linda S. Marks, Judge. Reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Carpenter, Zuckerman & Rowley, Tiva Amiri-Davani and Robert Ounjian for Appellants.

Resnick & Louis and Sue Y. Park for Respondents.

* * * After a night of drinking at a friend's house, a young woman left in a car driven by her intoxicated friend. The young woman died in the ensuing single car accident. Her parents and estate filed a wrongful death action against the social host who allegedly "allowed" the drunken driver of the car to retrieve his car keys and drive away. Plaintiffs also sued the social host's parents who owned the house where the party took place.

The trial court granted the defense motion for summary judgment, rejecting the plaintiffs' "negligent undertaking" theory the host voluntarily undertook the duty to withhold car keys from the guest until he was sober. The court additionally granted summary judgment based on California's "social host law" (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (c)) which immunizes a social host from liability for damages resulting from a guest's alcohol consumption.

We reverse the judgment as to the social host, but affirm the judgment in favor of his parents, who were not present during the party. We conclude there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the social host voluntarily undertook the duty to protect others by preventing his guest from driving drunk. Additionally, we find the statutory immunity for a social host inapplicable because the plaintiffs based their lawsuit on negligent undertaking, not on furnishing alcohol.¹

IBACKGROUND

A. The Incident

On January 26, 2015, Colin Byelick (Byelick) invited his friend, Colin Selsted (Selsted), and the decedent, Devon Williams, to join him and his girlfriend, AlanaZee, at the Byelick residence for a night of drinking at the community pool and hot tub; the plan was for all to stay the night. The four young people ranged in age from 23 to 28. Byelick's parents, who owned the residence, were away for the weekend.

Earlier that day, Selsted, Byelick, and Zee had been drinking together at several restaurants. They drove together to the Byelick residence in Selsted's new 2015 Volkswagen Golf GTI (the GTI). Upon arrival, Byelick directed Selsted to park the GTI inside the house's garage, due to street parking restrictions. After parking inside, Selsted handed his car keys to Byelick and stated, "I'm staying the night here. Hang on to my keys. I'll get them in the morning when I get up for work." Williams arrived in her own car.

The four changed into their bathing suits, made a mixed-drink concoction containing a liter of vodka, poured the alcoholic beverage into a large Tupperware container, and carried it to the pool and hot tub where they sat and drank for nearly an hour. They returned to the house where they talked in the kitchen for about 20 minutes, until Byelick went upstairs to shower and sleep, prompted by Zee's reminder he had a job interview in the morning. Byelick felt "definitely drunk." It was Byelick's "understanding" Selsted and Williams would sleep on couches in the living room downstairs; neither had mentioned leaving the house that night. Zee soon followed Byelick upstairs.

While in the upstairs bedroom, located above the garage, Zee heard the garage door open. Byelick was already asleep. Zee ran downstairs and into the garage where she discovered Selsted climbing into the driver's seat of the GTI; Williams was already in the passenger seat with the door closed. Zee yelled at Selsted and "begged" him not to drive. Selsted left the garage and followed Zee into the kitchen, where she continued to argue he should not drive. Eventually Selsted admitted Zee was "correct" and said he would get Williams from the car. Thinking she had convinced him not to leave, Zee went back into the kitchen to tidy up. Then she heard the car drive off.

Selsted later admitted at his deposition he was "blackout drunk" when he drove away from the house. Within minutes of leaving the Byelick residence, driving at a speed of 117 miles per hour, Selsted lost control of the GTI, swerved off the road, rolled the car multiple times, and hit a block wall. Williams died from her injuries the next day.

B. The Operative Complaint and Summary Judgment Motion

On May 26, 2015, Williams' parents and the administrator of her estate (collectively, plaintiffs), filed suit against multiple defendants, including Byelick and his parents (collectively, the Byelick defendants). Plaintiffs' operative second amended complaint stated a claim against the Byelick defendants for wrongful death based on negligent entrustment of a vehicle to an intoxicated driver, and a survival action.

The allegations of the complaint relevant to this appeal are as follows: The Byelick defendants "agreed to take possession of the keys to the partygoers' vehicles . . . [and agreed] to . . . maintain possession of the keys to [Selsted's] vehicle and to only relinquish control of the vehicle to a driver who was sufficiently sober to operate the vehicle safely." "At the conclusion of the party, [the Byelick defendants] returned the keys . . . and relinquished possession and control of [Selsted's] vehicle to [Selsted] despite knowing that he was intoxicated and unfit to drive . . . safely." The Byelick defendants' "entrustment of the vehicle to [Selsted] was a substantial factor in causing [Williams] to be killed."

In May 2017, the Byelick defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication of issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) The motion argued these defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (c), which immunizes a social host from liability for damages resulting froma guest's alcohol consumption.² Additionally, the motion argued plaintiffs could not prevail on their negligent undertaking claim under section 324A of the Restatement Second of Torts because no evidence supported the allegation Byelick agreed "to take [] Selsted's car key from him, essentially to protect him from himself[.]" The motion also asserted the negligent entrustment claim failed because the Byelick defendants did not "own or possess" Selsted's car; Byelick was "no more than a bailee of [] Selsted's vehicle" (and car keys), and a bailee cannot be held liable for negligent entrustment. (Knighten v. Sam's Parking Valet (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 69, 73.)

In their accompanying separate statement of undisputed facts, the Byelick defendants stated the following facts: Byelick's parents were out of town when the party took place; Byelick at no time "agree[d] or promise[d] to take possession and/or control of [] Selsted's car keys and/or [Selsted's] car" and did not "take actual possession or control of the car . . . that night"; and "At no time on January 26, 2015, or otherwise did [] Byelick promise or undertake to limit, control, or otherwise restrict [] Selsted's use of the car he was driving that night for any reason whatsoever." The defendants supported each fact with citations to Byelick's declaration.

In their opposing separate statement, plaintiffs did not dispute Byelick's parents were out of town during the incident. Otherwise, however, plaintiffs disputed each of the defendants' factual assertions with the following facts and a key inference drawn from these facts: "Upon their arrival at the Byelick residence, [] Byelick instructed [] Selsted to park the GTI inside his garage. . . . Thereafter, []Selsted gave his car keys to [] Byelick to avoid driving under the influence of alcohol later that night. . . . As he handed the keys over to [] Byelick, he stated, 'I'm staying the night here. Hang onto my keys. I'll get them in the morning when I get up for work.' . . . In taking the keys from [] Selsted without reservation, [] Byelick implicitly agreed to take possession of the vehicle and undertake the responsibility of preventing [] Selsted from driving under the influence of alcohol later that night." (Italics added.) In support, plaintiffs cited excerpts from Selsted's deposition testimony.

C. The Trial Court's Ruling Granting Summary Judgment for Defendants

At the hearing on the motion, the trial court rejected plaintiffs' argument "that by taking those car keys, Colin Byelick implicitly agreed to hold onto those car keys" and prevent Selsted from driving drunk. The court observed, "The facts don't even come close in this case" to establishing such an agreement between Byelick and Selsted. The court stated: "[T]he issue isn't even what Selsted says, the issue is what Byelick says. . . . We don't have any affirmative statement having been made by Byelick as to what was going on in his mind and what his intent was in accepting those keys."

The court further noted that, even assuming "just for argument's sake," the evidence was sufficient to show such an agreement, Civil Code section 1714's "broad and sweeping" immunity for furnishing alcoholic beverages would preclude Byelick's liability.

The trial court issued a minute order granting the defense motion for summary judgment. The order stated the evidence was "inadequate to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether [Byelick] agreed to take possession of" Selsted's keys and withhold them until Selsted was sober. "[N]o arrangement or agreement can be reasonably inferred from the evidence." Accor...