HNMC, Inc. v. Chan

683 S.W.3d 373

HNMC, INC., Petitioner,

v.Francis S. CHAN, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Leny Rey Chan, Jonathan Chan, and Justin Chan, Respondents

No. 22-0053

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued September 14, 2023

OPINION DELIVERED: January 19, 2024

On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas

Peter C. Hansen, Austin, for Amicus Curiae Texas Association of Defense Counsel.

Andrew Bender, Richard P. Hogan Jr., Jennifer Bruch Hogan, Jim S. Hart, Steven J. Kherkher, Houaton, James Christian Marrow, Sharon S. McCally, for Respondent.

Curry L. Cooksey, The Woodlands, P. Michael Jung, Dallas, Christina Connor Huston, Carol Kennedy, Houston, for Petitioner.

Kurt C. Kern, Plano, for Other interested party.

Justice Busby delivered the opinion of the Court.

This personal injury case concerns whether a property owner has a duty to make an adjoining public roadway safe from—or otherwise warn of—careless third-party drivers. A nurse was struck and killed by such a driver while crossing the public street next to the hospital where she worked. The trial court and court of appeals held that the hospital owed a specialized, case-specific duty to the nurse because the layout of its exit and parking lot created a situation in which injury to others was foreseeable.

We hold that courts should not attempt to craft case-specific duties when recognized duty rules apply to the factual situation at hand. Under these recognized rules, the hospital had a limited duty as a premises occupier based on its exercise of control over certain parts of the adjoining public right-of-way. But there is no evidence that any dangerous condition the hospital controlled in the right-of-way caused the nurse’s harm. Accordingly, we reverse and render a take-nothing judgment.

Background

Defendant HNMC owns and operates a hospital and a fenced parking lot in Northwest Houston. The hospital and lot are on either side of Cali Drive, a North–South street owned and maintained by Harris County. The county’s right-of-way for Cali Drive extends past either side of the street and includes the curb, grass medians, and sidewalks.

One exit from the hospital opens to stairs that lead down to the sidewalk abutting Cali Drive in the middle of the block. Near the bottom of the stairs, in the county right-of-way, HNMC constructed a concrete pad between the sidewalk and the street. The record includes evidence that HNMC built the pad to help drivers drop off and pick up passengers on Cali Drive. The pad is located across Cali Drive from the driveway that cars use to enter and exit the parking lot. But the hospital exit and the parking lot driveway do not line up exactly—the driveway is a few feet North of the hospital exit. On the parking-lot side of the street, HNMC placed traffic control signs in the county right-of-way to the North of the driveway.

There are crosswalks at each end of the block that connect the hospital to the parking lot’s pedestrian gates. But rather than walking to the end of the block, using the crosswalks, and using the pedestrian gates to access the lot, many of the hospital’s patients, visitors, and employees who exit the building here simply cross Cali Drive in the middle of the block and enter the lot through the driveway. There was a crosswalk in the middle of the block as recently as 2011, but the county abandoned the crosswalk, and its markings faded over time. The abandoned crosswalk did not line up with the hospital exit, the concrete pad, or the parking lot driveway. Instead, the abandoned crosswalk was located a few feet South of the hospital exit and the concrete pad.

From 2008 through 2012, there were several vehicle accidents on Cali Drive involving pedestrians. Concerned, HNMC wrote to the county in 2009, asking it to implement new safety measures on Cali Drive. The county conducted a traffic study, undertook some safety measures, and unilaterally recommended that HNMC take additional safety measures. HNMC did not take the recommended measures.

In 2015, after HNMC declined to take the safety measures and after the abandoned crosswalk had mostly faded, Leny Chan was killed while crossing Cali Drive. A nurse employed by HNMC for more than 30 years, Chan was leaving work and walking to her car located in the HNMC parking lot. She came out of the hospital exit and proceeded to cross Cali Drive in the middle of the block, intending to enter the parking lot via the driveway.

At the same time, James Budd was beginning to leave the parking lot in his car. He reached the driveway, pulled up past the traffic control signage located in the right-of-way to his right, and stopped. He looked to his left (South), his right (North), and then looked forward as he began to turn left out of the parking lot to proceed South on Cali Drive. Budd struck Chan as he was turning left. Emergency services responded, but Chan died that evening as a result of her injuries.

Chan’s estate and surviving family members (collectively Chan) sued Budd and Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc., Budd’s employer. Siemens designated HNMC and Harris County as responsible third parties, and Chan then added HNMC as a defendant. At the end of trial, the jury was given an ordinary negligence charge and found all parties negligent. The jury apportioned liability as follows: 40% to Budd, 30% to Harris County, 20% to HNMC, and 10% to Chan. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict, and Chan settled with Budd and Siemens.

HNMC appealed, arguing among other things that (1) it owed no duty to Chan, (2) Chan failed to obtain a premises liability finding, (3) there is no evidence of liability or damages, and (4) any liability is barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act because Chan was an HNMC employee leaving work when she was killed. A panel of the court of appeals agreed with the first argument and reversed, holding that HNMC had no duty to ensure Chan’s safety while crossing the street and rendering a take-nothing judgment. HNMC, Inc. v. Chan, No. 14-18-00849-CV, 2020 WL 2832780, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 28, 2020), withdrawn and superseded on reconsideration en banc, 637 S.W.3d 919 (2021).

But the court granted reconsideration en banc and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a 5-4 decision. Chan, 637 S.W.3d at 926. The en banc majority noted the general rule that property owners owe no duty to make safe public roadways appurtenant to their property and identified four exceptions to that rule. Id. at 929. Instead of applying any of these rules, however, the majority recognized a new duty specific to this situation by analyzing the factors listed in Greater Houston Transportation Co. v. Phillips. Chan, 637 S.W.3d at 930-36 (citing Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990)). The majority next concluded that HNMC had invited any error regarding the failure to secure a premises liability finding and that sufficient evidence supported the verdict. Id. at 936-40. And the majority held that HNMC failed to assign error to the trial court’s refusal to apply the Workers’ Compensation Act because HNMC’s appellate brief attacked only the denial of its motion for summary judgment, which is not reviewable on appeal following a trial. Id. at 928 (citing Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1996)).¹

Analysis

[1] HNMC raises two issues in its petition for review. First, it argues that it did not owe a duty of reasonable care to Chan while she was crossing Cali Drive. Second, HNMC contends that because Chan was leaving her place of employment when she was hit, the Workers’ Compensation Act bars any liability to HNMC, her employer. Because both issues raise questions of law, we review them de novo. Aleman v. Tex. Med. Bd., 573 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2019).

I. HNMC had a limited duty to Chan because it placed a concrete pad, driveway, and signs in the county right-of-way.

[2–5] "The threshold inquiry in a negligence case is duty." Elephant Ins. Co., LLC v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 525). Whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty "is a question of law for the court to decide from the facts surrounding the occurrence in question." Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 525. But courts should only consider recognizing a new duty "[w]hen a duty has not been recognized in particular circumstances." Pagayon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499, 503 (Tex. 2017); see also Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d at 144. If a court has not already decided whether certain circumstances will give rise to a duty, the relevant question is "whether a duty should be imposed in a defined class of cases." Pagayon, 536 S.W.3d at 504; see also Houston Area Safety Council, Inc. v. Mendez, 671 S.W.3d 580, 583 (Tex. 2023). We therefore begin our analysis by considering whether certain recognized duty or no-duty rules apply in these circumstances.

A. Because duty rules already address this class of cases, the Phillips factors should not be used to create a duty.

Relying on authority from other courts of appeals, the en banc majority identified a background no-duty rule and four "exceptions" in which a premises owner may owe a duty to persons who are not on its property. Chan, 637 S.W.3d at 929-30. Our Court’s precedent has described these rules somewhat differently.

[6] The majority correctly articulated a background no-duty rule for adjacent streets: "a property owner … has no duty to ensure the safety of a person who leaves the owner’s property and suffers injury on an adjacent public roadway, or to ensure that person’s safety against the dangerous acts of a third party." Id. at 929. As we explain below, this rule is supported by our precedent, and it applies to a defined class of cases that includes the facts of this case.

The en banc majority then opined that this rule "is subject to certain exceptions," and it cited several of our cases. Id. But most of the cases...