Hoback v. State

225 N.E.3d 208

Dallas Dale HOBACK, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CR-411

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed December 20, 2023

Appeal from the Clark Circuit Court, The Honorable Bradley B. Jacobs, Judge, Trial Court Cause No. 10C02-1803-F6-540

Attorney for Appellant: Matthew J. McGovern, Fishers, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Daylon L. Welliver, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Bailey, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Dallas Dale Hoback appeals his convictions and sentence, following a jury trial. He raises several issues on appeal, but we address only the dispositive issue of

whether the trial court erred when it denied his Criminal Rule 4(C) motion for discharge.

[2] We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On March 29, 2018, the State charged Hoback with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine,¹ Level 6 felony possession of a narcotic drug,² and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.³ The police arrested Hoback for those charges on April 19, 2018.

[4] At a status conference on January 2, 2019, Hoback informed the court that plea negotiations were occurring and that he thought the case would get resolved, but he also asked for a trial date. On January 23, 2019, the trial court scheduled a jury trial for April 16, 2019. At a pretrial conference on January 24, 2019, a plea offer was tendered. At a status conference on March 20, 2019, additional dates were requested and the minute entry sheet, containing the signature of Hoback’s counsel, noted a new status conference date of June 5, 2019. On April 10, 2019, the CCS noted both the new status conference date and that the jury trial date of April 16 was cancelled. The record does not disclose on whose motion the trial date was cancelled or the reason therefor. See App. v. II at 7 (stating, "Reason: Other").

[5] The case was subsequently continued multiple times due to the non-appearance of defense counsel and Hoback’s requests for new dates. A plea agreement was filed on December 20, 2019. The plea hearing was continued multiple times at Hoback’s request until he ultimately withdrew from the plea on October 1, 2020. After a series of events including defense continuances, the entry of another plea agreement and another withdrawal of the plea, court congestion findings, and public health emergency orders, on April 13, 2022, the trial court set the jury trial for July 12, 2022.

[6] The State subsequently filed two motions for continuance—one on July 5, 2022, and the other on July 21, 2022—both due to the unavailability of an "essential witness for the State." App. v. II at 155, 167. The trial court granted each motion and reset the jury trial for August 2, 2022, and August 23, 2022, respectively. Hoback did not object to either of the State’s motions for continuance, the trial court’s decisions to grant them, or the dates on which the trials were reset. On August 15, 2022, Hoback filed a motion for discharge, which the trial court denied following an August 16 final motions hearing.

[7] Following the trial, the jury found Hoback guilty as charged. The trial court subsequently sentenced Hoback to "692 days fixed term of imprisonment’ on count 1, "692 days fixed term of imprisonment" on count 2, and "60 days fixed term of imprisonment" on count 3. Id. The written order stated, "Counts to run concurrently[,"] and "JTC⁴ 2/14/2022 - 1/26/2023 346 actual days." Appealed Order. Hoback now appeals his convictions and sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[1] [8] Hoback appeals the trial court’s denial of his Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) motion for discharge for failure to give him a timely trial—sometimes referred to as a "speedy trial" claim. In reviewing speedy trial rule claims, we review questions of law de novo and factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Har- per, 135 N.E.3d 962, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans, denied.

Waiver

[2, 3] [9] As an initial matter, we must address the State’s assertion that Hoback waived his Rule 4(C) claim by failing to adequately brief the issue. "When a defendant files a motion to discharge, it is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the one-year time frame has been exceeded and that he is not responsible for the delay." Ratliff v. State, 132 N.E.3d 41, 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quotations and citation omitted), trans. denied. Moreover, Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(a) requires that the statement of facts in an Appellant’s brief must "describe the facts relevant to the issues presented for review" and must "be supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix." When a party refers to facts without citation to the record in support, "we need not consider those facts." Reed v. City of Evansville, 956 N.E.2d 684, 688 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[4-6] [10] Similarly, Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that "[e]ach contention [of the argument] must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal." When an appellant provides no citation to legal authority supporting his contentions, those contentions are waived. E.g., Shields v. Town of Perrysville, 136 N.E.3d 309, 312 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, under our Appellate Rules, "[i]t is not sufficient for the argument section that an appellant simply recites facts and makes conclusory statements without analysis or authoritative support." Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17 N.E.3d 363, 373 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). This rule "prevents the court from becoming an advocate when it is forced to search the entire record for evidence in support of [a party’s] broad statements." Lane Alan Schrader Trust v. Gilbert, 974 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990)).

[7] [11] Here, the one-year time limit per Rule 4(C) began to run on April 19, 2018, the date Hoback was arrested. Thus, it was Hoback’s burden to show that he was not brought to trial within the following year and that any delay was not caused by him, congestion of the court’s calendar, or an emergency. See, e.g., Ratliff, 132 N.E.3d at 43. Hoback fails to point to any facts or evidence regarding the relevant one-year time period—i.e., from April 19, 2018, to April 19, 2019.⁵ He does not discuss any delays that took place during that time period and to whom such delays are attributable. Therefore, we could find Hoback’s discharge argument waived under Appellate Rule 46(A), as the State urges us to do.

[8, 9] [12] However, it is well-established that we prefer to address claims on the merits where possible, "instead of on procedural grounds like waiver." Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (choosing to address the merits of the appellant’s claims despite Appellate Rule 46 inadequacies in briefing). "Thus, unless we find a party’s non-compliance with … [Appellate Rule 46] sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised, we will address the merits of his claim." Id. (quotations and citations omitted), This is especially true for claims that have a constitutional dimension, as the speedy trial rule does. See Peele v. State, 136 N.E.3d 1155, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12). Here, we are able to, and chose to, address the merits of Hoback’s Rule 4(C) claim despite the inadequacies of his briefs.

Discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C)

[10, 11] [13] "The right of an accused to a speedy trial is, guaranteed by the United States, and Indiana Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12." Peele, 136 N.E.3d at 1158. Indiana Criminal Rule 4 implements those rights, and subsection (C) generally requires that a criminal defendant be brought to trial within one year from the date the criminal, charges were filed or the date he was arrested, whichever is later. Id.; Ind. Crim. Rule 4(C). Thus, Criminal Rule 4 "places an affirmative duty on the State to bring a defendant to trial within one year." Gibson v. State, 910 N.E.2d 263, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[12-14] [14] Furthermore, a "defendant has no obligation to· remind the trial court of the State’s duty, nor is he required to take any affirmative action to see that he is brought to trial within the statutory time period." State v. Black, 947 N.E.2d 503, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The defendant may waive his "right to be brought to trial within one year by failing to raise a timely objection if the trial court, acting during the one-year period, schedules the trial beyond the limit." Wood v. State, 999 N.E.2d 1054, 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. However, the defendant "has no duty to object to the setting of a belated trial date if the setting occurs after the year has expired[,]" id., because under those circumstances "the court cannot reset the trial within the time allotted by Criminal Rule 4(C)[,]" Young v. State, 765 N.E.2d 673, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). "In such an instance, the defendant may simply move for discharge after the expiration of the time limitation of Criminal Rule 4 without making an objection to the scheduled trial date." Id.

[15, 16] [15] However, when a continuance is had on the defendant’s motion or delay is caused by the defendant’s acts, congestion of the court, or an emergency, the time. limitation is extended by the amount of time resulting from such delay(s). Crim, R. 4(C), (F). But we "may not attribute any delays in proceeding to trial to the defendant where the record is void regarding the reason for the delay." Young, 765 N.E.2d at 678 (citing Morrison v. State, 555 N.E.2d 458, 461 (Ind. 1990)) (overruled on other grounds by Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1066 (Ind. 2004)). When "docket entries are absent or missing regarding the reason for a delay, the delay is not chargeable to the defendant." Id. As a panel of this Court noted in Staples v. State:

A trial court speaks through

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