Hochstetler v. State

215 N.E.3d 365

Freeman HOCHSTETLER, Willard Yoder, and Joe Hochstetler, Appellants-Defendants,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-CR-2154

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed July 27, 2023

Rehearing Denied October 10, 2023

Attorneys for Appellants: Paul E. Harold, Stephen M. Judge, SouthBank Legal, South Bend, Indiana, Karen Lynch Conway, Conway Law, LLC, South Bend, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Indiana Attorney General, Jesse R. Drum, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Riley, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellants Freeman Hochstetler (Freeman), Willard Yoder (Yoder), and Joe Hochstetler (Joe), (collectively, Defendants), appeal their convictions for intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(1).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Defendants present this court with three issues, which we restate and reorder as:

(1) Whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendants committed intimidation;

(2) Whether Defendants’ convictions are barred by the church autonomy doctrine; and

(3) Whether Defendants waived their arguments that their convictions are subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause and the Indiana Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] The Old Order Amish Church (OOAC) is a religious organization that has members living in several counties in Indiana. The OOAC in Indiana is divided into Districts. In 2016, J.W. and E.W. were members of OOAC District 50 living with at least five of their seven children in LaGrange County. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) first became involved with the family in December 2016 after it received a report that the father, J.W., was using inappropriate physical discipline in the home.

[5] DCS opened an informal adjustment with the family. E.W. and J.W. worked with Amish support groups as well as DCS during the informal adjustment period. A safety plan prohibiting J.W. from disciplining the children was imposed, but J.W. violated the plan by directing E.W. to discipline the children in the manner he preferred. The DCS informal adjustment ended in the spring of 2017 with the filing of a CHINS petition after J.W. was arrested¹ for battery against one of his children who was four or five years old at the time. In May 2017, E.W. and J.W. separated. DCS instituted a new safety plan for the family. On May 31, 2017, a civil protective order (the protective order)² was issued against J.W. in favor of E.W. and five of their minor children who were still living at home.

[6] E.W. believed that to comply with DCS's safety plan, she needed to keep J.W. away from their children and keep the protective order active. DCS employees told E.W. that if she had the protective order rescinded and there were further instances of abuse in the home, she was at risk of having her children removed from her care. J.W. made no progress during the CHINS proceedings, but the CHINS case was closed at the end of 2017 because DCS felt that E.W. would adequately protect the children's safety. In January 2018, E.W. moved with the children to OOAC's District 70-1, which is in Elkhart County. Initially, although she was not formally made a new member, E.W. was welcomed in District 70-1, and she took communion in the church there.

[7] It is the practice of the members of the OOAC not to involve secular authority or law enforcement in their lives. Although it is unclear from the record whether the members of District 50 were upset about J.W.’s abuse of his family or that E.W. had procured a protective order against J.W. or both, some members of District 50 supported E.W., while others did not. It is also a practice of the OOAC that when there is strife or discord in a District, a panel of three bishops from outside the District is formed to work with the community to resolve whatever issue it is facing. Joe Hochstetler, Freeman Hochstetler, and Daniel Hershberger (Hershberger), who are all bishops in the OOAC, were empaneled in 2017 to work with District 50, a process which began with the bishops discussing the matter with every family in the District.

[8] In August 2018, the two Hochstetlers and Hershberger met with E.W. to pressure her to reconcile with J.W. After this meeting, Hershberger left the panel, and Yoder took his place. In February 2020, the two Hochstetlers and Yoder—Defendants—and their wives met with E.W. at her home in Elkhart County. E.W. told them she would not remove herself from the protective order because doing so would violate DCS's safety plan and would increase the risk of her children being removed.

[9] Defendants returned to E.W.’s home on June 29, 2020, unannounced and without their wives. Defendants advised E.W. that District 50 had voted the previous day to place her in the Bann.³ Being placed in the Bann in the OOAC is a serious consequence to church members and meant that, although E.W. could attend church, she could not take communion or participate in church meetings, she could not serve herself at communal church meals, and her money would not be accepted at Amish stores. When E.W. asked if she had been banned for her refusal to remove herself from the protective order, Freeman nodded his head, while Joe told E.W. that she had "put [her]self into the ban [sic]." (Transcript Vol. II, p. 176). Defendants explained to E.W. that, to have the Bann lifted, E.W. would have to remove her name from the protective order. E.W. would also have to go to District 50, make a public confession of fault, and start working with an entirely different support group. Although E.W. was open to attempting reconciliation with J.W., she was unwilling to remove herself from the protective order.

[10] About four months later—with E.W. having taken no action to remove herself from the protective order—the local Bishop of the District 70-1 church read a letter from Defendants to the congregation. The letter announced to the congregation that E.W. had been placed in the Bann in District 50, in part, for her continued participation in the protective order. The letter specified that the eventual lifting of the Bann was conditioned, in part, on E.W.’s removal from the protective order.

[11] On May 28, 2021, the State filed Informations, charging Defendants with Class A misdemeanor intimidation for communicating a threat to E.W. to expose her to "hatred, contempt, disgrace, or ridicule, with the intent that [E.W.] engage in conduct against her will, to wit: petition to remove herself from a protective order[.]" (Amended App. Vol. II, p. 224). Defendants filed an unsuccessful motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that their actions were protected by the First Amendment and the church autonomy doctrine.

[12] During the ensuing bench trial, Defendants argued that their threatened speech—the Bann —invoked a matter of public or general concern within the OOAC community. Therefore, Defendants read Brewington v. State , 7 N.E.3d 946 (Ind. 2014), as requiring the State to prove actual malice. The State vigorously defended against applying actual malice, arguing:

E.W.’s decision to get a protective order is not and will not be a matter of public concern. It's a private choice, a private exercise to protect her family, to shield her children, based on what DCS communicated to her. Even more generally, Your Honor, a decision to seek a protective order is a fundamentally private act.

(Tr. Vol. III, p. 19). Finding that actual malice did not apply, the trial court convicted Defendants of intimidation.

[13] Defendants now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review

[14] When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Runnells v. State , 186 N.E.3d 1181, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). We look to the evidence and any resulting reasonable inferences that support the verdict. Id. The conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

B. State's Contentions

[15] We pause to address the State's appellate contentions. At trial, Defendants argued that their speech concerned issues of public or general concern, triggering the requirement that the State prove actual malice. At trial, the State vigorously defended this position, but on appeal, without explanation, the State reverses course. Now, the State joins Defendants in urging that their convictions must be reversed because the evidence of actual malice is lacking.

[16] We acknowledge that this court has accepted concessions by the State that the evidence does not support a conviction.

See , e.g. , Brent v. State , 957 N.E.2d 648, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing based on the State's admission that it had not presented evidence to support an element of the offense of visiting a common nuisance, given that the court was not faced with any other legal issued related to that conviction). However, here, the State attempts to concede its case based on a question of law which is a matter for the courts, not the State, to decide. In addition, we have long held that, even where the State concedes error, it is "nevertheless the duty of this court to examine the record and decide the law as applied to the facts." Nash v. State , 433 N.E.2d 807, 810 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) ; see also State v. Torres , 159 N.E.3d 1018, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (noting that even when the appellee fails to file a brief, this court is still obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record). The State does not present us with any authority indicating that we must accept its concession. Therefore, despite the State's change of stance, we will examine the law and the facts before us to determine whether the evidence supports Defendants’ convictions.

C. Sufficient Evidence of...