Hodges v. Gov't of Dist. of Columbia

975 F.Supp.2d 33

Toshia Hodges, Plaintiff,

v.Government of District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Barron Jackson, Plaintiff,

v.Government of District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Irma Flores, Plaintiff,

v.Government of District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Rasheed Hammond, Plaintiff,

v.Government of District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12–1900 (ABJ), Civil Action No. 12–1948 (ABJ), Civil Action No. 12–1989 (ABJ), Civil Action No. 12–1990 (ABJ)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

September 30, 2013

William Charles Cole Claiborne, III, Law Office of William Claiborne, III, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Douglas Stuart Rosenbloom, Gary Daniel Feldon, Keith David Parsons, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants, Government of District of Columbia, Sean Napper, Daniel Kelly, Michael Henderson and John Stathers.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Toshia Hodges, Barron Jackson, Irma Flores, and Rasheed Hammond have brought four separate actions against several Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers in their individual capacities and against the District of Columbia. They allege claims arising out of their arrests for disorderly conduct and their release pursuant to a “post-and-forfeit” procedure whereby an arrestee simultaneously posts and forfeits collateral in return for his release from jail without prosecution. Six of their claims are brought solely against the District of Columbia challenging the post-and-forfeit procedure. Specifically, plaintiffs assert: (1) four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the procedure, as applied to them, violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights; (2) one claim that the procedure constituted common law conversion of their forfeited collateral; and (3) one claim that the post-and-forfeit statute is void for vagueness.¹

The District of Columbia has moved to dismiss plaintiffs' post-and-forfeit claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In support of its motion, the District points to this Court's recent dismissal of substantially similar claims in Fox v. District of Columbia (“ Fox I ”), 851 F.Supp.2d 20 (D.D.C.2012) and Fox v. District of Columbia, (“ Fox II ”), 923 F.Supp.2d 302 (D.D.C.2013). In that case, the plaintiff asserted that the payment of collateral under the post-and-forfeit procedure violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments and constituted common law conversion. Fox I, 851 F.Supp.2d at 22; Fox II, 923 F.Supp.2d at 305. After extensive briefing and a lengthy motion's hearing, this Court concluded that the post-and-forfeit procedure did not violate the plaintiff's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and did not constitute common law conversion because it was voluntary and it furthered the District's legitimate interests. SeeFox I, 851 F.Supp.2d at 23; Fox II, 923 F.Supp.2d at 309–10.

Plaintiffs in this case recycle many of the arguments that the Court rejected in Fox. Therefore, the Court finds that although plaintiffs have standing to bring their post-and-forfeit claims, they have failed to plausibly allege that the procedure violated their rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, that it constitutes conversion, or that the statute is void for vagueness. The Court will therefore grant the District's motion to dismiss those counts under Rule 12(b)(6).

In addition to the post-and-forfeit claims, plaintiff Jackson has brought a section 1983 claim against the District alleging that his arrest violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The District has also moved to dismiss that claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court finds that Jackson has failed to meet the standard for municipal liability under section 1983, and therefore, it will grant the District's motion to dismiss this claim. All of the plaintiffs' claims against the individual officers and their claims against the District concerning disorderly conduct arrests will remain.

BACKGROUND

The D.C.Code expressly grants the MPD the authority to tender an offer to any arrestee charged with certain misdemeanors to “obtain a full and final resolution of the criminal charge” by agreeing to simultaneously post and forfeit an amount as collateral. D.C. Code § 5–335.01(a). This is referred to as “the post-and-forfeit procedure.” It is not an admission of guilt, and it does not result in a criminal conviction. While the process does not eradicate the record of the original arrest, the statute provides that “[t]he fact that a person resolved a charge using the post-and-forfeit procedure may not be relied upon by any court ... or agency of the District of Columbia in any subsequent criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or administrative action to impose any sanction, penalty, enhanced sentence, or civil disability.” Id. § 5–335.01(b).

The collateral amount for each charge is set by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and, if not forfeited, serves as a security upon release to ensure the arrestee's appearance at trial. Id. § 5–335.01(a), (g). The statute requires that the MPD provide written notice to the arrestee at the time the offer is tendered. Id. § 5–335.01(c). The notice must include, in relevant part, the identity of the crime to be resolved, and the amount of collateral to be posted and forfeited. Id. § 5–335.01(d)(1). The notice must also state that the arrestee has the right to choose whether to accept the post-and-forfeit offer or to proceed with the criminal case and a potential adjudication on the merits, and that the forfeiture becomes final ninety days after the arrestee signs the notice. Id. §§ 5–335.01(d)(2), (6). During the ninety day period, the arrestee or the Office of the Attorney General may file a motion with the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to set aside the forfeiture and proceed with the criminal case. Id. § 5–335.01(d)(6).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs allege that Metropolitan Police Department officers arrested and charged them with “disorderly conduct—loud and boisterous” without probable cause. After their arrests, they were each transported to a police station and offered the choice between posting and forfeiting $35.00 to obtain their immediate release and resolution of their criminal charges, or spending the night in jail and being transported to Superior Court for presentment the following day. Plaintiffs allege that the police officers did not offer them citation release, release on collateral (without forfeiting), or release on the Detention Journal.² Each of the plaintiffs elected to pay and forfeit the collateral, and they were each presented with a post-and-forfeit form that included the statutorily required notifications under section 5–335.02(d). None of them exercised their statutory right to seek to have the forfeiture set aside and contest the charges by filing a motion in Superior Court.

The factual allegations specific to each plaintiff are follows:

A. Hodges v. District of Columbia (Civ.Action.No. 12–1900)

Plaintiff Toshia Hodges alleges that on November 26, 2009, her ex-husband called her and asked her to pick up his daughter from his mother's house in the southeastern part of the District of Columbia. Hodges Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 18] ¶ 17. She explains that the police had been called to the house because of a “situation” involving her ex-husband, his daughter, and other members of his family. Id. ¶ 19. When she arrived at the house, she allegedly witnessed police officers “abusing [her ex-husband] physically and verbally.” Id. ¶ 21. Hodges states that after she “implored the MPD officers to get off her husband,” one of the officers grabbed her, slammed her onto the police car, handcuffed her, and placed her in the police car. Id. ¶¶ 26, 30. According to Hodges, she did not touch any officers, interfere with them, or yell at them. Id. ¶¶ 27–29.

The officers transported Hodges to the police station and charged her with “disorderly conduct—loud and boisterous” under D.C. Code § 22–1321(a)(1). See id. ¶¶ 33, 42. Hodges' mother went to the police station to assist her daughter. Id. ¶ 34. At the station, the officer allegedly told Hodges' mother that “if her daughter ‘wanted to come home tonight’ she would have to pay $35.00 to ‘post and forfeit’ for ‘disorderly conduct—loud and boisterous.’ ” Id. ¶ 35. The officers added that if Hodges did not want to forfeit the collateral, she could wait to be transported to Superior Court the following day. Id. ¶ 36. Hodges elected to pay the $35.00 post-and-forfeit amount and was released. Id. ¶ 49.

B. Jackson v. District of Columbia (Civ. Action No. 12–1948)

On the afternoon of February 21, 2010, plaintiff Barron Jackson was riding a D.C. metropolitan bus that came to a stop near the intersection of 14th Street and E Street, N.E. because a police car was allegedly partially blocking the street. Jackson Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 8] ¶¶ 19–21. According to Jackson, the bus was unable to pass by the car because another officer was standing in the street next to the car. Id. ¶ 22. After what he states was about ten to fifteen minutes, Jackson grew tired of waiting and exited the bus. Id. ¶¶ 24, 26. He then walked to the officer in the street and stated: “Why don't you move the damn car?” Id. ¶ 27. The officer allegedly asked Jackson to repeat his statement, and Jackson replied: “I said why don't you move the f*cking car out of the street so the bus can get by?” Id. ¶¶ 28–29. The officer told Jackson that he could not say that, and Jackson responded: “I can say anything I want to ... This is the United States!” Id. ¶¶ 30–31.

The officers arrested Jackson for “disorderly conduct—profane language” under D.C. Code § 22–1321 and transported him to the police station, where they held him for several hours. Id. ¶¶ 44, 49, n.2. At the station, the officers...