Hodges v. Sharon, Case No. 1:13-cv-00654-DAD-SAB (PC)

TYRE'ID O.I. HODGES, Plaintiff, v. JERALD SHARON, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00654-DAD-SAB (PC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

July 27, 2016

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(ECF No. 41, 51-53)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Plaintiff Tyre'id O.I. Hodges is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment which was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part.

I.PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed this action on May 6, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) On February 26, 2014, an order issued finding that Plaintiff had stated cognizable claims under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA") against Defendants Jerald Sharon, Rosa Guembe, Kathleen Allison, Ralph Diaz, D. Foston, Darryl Heterbrink, R. Hall, Jose D. Ojeda, and J. D. Lozano, and a cognizable Equal Protection Claim against Defendant Jerald Sharon. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff was ordered to either file an amended complaint or notify the Court that he was willing to proceed on those claims found to be cognizable in the February 26, 2014 order. (Id. at 9-10.) On this same date, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (ECF No. 10.) On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff notified the Court that he wanted to proceed on those claims found to be cognizable in the February 26, 2014 order, and requested that the first amended complaint be disregarded. (ECF No. 11.) On March 26, 2016, an order issued striking the first amended complaint. (ECF No. 12.)

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on August 18, 2014 which was granted on October 22, 2014, and Plaintiff's claim for monetary damages under RLUIPA was dismissed. (ECF Nos. 20, 28.)

On December 30, 2015, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 41.) After receiving several extensions of time, Plaintiff filed an opposition on February 24, 2016.¹ (ECF Nos. 51-53.)

II.LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marksomitted); Washington Mut. Inc. v. U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case...." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Each party's position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted), and it must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes entry of judgment, Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

Section 3 of RLUIPA provides that "[n]o government shall impose a substantial burdenon the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, unless the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest, and does so by the least restrictive means." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005) (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2)). Religious exercise includes "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by or central to, a system of religious belief." Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). In enacting RLUIPA, Congress replaced the "legitimate penological interest" standard with the " 'compelling governmental interest' and 'least restrictive means' tests codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)." Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005).

Section 3 applies to state run institutions such as prisons. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). RLUIPA does not elevate accommodation of religion over an institutions need to maintain order and safety. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723. In enacting RLUIPA, the legislature expected courts to apply the standards of RLUIPA with "due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources." Cutter, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (citations omitted).

The inmate bears the initial burden of presenting evidence to demonstrate a prima facie claim that the conditions he is objecting to constitute a substantial burden on the exercise of his religious beliefs. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994. If the inmate establishes the prima facie existence of a substantial burden on exercise of his religious beliefs, then the defendants bear the burden of proving that any substantial burden on the exercise of the inmate's religious beliefs is both in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means for furthering that compelling governmental interest. Id. at 995. RLUIPA is to be broadly construed in favor of protecting an inmate's right to exercise his religious beliefs. Id.

"[A] 'substantial burden' on 'religious exercise' must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995 (quoting San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir.2004)). The Supreme Court has also found a substantial burden "where the state denies an important benefit because of conductmandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981)).

RLUIPA provides a safe harbor provision by which the government entity may avoid liability under RLUIPA "by changing the policy or practice that results in a substantial burden on religious exercise, by retaining the policy or practice and exempting the substantially burdened religious exercise, by providing exemptions from the policy or practice for applications that substantially burden religious exercise, or by any other means that eliminates the substantial burden." 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-3(e). While the Court does not find any published Ninth Circuit case construing this provision, courts have interpreted it according to its ordinary meaning. Forter v. Geer, 868 F.Supp.2d 1091, 1098 (D. Or. 2012), aff'd, 536 F. App'x 724 (9th Cir. 2013).

III.ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT

On October 23, 1998, Plaintiff was transferred to the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility ("CSATF") and is currently housed in Facility A Building 2. (Compl. ¶ 22, ECF No. 1.) Although Plaintiff had been born Jewish, prior to his incarceration he had practiced Hebrew Christianity. (Id.) In 1995, Plaintiff adopted the beliefs of Messianic Judaism, and from 1995 to 2009, he was not able to practice his faith in an open forum. (Id.) In November 2009, the Messianic Jewish members were afforded the opportunity to have use of the Facility Chapel but without a Messianic Jewish Rabbi, no Messianic Jewish prayer books, no bibles, no prayer shawls, no skull caps, or Messianic Jewish CDs or DVDs. (Id.) Plaintiff also requested to have kosher meals provided for the specific Holy Days and a daily kosher diet, but the request was denied by Defendant Sharon (Jewish Chaplain) after a lengthy interview. (Id.)

On August 3, 2010, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal requesting that his religious designation be made Messianic Judaism. (Id.) Plaintiff sought to have Messianic Judaism be listed under the Jewish category and be officially endorsed by the prison and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"). (Id.) Plaintiff also sought to have specified days for Messianic Jewish services, kosher religious meals, to be excused from workfor religious observances, and noted that a Messianic Jewish rabbi was required for religious...