Hodgson v. Wood

1

JOSHUA S. HODGSON, Plaintiff, v. W WILLIS WOOD, et al., Defendants.

No. 9:22-CV-275 (LEK/DJS)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

January 23, 2024

JOSHUA S. HODGSON Plaintiff, Pro Se

MURPHY BURNS LLP Attorney for Defendants

THOMAS K. MURPHY, ESQ.

DANIEL J. STEWART UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER^[1]

P Pro se Plaintiff brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at the Fulton County Jail. See Dkt. No. 1, Compl. Defendants have now filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), seeking to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. Dkt No. 19. Plaintiff's response to the Motion was originally due April 24, 2023. See Dkt. No. 21. Plaintiff requested an extension of time to respond, Dkt. No. 23, and the Court granted an extension to May 24, 2023. Dkt. No. 24. Plaintiff then requested a second extension to respond and the Court reset the response deadline to June 27, 2023. Dkt Nos. 25 & 26. Plaintiff did not respond by that date and the Court sua sponte reset the deadline a third time, directing Plaintiff to respond by October 6, 2023, and providing renewed warnings about the consequences of not responding. Dkt. No. 28. To date, Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion.

Defendants seek summary judgment on two grounds: 1) the purported preclusive effect of certain criminal proceedings involving Plaintiff and 2) the merits of the claims. See generally Dkt. No. 19-3, Defs.' Mem. of Law. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED on the merits.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 28, 2020, Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Fulton County Jail as a M result of a parole violation. Compl. at p. 4; Dkt. No. 19-6, Pl.'s Dep., p. 6.^[2] On that date, Plaintiff was scheduled for a medical visit outside the facility. Dkt. No. 19-9, Siegle Aff., ¶ 2. Defendants Siegle and Blake were assigned to transport Plaintiff to that appointment.

Id.; Dkt. No. 19-10, Blake Aff., ¶ 2. Siegle and Blake secured Plaintiff for transport using handcuffs and leg shackles in the Jail's holding cell area. Siegle Aff. at ¶ 2; Blake Aff. at ¶ 3. Those officers, along with Defendant Wood, left the holding cell for an area known as the sally port where the transport van was parked. Siegle Aff. at ¶ 3; Blake Aff. at ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 19-8, Wood Aff., ¶ 3. Most of the escort inside the sally port was captured on surveillance video. Dkt. No. 19-7, Video.

Upon entering the sally port, Siegle went to the facility weapons station to obtain a firearm for the transport. Siegle Aff. at ¶ 4. After obtaining a weapon, Siegle proceeded to enter the van in the driver's seat. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. Blake and Wood escorted Plaintiff to the transport van. Blake Aff. at ¶¶ 5-6; Wood Aff., ¶ 4; Video at 00:12-00:40. Plaintiff was seated in the van without incident. Video at 00:33-00:43; Pl.'s Dep. at pp. 22-23. Blake and Wood walked away from the van. Video at 00:43-00:48. Blake then proceeded to obtain a firearm. Blake Aff. at ¶ 6.

A few seconds after leaving the van, Defendant Wood approached it again. Video at 00:54-1:00. Wood maintains that he returned to the van to fasten Plaintiff's seatbelt, b but that Plaintiff refused to permit him to do so. Wood Aff. at ¶¶ 6-8. Plaintiff claims that upon arriving back at the van Wood confronted him about grievances he had filed. Pl.'s Dep. at pp. 24 & 26. He claims that it was then that Wood punched him, delivering “three or four blows to [Plaintiff's] right rib cage” in what Plaintiff described as “rapid blows.” Pl.'s Dep. at pp. 28-29. Wood then left the van, but Plaintiff testified that Wood returned and punched him again. Id. at p. 34. The video shows Wood leaving the sally port and Blake entering the transport van, which then proceeded to leave the facility. Video at 1:17-2:00.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate through “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with [ ] affidavits, if any,” that there is no genuine issue of material fact. F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and cannot rest merely on allegations or denials of the facts submitted by the movant. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory allegations or denials are M ordinarily not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment when the moving party has set out a documentary case.”); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994). To that end, sworn statements are “more than mere conclusory allegations subject to disregard . . . they are specific and detailed allegations of fact, made under penalty of perjury, and should be treated as evidence in deciding a summary judgment motion” and the credibility of such statements is better left to a trier of fact. Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d at 289 (citing Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) and Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995)).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). “[T]he trial court's task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). Furthermore, where a party is proceeding pro se, the court must “read [his or her] supporting papers liberally, and . . . interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). Nonetheless, summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita E Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. Ltd., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants seek summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff's excessive force claim is procedurally barred and that dismissal on the merits with respect to all claims is appropriate. Defs.' Mem. of Law at pp. 3-10. For the reasons which follow, the Court recommends dismissing all claims on the merits.

A. Excessive Force Claim against Defendant Wood

1. Heck Bar

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

Id. at 486-87. Defendants claim that this claim is barred as a result of subsequent charges brought against Plaintiff. Defs.' Mem. of Law at pp. 6-7. The Court recommends that this is not a basis for summary judgment.

Plaintiff filed a grievance the day after the alleged assault by Defendant Wood which was investigated. Dkt. No. 19-5 at pp. 22-27. Plaintiff ultimately gave a sworn

M statement to an investigator with the Fulton County Sheriff's Department stating that he was assaulted by Wood. Id. at pp. 20-21. Investigators eventually concluded that no assault occurred and Plaintiff was charged with making a false written statement and falsely reporting an incident to law enforcement, both misdemeanors. Id. at pp. 10-11. In an unrelated matter, charges were also brought against Plaintiff for possession of prison contraband. See id. at p. 1. Plaintiff pled guilty to that charge. Id. A criminal disposition form related to the misdemeanor charges indicates only that they were “covered” by the unrelated contraband charge. Id. at p. 2. There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff pled guilty to either of those charges.^[3] Plaintiff's assault allegations in no way call into question his conviction for possessing prison contraband and so Heck is not applicable. Summary judgment on this ground should be denied.

2. Merits

“The law is unclear as to whether or not an alleged parole violator should be treated as a convicted prisoner or a pretrial detainee.” Jenkins v. Medert, 2018 WL 4328823, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018). The District Court's initial review order, and Defendants themselves, analyzed Plaintiff's excessive force claim assuming that Plaintiff would be considered a pretrial detainee, the more favorable standard to Plaintiff, and so the Court assumes this to be true for purposes of this Motion. Dkt. No. 7; Defs.' Mem. of Law at p. 3.

In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the Supreme Court addressed the proper standard for e evaluating excessive force claims brought under the Fourteenth...