Hodson v. United States

DAVID JOSEPH HODSON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

Case No. 19-CV-2169 (PAM/ECW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

February 2, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action comes before the Court on Ground Four of Petitioner David Joseph Hodson's Second Amended Motion to Withdraw Plea, for Relief from Order, and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1 ("Petition")). For the following reasons, the Court recommends dismissing Ground Four of the Petition—and so this action—without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Oregon Proceedings

On November 16, 2011, a grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon ("USDC-DOR") indicted Hodson on one count of arson under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and one count of making and possessing an unregistered destructive device under 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(c), 5861(f), 5822, 5841, 5845, and 5871. (See Oregon Dkt. 1 at 1-2.¹)On March 6, 2012, Hodson filed a "Notice of Intent to Present Insanity Defense." (See Oregon Dkt. 25 at 1.) This stated that Hodson "inten[ded] to assert a defense of insanity" and that an expert would testify that "at the time of the events described in the indictment, [Hodson] was insane in accordance with the test for insanity set [forth] in 18 U.S.C. § 17." (Id. at 1-2.)

On August 20, 2012, Hodson waived his jury trial rights and a court trial began. (See Oregon Dkt. 39 at 1.) At trial, the Government "stipulated to the admission into evidence" of a report by Hodson's expert, and further stipulated to "his opinion that, at the time of the charged offenses, [Hodson's] conduct was the result of a severe mental disease or defect such that [Hodson] was unable to appreciate the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of his acts." (Oregon Dkt. 40 at 1-2.) During the August 20, 2012 proceedings, the court found Hodson was competent and understood the proceedings based on Hodson's responses to questions about the lawyers' roles and the court's role. (Oregon Dkt. 127 at 5-6.) The court asked if Hodson understood his right to a jury trial and if his waiver of that right was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Id. at 6-9.) The court explained to Hodson that both his lawyer and the government were proposing to proceed by way of a stipulated facts trial, that evidence regarding Hodson's mental state would be submitted verbally during the hearing, and that both sides would be arguing thatHodson should be found not guilty only because he was insane at the time the event took place. (Id. at 7-8.)

On August 22, 2012, the USDC-DOR entered a judgment finding Hodson not guilty only by reason of insanity. (See Oregon Dkt. 40 at 2.) The court also found that Hodson had "recovered from his mental disease or defect to such an extent that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4243(b)(2), his conditional release under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric or psychological care or treatment would no longer create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another." (Id.) Based on these findings, the USDC-DOR ordered that Hodson "be conditionally discharged under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment under the management and supervision of the U.S. Probation Office." (Id.)

Over the next several years, Hodson had various problems following the terms of his conditional release. (See Dkt. 11 at 1, 9-10; Dkt. 27 at 3.) On August 15, 2017, the USDC-DOR revoked Hodson's conditional release based on 18 U.S.C. § 4243(g).² (See,e.g., Oregon Dkt. 118 at 3.) The court placed Hodson into the Attorney General's custody "for care and treatment at a suitable facility," and recommended, "based on [Hodson's] prior mental health treatment, that he be hospitalized at the Federal Medical Center, Rochester Minnesota ['FMC-Rochester'] until it is found that an alternative placement in the community is in his best interest." (Id.)

In August 2018, Hodson emailed the USDC-DOR, stating that he wished "to withdraw [his] Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity plea" and asserting "ineffective assistance of [counsel]." (Oregon Dkt. 123 at 1.) He claimed that his plea decision had hinged on incorrect information that trial counsel had given him about the effects of "4243 status." (Id.) The USDC-DOR construed this as a motion to withdraw Hodson's guilty plea and appointed Robert Weppner to serve as Hodson's counsel. (See, e.g., Oregon Dkt. 125.)

In February 2019, Hodson filed the Petition in the USDC-DOR. (See Oregon Dkt. 128.) It presented four grounds for relief: (1) a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6); (2) a plea-withdrawal motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d)(2)(B); (3) a motion to correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; and (4) a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (See id. at 3-6.) Each ground sought to withdraw Hodson's 2012 not-guilty plea based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, namely that he was not advised that pleading not guilty byreason of insanity ("NGRI") could result in indefinite incarceration in the federal prison system. (See id.) After initial briefing (see Oregon Dkt. 136, 141), the USDC-DOR ordered the parties to address the court's jurisdiction to address the Petition's § 2241 component (see Oregon Dkt. 143). That further briefing was complete on July 17, 2019. (See Oregon Dkts. 144-45.)

On August 7, 2019, the USDC-DOR issued an opinion and order addressing the Petition. (See Oregon Dkt. 146.) The court denied Hodson's motions under Civil Rule 60(b)(6), Criminal Rule 12(d)(2)(B), and 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (See id. at 3-4.) As for the Petition's § 2241 portion (Ground Four) the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over that portion because a § 2241 petition must be heard by the "custodial court."³ (Id. at 5 (quoting Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000).) The court thus transferred Ground Four of the Petition to "the court of competent jurisdiction." (Id. at 6.) Because Hodson then resided (and still resides) at FMC-Rochester, the case was transferred to this District, which received the action on August 8, 2019.⁴ (See, e.g., Dkt. 1 at 1.)

B. Petition

As noted above, only Ground Four of the Petition is before this Court.⁵ Ground Four asserts that Hodson is subject to the § 2241 remedy for at least two reasons: (1) that is he "in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States" (id. at 5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2))); and (2) that he "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States" (id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); ellipses in Petition)). As relief, Hodson contends that he is entitled to "vacation of the Court's Order of August 15, 2017, vacation of the Court's judgment of August 22, 2012, and withdrawal of his [NGRI] plea." (Id. at 6.)

On January 3, 2020, the Court ordered Respondent to file an answer to the Petition's Ground Four and gave Hodson the option to reply. (See Dkt. 3 at 1-3.) The Court also appointed counsel for Hodson. (See id. at 2.) The United States and Hodson have filed a response and reply, respectively (see Dkt. 11, Dkt. 27), so briefing concerning the Petition's Ground Four is complete.

II. ANALYSIS

The parties dispute whether this Court has jurisdiction to address Ground Four of the Petition. (Compare Dkt. 11 at 14-20, 25, with Dkt. 27 at 4-9.) Because jurisdictional questions are threshold questions, the Court will address this dispute at the outset. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004); Willis v. United States, No. 20-CV-0975 (PAM/DTS), 2020 WL 5505886, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2020), R.&R. adopted, 2020 WL 5500456 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 2020).

The key points of contention are (1) whether the existence of a separate (and ostensibly adequate) statutory remedy—namely, the procedure established by 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h)—bars Hodson from using 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and (2) whether Hodson otherwise cannot use § 2241 because he seeks to "collaterally attack his decision to assert a successful insanity defense." Archuleta v. Hedrick, 365 F.3d 644, 648-49 (8th Cir. 2004). On both points, Respondent says yes; Hodson, no. As discussed below, the Court agrees with Hodson on the first point, but with Respondent on the second. The Court therefore recommends dismissing this action without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

A. Relevance of Statutory Remedy

The parties dispute whether the availability of 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) prevents Hodson from using § 2241. (Compare Dkt. 11 at 17-20, with Dkt. 27 at 4-6.) Respondent contends that § 2241 relief exists only where a petitioner has no other remedy; that § 4247(h) provides Hodson an "alternative route to discharge"; and so § 4247(h)'s availability bars Hodson's turn to § 2241. (Dkt. 11 at 17.) Hodson's main counter is that § 4247 "expressly provides" for habeas relief. (Dkt. 27 at 4.) In theCourt's view, the Eighth Circuit's Archuleta decision is dispositive in Hodson's favor. Describing Archuleta in some detail will make this clear (and will also clarify the next section's discussion).

In Archuleta, the Eighth Circuit reversed a district court decision to dismiss a § 2241 petition; the Eighth Circuit remanded the case with an instruction to transfer the case to another district. 365 F.3d at 646. Authorities in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah ("USDC-DUT") had charged Archuleta with assaulting a federal officer. See id. He was later found "not guilty only by reason of insanity," and the USDC-DUT committed him to federal custody at the Federal Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri ("FMC-Springfield"). Id. Archuleta was conditionally released for a time, but in July 2002 the USDC-DUT revoked his release and recommitted him to FMC-Springfield. See id.

In August 2002 Archuleta filed a § 2241 petition in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of...