Hofacker v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n

179 F.Supp.3d 463

Lisa A. Hofacker, Plaintiff,

v.Wells Fargo Bank National Association, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION No. 16-517

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed April 7, 2016

Adam David Meshkov, Meshkov & Breslin, Easton, PA, for Plaintiff.

Lauren Fuiman Cell, Michael R. Galey, Fisher & Phillips LLP, Radnor, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

ROBERT F. KELLY, Senior District Judge

Presently before this Court is Defendant, Wells Fargo Bank National Association's (“Defendant”), “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint,” the Response in Opposition by Plaintiff, Lisa A. Hofacker (“Plaintiff”), and Defendant's Reply in Further Support of its Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, this Motion is granted without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 10, 2015, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit by filing a Writ of Summons in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas against her former employer. On December 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint setting forth claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) at 43 Pa.C.S.A. § 951 et seq. Defendant responded by filing a Notice of Removal to this Court on January 4, 2016. (Doc. No. 1.)

The facts of this case begin on approximately February 7, 2012, when Plaintiff was hired as a part-time teller/sales associate by Defendant's branch, which is located at 541 Main Street, Slatington, Pennsylvania, 18080. (Compl ¶ 7.) Soon after Plaintiff was hired, she made an oral request for a reasonable accommodation. (Id.¶ 11.) Plaintiff suffered from a permanent right-sided long thoracic and suprascapular nerve injury, fibromyalgia, and a non-displaced tear of the right superior glenoid labrum. (Id.¶ 8.) If she performs repetitive motions, these injuries cause extreme pain and fatigue. (Id.¶¶ 9-10.)

Due to these injuries, Plaintiff requested that she not be required to work the drive-through banking window because “she was unable to bear the repeated operation of the pneumatic tubes utilized with and by drive-through banking customers.” (Id.¶ 12.) Plaintiff made her request to branch managers and, after receiving no response, submitted an identical written accommodation online. (Id.¶¶ 13-14). Defendant eventually granted Plaintiff's request on or about March or April 2012, and continued to allow the accommodation until September 2013. (Id.¶ 15.) It was during that period that the drive-through window was reconfigured in an effort to eliminate the need for over-the-head reaching by employees. (Id.¶ 16.)

Plaintiff alleges that on or about November 17, 2012, she attempted to work the reconfigured drive-through window, but experienced tremendous pain, and Defendant, again, accommodated her by removing her from her drive-through duties. (Id.¶ 17.) In August 2013, Defendant's Accommodations Specialist, Susan J. Price (“Ms. Price”), wrote a letter to Plaintiff's physician requesting clarification with respect to her physical limitations. (Id.¶ 18.) On August 26, 2013, Plaintiff's physician, Dr. Patrick Hanley, D.O. (“Dr. Hanley”) responded in writing to Ms. Price, speculating that the reconfigured drive-through work station should alleviate Plaintiff's pain. (Id.¶ 19.)

Plaintiff alleges that on September 28, 2013, she was told by branch manager Christine Steigerwalt that working at the drive-through window was an essential function of her job and due to unspecified staffing issues, she would no longer be provided the assistance of a second employee to handle the exchange of items from the pneumatic tubes. (Id.¶¶ 20-21.) The next day on September 29, 2013, Plaintiff worked the drive-through window without assistance. (Id.¶ 23.) Plaintiff alleges that working the drive-through window resulted in her having to take a forced leave of absence a day after the shift due to extreme pain. (Id.¶ 24.)

On or about January 20, 2014, Dr. Hanley provided a note to Defendant clearing Plaintiff to return to work on the restriction that she not work the drive-through window until a functional capacity evaluation was performed. (Id.¶ 25.) Ms. Price sent a letter to Plaintiff on January 24, 2014, indicating she was unhappy with Dr. Hanley's request and she would not abide by it; rather, she would hold Plaintiff's job open until February 7, 2014, to accommodate the functional capacity evaluation, which was scheduled for January 28, 2014. (Id.¶ 26; Exh. C.)

Following the functional capacity evaluation, Dr. Hanley sent a letter to Ms. Price indicating that Plaintiff needed to be limited to jobs that did not include over-the-head reaching or any type of pulling or pushing with the right arm. (Id.¶¶ 27; Exh. D.) These limitations were confirmed in a follow-up letter between Dr. Hanley and Ms. Price. (Id.¶¶ 28; Exh. E.) Ms. Price then sent Plaintiff correspondence indicating that Defendant would accommodate her by having her use her left arm to push and pull any transactions at the lobby counter and by having her pull the canisters from the tubes with her left hand at the drive-through window. (Id.¶ 30; Exh. F.) Plaintiff never returned to work because she alleges that Defendant failed to provide a reasonable accommodation despite its ability to do so, which resulted in her being forced from her job. (Id.¶ 32; Pl.'s Resp. in Opp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 4.)

Presently before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 4.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against it for two reasons: (1) Defendant did not fail to accommodate Plaintiff; and (2) Plaintiff was not qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without a reasonable accommodation. (See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. at 7-15.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993). Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff has failed to set forth a claim from which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ; see also Lucas v. City of Phila., No. 11–4376, 2012 WL 1555430, at *2 (E.D.Pa. May 2, 2012) (citing Hedges v. U.S., 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.2005) ). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must view any reasonable inferences from the factual allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Buck v. Ham p ton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir.2006).

The United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) set forth in Twombly, and further defined in Iqbal, a two-part test to determine whether to grant or deny a motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (“Third Circuit”) has noted that these cases signify the progression from liberal pleading requirements to more “exacting scrutiny” of the complaint. Wilson v. City of Phila., 415 Fed.Appx. 434, 436 (3d Cir.2011).

Initially, the court must ascertain whether the complaint is supported by well-pleaded factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Conclusions of law can serve as the foundation of a complaint, but to survive dismissal they must be supported by factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. These factual allegations must be explicated sufficiently to provide a defendant the type of notice that is contemplated by Rule 8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008). Where there are well-pleaded facts, courts must assume their truthfulness. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Upon a finding of a well-pleaded complaint, the court must then determine whether these allegations “plausibly” give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This is a “context specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. Plausibility compels the pleadings to contain enough factual content to allow a court to make “a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). This is not a probability requirement; rather plausibility necessitates “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility.”' Id.(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In other words, a complaint must not only allege entitlement to relief, but must demonstrate such entitlement with sufficient facts to nudge the claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 683, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; see also Holmes v. Gates, 403 Fed.Appx. 670, 673 (3d Cir.2010).

The general rule is that “a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.” W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 n. 6 (3d Cir.2010) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1997) ). “However, an exception to the general rule is that a 'document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint' may be considered 'without converting the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary judgment.”' Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426 (citing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir.1996) ); see also Pension...