Hogan v. Mahabir

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TANYA YVETTE HOGAN, Plaintiff, v. KESHIA MAHABIR and JOHN PORTA, Defendants.

No. 22-CV-07858 (HG) (CLP)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

May 24, 2023

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

HECTOR GONZALEZ, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff has asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act against another employee of her former employer and an attorney who represented Plaintiff's former employer during an administrative proceeding that Plaintiff commenced with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”). ECF No. 1. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Southern District”) granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis but transferred the case to this Court. ECF Nos. 3, 4.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the two current Defendants with prejudice because the ADA and Rehabilitation Act do not provide for individual liability. The Court also denies Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to assert these claims against her former employer because such an amendment would be futile. Any ADA claim against Plaintiff's former employer would be barred by the statute of limitations, and Plaintiff cannot allege that her former employer, a private company, was a recipient of federal funds, as required by the Rehabilitation Act.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her complaint using a pre-printed form that the Southern District makes available to litigants who are representing themselves pro se. ECF No. 1. On that form, Plaintiff checked boxes indicating that she is asserting federal claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Id. at 4. She left unchecked boxes that she could have used to indicate her intent to assert any claims under the New York State Human Rights Law or the New York City Human Rights Law, even though the form indicated that those statutes authorize plaintiffs to assert claims of “employment discrimination” on the basis of their alleged “disability.” Id. Using other check boxes, Plaintiff alleges that her claims are based on her former employer's termination of her employment and failure to accommodate her alleged disability. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from a “learning disability,” attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and “depressive disorder.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff attached to her complaint a written assessment provided by Northwell Health in February 2022 corroborating those diagnoses. ECF No. 1-2 at 6.

Plaintiff's former employer is named either DNATA Ground Services or DNATA USA (“DNATA”)-the materials she filed use both names in different places-and provides an unspecified service at JFK Airport. ECF No. 1 at 3, 9. However, rather than naming her former employer as a Defendant, Plaintiff indicated in the “Defendant Information” section of her form complaint that she is naming as Defendants one of her former colleagues, Keshia Mahabir, along with an attorney from Jackson Lewis PC, John Porta. Id. at 2. Plaintiff's complaint attaches a right-to-sue letter that she received from the EEOC after filing a charge of discrimination, which indicates that Defendant Porta and Jackson Lewis represented DNATA during Plaintiff's administrative proceedings before the EEOC. Id. at 11-12.

Plaintiff seeks multiple forms of relief. ECF No. 1 at 6. She demands that her employer re-hire her, accommodate her disabilities and pay $20,000 in damages attributable to the “mental anguish” that Plaintiff suffered because of her termination and subsequent eviction from her residence. Id. Plaintiff seeks an additional $7,500 in damages attributable to a period of time in which her employer was allegedly “withholding [her] from work” during a dispute related to her identification badge and a drug test. Id.

Plaintiff's complaint does not describe the alleged misconduct that Defendants committed, apart from the cursory description of the incident related to her identification badge and drug test. ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff does not indicate how the individuals she named as Defendants were involved in that incident. Id. However, Plaintiff's complaint attaches the charge of discrimination that she filed with the EEOC and the New York State Division of Human Rights, which contains a longer factual narrative. Id. at 9-10. In that charge, Plaintiff alleges that she requested from her employer the following accommodations when taking unspecified “tests”: “a reader,” “extra time,” and “an alternative testing place.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff also alleges that she aggravated a pre-existing neck and shoulder injury but that her employer denied her “an accommodation of being transferred somewhere else.” Id.

Specifically with respect to Defendant Mahabir, Plaintiff's EEOC charge alleges that Plaintiff missed work to attend doctors' appointments and because of “flare ups” of her “chronic asthma.” ECF No. 1 at 9-10. Despite providing “documentation from [her] doctors” to justify these absences, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mahabir, a human resources employee at DNATA “hassled” and “manipulated” her and advocated that Plaintiff “be removed from the job.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff's charge of discrimination does not mention Defendant Porta or describe him as having played a role in the incidents giving rise to the charge. Id.

Plaintiff's charge of discrimination briefly describes other incidents that occurred during her employment that are not expressly connected to any of her alleged disabilities. For example, Plaintiff alleges that she was not provided certain winter apparel, which she alleges was part of DNATA's winter uniform. ECF No. 1 at 10. She also alleges that she “went to [the] warehouse to warm up,” but another employee yelled at her and told her to leave. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that another employee complained that Plaintiff was sending her harassing text messages, which Plaintiff denies, and the Human Resources department coerced Plaintiff into writing a statement admitting that the incident happened. Id.

Plaintiff initiated her lawsuit in the Southern District, which granted her request to proceed in forma pauperis without paying any court fees. See ECF No. 3. However, the Southern District declined to issue a summons to Defendants, and they have therefore not appeared. See ECF No. 4. Instead, the Southern District transferred the case to this District, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, because although venue was proper in the Southern District for Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, venue in the Southern District would likely not be proper for any state law claims that Plaintiff might want to assert, and this District would be a more convenient forum because the employment discrimination that Plaintiff challenges occurred in this District, specifically at JFK Airport. Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).^[1] “A claim is plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all allegations contained in a complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The Court's obligation “to construe a pro se complaint liberally” continues to apply “[e]ven after Twombly” established the plausibility standard for assessing pleadings. Newsome v. Bogan, 795 Fed.Appx. 72, 72 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009)).

Despite this leniency afforded to pro se plaintiffs, when a plaintiff seeks permission to proceed in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Courts must be careful when reviewing complaints submitted by plaintiffs seeking in forma pauperis status “not to conflate easy cases with inarguable or fanciful ones, as only the latter warrant dismissal” as frivolous. Alvarez v. Garland, 33 F.4th 626, 637 (2d Cir. 2022). The Court therefore may not dismiss a complaint filed by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), “simply because the [C]ourt finds the plaintiff's allegations unlikely.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). The Court may, however, dismiss a complaint as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,” and the Court need not restrict itself to facts capable of judicial notice when reaching that conclusion. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff Cannot Bring ADA or Rehabilitation Act Claims Against Individuals

Plaintiff cannot assert her ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims against individuals, so her claims against Defendants must be dismissed. The Second Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of Rehabilitation Act claims against individual defendants “on the basis that the Rehabilitation Act does not provide for individual liability.” Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2022). The Second Circuit has also held that ADA retaliation claims, which arise under Title V of the ADA, “cannot provide for individual liability.” Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2010).^[2] Some of...