Hogan v. Teamsters Local 170

495 F.Supp.3d 52

Michael P. HOGAN, Plaintiff,

v.TEAMSTERS LOCAL 170, and Shannor R. George, individually and in his capacity as Secretary-Treasurer of Treamsters Local 170, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION No. 19-11339-TSH

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Filed September 30, 2020

Brian A. Consigli, Consigli & Brucato, PC, Milford, MA, for Plaintiff.

Ariel Grayson Sullivan, Jacob A. Tosti, Bowditch & Dewey, LLP, Framingham, MA, Joshua A. Lewin, Bowditch and Dewey, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR TO DISMISS

HILLMAN, D.J.

Plaintiff, Michael P. Hogan ("Hogan" or "Plaintiff"), brings this action against the Defendants, Shannon R. George ("George") and Teamsters Local 170 ("Local 170") under state and federal law, alleging breach of contract (Count One); retaliation (Count Two); abuse of process (Count Three); malicious prosecution (Count Four), and; defamation (Count Five). Defendants move to dismiss all counts of the Complaint filed against them for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Background

The factual background is taken from Plaintiff's Complaint and assumed to be true at this stage of the litigation. The Court will also consider facts susceptible of judicial notice that "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

Local 170 is affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT"). In 2018, Plaintiff and Defendant George were both running for the position of Secretary-Treasurer of Local 170. George was the current Secretary-Treasurer and Hogan had previously held the position. On June 1, 2018, five envelopes containing statements disparaging George were received at Local 170. The five envelopes were placed in a sealed container and turned over to the Worcester Police Department.

On June 11, 2018, the Worcester Police Department's Latent Print Unit issued a finding that a latent print identified as belonging to Plaintiff was found on a letter inside one of the unopened envelopes. On June 14, 2018, a Worcester police officer ("Interviewing Officer") interviewed George and informed him of the Latent Print Unit's findings. During the interview, George stated that Plaintiff drove past the Local 170 and blew his truck's air horn "nearly every day." George further stated that he had been told by others that Plaintiff's reason for driving by Local 170 and blowing his air horn was to "let George know that [Hogan] will be coming back." The Interviewing Officer noted in his report that this caused George and his family severe emotional distress and that he advised George to seek a harassment order against Plaintiff.

On June 15, 2018, the Interviewing Officer interviewed Plaintiff who denied any knowledge of the letters, could not explain how his fingerprint was on one of the letters, and expressed his opinion that "campaign mailings for union election are not subject to libel laws." Plaintiff denied preparing, forging, or distributing the letters, and alleged that Defendants wrongfully accused him when they knew or should have known that he did not prepare, forge, or distribute the letters.

On June 18, 2018, the Interviewing Police Officer wrote an extended report of his investigation concluding that Plaintiff "had knowledge of the content of the 5 letters and they were sent to harass the victim [George] who has suffered serious emotional distress. Plaintiff has participated in a pattern of harassment through the repeated use of the air horn as well as these letters." On the same day, the Interviewing Officer requested that a "summons be issued charging Michael Hogan with Criminal Harassment MGL 265/43A."

On July 9, 2018, a Clerk Magistrate of the Worcester Central District Court held a Show Cause Hearing on the police's application for the criminal harassment charge, and a finding of no probable cause was issued by the Clerk Magistrate. The Worcester Police appealed the Clerk Magistrate finding to a judge of the Worcester Central District Court. (Compl. Ex. B, 3 ¶ 1, Docket No. 1-2.). A hearing on the appeal was scheduled for August 7, 2018. The appeal was withdrawn by the Worcester Police on July 24, 2018 at the request of the law firm representing Local 170. (Compl. Ex. B, 3 ¶ 1, Docket No. 1-2.)

On June 19, 2018, George filed charges against Plaintiff with the Executive Board of Local 170, alleging facts similar to those in the criminal harassment allegations and seeking to expel Plaintiff from Local 170. On July 20, 2018, a hearing was conducted by Local 170 on the charges against Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff received notice of this hearing several weeks prior to the hearing date, he requested postponement on the day before the hearing. That request was denied, and the hearing was held without Plaintiff's presence. On July 24, 2018, the Executive Board of Local 170 found Plaintiff guilty of the charges and expelled him from Local 170.

The Plaintiff appealed that finding and requested a stay of the expulsion order, which was granted by the union's General President pending exhaustion of Plaintiff's internal union appeals. The stay also permitted Plaintiff to continue his campaign for Secretary-Treasurer of Local 170. On September 4, 2018, a hearing on the appeal was held by Joint Council 10, which upheld the guilty finding and expulsion of Plaintiff from Local 170.

Plaintiff appealed that decision to the General Executive Board of IBT. During the appeal process, Defendants continued to inform the membership of Local 170 that Plaintiff had been expelled and continued to inform the membership that Plaintiff had prepared, forged, and distributed the letters. Plaintiff continued his candidacy for the position of Secretary-Treasurer but was defeated in the election. On or about December 5, 2018, after the election was over, IBT issued a decision reversing the decision of the Executive Board of Local 170 and Joint Council 10 to expel Plaintiff.

Standard of Review

A defendant may move to dismiss, based solely on the complaint, for the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although detailed factual allegations are not necessary to survive a motion to dismiss, the standard "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "The relevant inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw from the facts alleged in the complaint." Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset , 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011).

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Langadinos v. American Airlines, Inc. , 199 F.3d 68, 68 (1st Cir. 2000). It is a "context-specific task" to determine "whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief," one that "requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]’— that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ). On the other hand, a court may not disregard properly pled factual allegations, "even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

Discussion

The first issue that the Court confronts are the factual allegations in the Complaint that are contradicted by factual allegations in the exhibits incorporated into the Complaint. (Compl. 2 ¶ 10, 4 ¶ 25, Docket No. 1.) Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), "A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes." Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Furthermore, "it is well-established that in reviewing the complaint, we ‘may properly consider the relevant entirety of a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint ... without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.’ " Clorox Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Commer. Co., 228 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (citing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996) ). When "a written instrument contradicts allegations in the complaint to which it is attached, the exhibit trumps the allegations." Yacubian v. United States , 750 F.3d 100, 108 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Clorox Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Commer. Co. , 228 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2000) ) (citing Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 229 n.1 (1st Cir. 2013) ).

Count I – Breach of Contract

In Count I, Plaintiff contends that the IBT Constitution is a contract between IBT, Local 170 and their members within the meaning of § 301 of the Labor Relations Management Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Plaintiff further argues that Local 170 violated Article XIX of the IBT Constitution by failing to apply the procedural safeguards of the IBT Constitution in disciplinary trials and appeals.

For a breach-of-contract claim to survive a motion to dismiss under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff "must do more than allege, in conclusory fashion, that the defendant breached the contract"; rather, he must "describ[e], with ‘substantial certainty’ the specific contractual promise the defendant failed to keep." Alenci v. Hometown Am. Mgt., LLC, CV 19-12244-LTS, 2020 WL 2515872, at *4 (D. Mass. May 15, 2020), citing Brooks v. AIG SunAmerica Life...