Holden v. Bwell Healthcare, Inc.

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PAMELA HOLDEN, et al. Plaintiffs, v. BWELL HEALTHCARE, INC., et al. Defendants

CIVIL No. BPG-19-760

United States District Court, D. Maryland

December 7, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Beth P. Gesner, Chief United States Magistrate Judge

The above-referenced case was referred to the undersigned for all proceedings with the consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c) and Local Rule 301.4. (ECF Nos. 59, 60). Currently pending are plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants Bwell Healthcare, Inc. and Femmy Kuti (“plaintiffs' Motion”) (ECF No. 70), defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“defendants' Cross Motion”) (ECF No. 75), plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“plaintiffs' Response and Reply”) (ECF No 77), defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (“defendants' Reply”) (ECF No. 78), and defendants' Supplemental to Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (“defendants' supplemental briefing”) (ECF No. 79). No. hearing is deemed necessary. Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons discussed herein plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No 70) is granted in part and denied in part, and defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No 75) is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this court considers the facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). When the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment, in “considering each individual motion, the court must take care to ‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable' to the party opposing that motion.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996)). Defendant Bwell Healthcare, Inc. (“Bwell”) is a state-licensed residential service agency that coordinates with Maryland's Department of Health to provide homecare assistance to individuals enrolled in Maryland state Medicaid programs. (ECF No. 75-1 at 6). Defendant Femmy Kuti (“Mr. Kuti”) is Bwell's director of operations. (ECF No. 70-3 at 33). Plaintiffs Pamela Holden, April Wright, and Stephanie Williams (“plaintiffs”) were hired by Mr. Kuti (ECF No. 70-7 at 4) and worked for Bwell as homecare aides.^[1] Ms. Holden worked for Bwell from approximately 2012 through September 2019 and Ms. Wright worked for Bwell from January 2016 through February 2017. (ECF No. 70-1 at 12). Ms. Williams began working for Bwell in March 2016 and remained employed by Bwell as of the time of the filing of plaintiffs' Motion, although she was briefly terminated in July 2019 and reinstated shortly thereafter. (Id.) While working for Bwell, plaintiffs were classified as independent contractors and paid $11 per hour. (ECF No. 75-1 at 8, 10). Defendants, however, note that Bwell recently increased the pay for their homecare aides to $11.50 per hour. (Id. at 11).

On March 12, 2019, Ms. Holden and Ms. Wright filed their Complaint against defendants, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (“MWHL”), and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”). (ECF No. 1). Ms. Williams was not a party to the lawsuit at the time of the Complaint. In a letter addressed to Ms. Holden dated July 5, 2019, Mr. Kuti noted his intent to terminate Ms. Holden based on defendants' belief that Ms. Holden was a “disgruntled and dissatisfied employee with tendencies to be a saboteur.” (ECF No. 11-3 at 5). In another letter addressed to Ms. Williams dated July 9, 2019, Mr. Kuti informed Ms. Williams of a “suspension of relationship, ” noting that Ms. Williams would no longer be assigned to provide direct care services because she was “a disgruntled employee with a poor attitude” who “harass[ed] and disrespect[ed] our Administrators, [and] us[ed] vulgar/abusive language towards them . . . .” (ECF No. 11-4 at 5). On July 15, 2019, plaintiffs filed their amended Complaint against defendants in which Ms. Williams was added as a plaintiff only as to the plaintiffs' retaliation claim. (ECF No. 14).

Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on March 8, 2021, arguing that (1) plaintiffs were employees under the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL, (2) defendants failed to pay Ms. Holden and Ms. Wright required wages for travel time and overtime, (3) Ms. Holden and Ms. Wright are entitled to liquidated damages for defendants' alleged violations under the FLSA and MWHL, (4) Ms. Holden and Ms. Wright are eligible for treble damages for defendants' alleged violations under the MWPCL, (5) defendants violated the FLSA's anti-retaliation provisions by terminating Ms. Holden and Ms. Williams, and (6) Mr. Kuti is individually liable as plaintiffs' employer. (ECF No. 70-1 at 18-34). Defendants moved for summary judgment on March 29, 2021, opposing plaintiffs' position as to all six issues discussed above. (ECF No. 75-1 at 18-29).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine dispute remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is properly considered “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Id. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Pulliam Inv. Co., Inc. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). On those issues for which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof, however, it is his or her responsibility to oppose the motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other admissible evidence specified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (4th Cir. 1993). If a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court does not evaluate whether the evidence favors the moving or non-moving party, but considers whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In undertaking this inquiry, the court views all facts and makes all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The non-moving party, however, may not rest on its pleadings, but must show that specific, material facts exist to create a genuine, triable issue. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A “scintilla” of evidence in favor of the non-moving party, however, is insufficient to prevent an award of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Further, “mere speculation” by the non-moving party or the “building of one inference upon another” cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. Cox v. Cnty. of Prince William, 249 F.3d 295, 299-300 (4th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment should be denied only where a court concludes that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Where, as here, the parties file cross motions for summary judgment, “[t]he court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, in each case, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard.” Towne Mgmt. Corp. v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 627 F.Supp. 170, 171 (D. Md. 1985).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Status of Plaintiffs Under the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL

Plaintiffs first argue that they were employees of defendants under the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL. (ECF No. 70-1 at 18). Defendants contend that plaintiffs were independent contractors and therefore, the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL do not apply to them. (ECF No. 75-1 at 18). The FLSA defines an employee as “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The term “employ” means “to suffer or permit to work.” Id. at § 203(g). The definition of employee is to be construed broadly in light of the remedial nature of the FLSA. McFeeley v. Jackson Street Ent., LLC, 825 F.2d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 2016). “To determine whether a worker is an employee under the FLSA, courts look to the ‘economic realities' of the relationship between the worker and the putative employer.” Id. at 241 (citing Schultz v. Capital Intern. Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2006)). The court must focus on whether the worker “is economically dependent on the business to which he renders service or is, as a matter of economic [reality], in business for himself.” Id. In doing so, the court considers six factors: “(1) the degree of control that the putative employer has over the manner in which the work is performed; (2) the worker's opportunities for profit or loss dependent on his managerial skill; (3) the worker's investment in equipment or material, or his employment of other workers; (4) the degree of skill required for the work; (5) the permanence of the working relationship; and (6) the degree to which the services rendered are an integral part of the putative employer's business.” Id. (“th...