Holley v. Comm'r of Corr.

315 A.3d 1107

225 Conn.App. 477

Ronnie HOLLEY

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 43186)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 9, 2020

Officially Released May 21, 2024

Jennifer Bourn, chief of legal services, for the appellant (petitioner).

Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick Griffin, state’s attorney, and Craig Nowak, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Harper, Js.^*

CRADLE, J.

₄₇₈The petitioner, Ronnie Holley, appeals from the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely under ₄₇₉General Statutes § 52-470 (d) and (e).¹ On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly rejected his claim that his petition was timely under § 52-470 (d) because it was filed within two years of the final judgment on his prior federal habeas petition or, alternatively, that he had established good cause, under § 52-470 (e), to overcome the presumption of unreasonable delay for the filing of his untimely habeas petition in that he was unaware of the statutory time limit. We disagree and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.

The following facts and procedural history, as set forth by the habeas court, are relevant to the petitioner’s ₄₈₀Reclaims on appeal. "[T]he petitioner was convicted of sexual assault [in the] first degree and assault [in the] third degree by a jury after a trial held in the judicial district of New Haven. Following his convictions, the trial court sentenced him to a total effective term of fifteen years, execution suspended after ten years, followed by ten years of probation. The petitioner took a direct appeal from his convictions, which were affirmed. State v. Holley, 90 Conn. App. 350, 877 A.2d 872, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 929, 883 A.2d 1249 (2005). The petitioner has also filed two prior state habeas corpus petitions, the most recent one having been denied on January 12, 2009. Holley v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-07-4001499-S, 2009 WL 942388 (January 12, 2009). The decision of the habeas court was affirmed on appeal, and the petitioner’s subsequent request for certification to [appeal to our] Supreme Court was denied. Holley v. Commissioner of Correction, 124 Conn. App. 907, 5 A.3d 584 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 924, 11 A.3d 151 (2011). [Our] Supreme Court released notification of its decision on January 4, 2011." Following that decision, in 2011, the petitioner brought a federal habeas action. On December 9, 2014, the court denied the federal petition. Holley v. Chapdelaine, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:11CV00576 (JAM) (D. Conn. December 9, 2014).

"The current petition for a writ of habeas corpus was received by the clerk on December 8, 2016. The respondent [Commissioner of Correction] filed a request for order to show cause on October 31, 2018, asserting that the petition should be dismissed because it was not filed within two years from when appellate review of the decision on the prior [state] petition became final on January [4], 2011, as provided for in ₄₈₁… § 52-470 (d) (1). The court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter [on] February 22, 2019."

At the hearing, the petitioner was the sole witness. The petitioner asserted that "he was not aware of the limitation periods imposed by § 52-470 (d)." The petitioner also argued that " ‘good cause’ should be found in the fact that he commenced a federal habeas petition attacking the same conviction after the January 4, 2011 Supreme Court decision, and that federal case was not finally adjudicated until [December 9, 2014]."

In a memorandum of decision dated May 13, 2019, the court, Newson, J., dismissed the habeas petition as untimely under § 52-470 (d), concluding that the petitioner failed to establish good cause for the delay. The court rejected the petitioner’s first argument by stating: "[E]veryone is presumed to know the law, and … ignorance of the law excuses no one …. Thus, the [petitioner] is charged with knowledge of the law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court rejected the petitioner’s second argument by stating that "there is nothing in the language of § 52-470 (d) that could reasonably be read to contemplate a tolling of the limitation period while a petitioner is engaged in parallel challenges to the same conviction in a different forum. … Therefore, this basis is also insufficient to establish ‘good cause’ for this petition being filed … beyond the … deadline." (Citation omitted.) The court thereafter denied the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal. This appeal followed.

[1, 2] "Faced with a habeas court’s denial of a petition for certification to appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate review of the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test enunciated by our Supreme Court in Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and adopted in Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126 (1994). First, ₄₈₂[the petitioner] must demonstrate that the denial of his petition for certification constituted an abuse of discretion. … Second, if the petitioner can show an abuse of discretion, he must then prove that the decision of the habeas court should be reversed on the merits. … To prove that the denial of his petition for certification to appeal constituted an abuse of discretion, the petitioner must demonstrate that the [resolution of the underlying claim involves issues that] are debata- ble among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. …

[3] "In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous. …

[4–6] "The conclusions reached by the [habeas] court in its decision to dismiss [a] habeas petition are matters of law, subject to plenary review. … [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [the reviewing court] must determine whether they are legally and logically correct … and whether they find support in the facts that appear in the record. … To the extent that factual findings are challenged, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erroneous …." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rice v. Commissioner of Correction, 204 Conn. App. 513, 517-18, 251 A.3d 1009, cert. denied, 337 Conn. 906, 252 A.3d 365 (2021).

[7, 8] On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly determined that his petition was untimely under § 52-470 (d) on the ground that it was not filed ₄₈₃within the statutorily prescribed time limit of two years after the date of judgment on his prior habeas petition because it was filed within two years of final judgment on his prior federal habeas petition, which, he contends, is included within the meaning of "prior petition" under § 52-470 (d). Alternatively, he argues that he has demonstrated good cause for the untimely filing of his petition in that he was unaware of the statutory time limit.

Our resolution of the petitioner’s claims is dictated by our Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of § 52-470 (d), which provides in relevant part: "In the case of a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of … [t]wo years after the date on which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review … [or] October 1, 2014 …." In particular, the parties concede, and we agree, that our Supreme Court’s decision in Felder v. Commissioner of Correction, 348 Conn. 396, 306 A.3d 1061 (2024), is dispositive of the petitioner’s claims.

In Felder, our Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that his petition was timely filed because he filed it within two years of the final judgment in his federal habeas petition, concluding that the phrase "prior petition," as used in § 52-470 (d), "unambiguously refers solely to state [habeas] petitions, and, therefore, any contrary interpretation by the petitioner would have been unreasonable." Id., at 414, 306 A.3d 1061. In Felder, the court also held that a petitioner’s lack of knowledge, standing alone, is insufficient to establish good cause for a delay in filing an untimely petition. See id., at 413, 306 A.3d 1061. Citing Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 343 Conn. 424, 274 A.3d 85 (2022), the court held that the petitioner bears the ₄₈₄burden of demonstrating that something "outside the control of the petitioner had any bearing on his lack of knowledge …." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)...