Holloway v. Irwin

1

CEASAR HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff v. SUPERINTENTDENT RANDY IRWIN, CO. K. MILLER, SERGEANT ANDRES, HEARING EXAMINER FISCUS, Defendants

No. 1:23-CV-00278-SPB

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania, Erie Division

October 29, 2024

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS ECF NO. 25

RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

I. Recommendation

It is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (1) all claims against Defendants in their official capacities; (2) all claims against Defendant Superintendent Irwin; (3) all claims based on alleged violations of DOC policy; and (4) Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment due process claim be GRANTED. It is further recommended that Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment "failure to protect” claim and Eighth Amendment claim based on the conditions of Plaintiff s confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

II. Report

A. Relevant Background

Plaintiff Ceasar Holloway (“Holloway”) is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC”) at its State Correctional Facility at Forest (“SCI-Forest”). Holloway's Amended Complaint-the operative pleading before the Court-names four current or former SCI-Forest employees as Defendants: Superintendent Randy Irwin, Sergeant Andres, CO K. Miller, and Hearing Examiner Fiscus (collectively, “Defendants”). The Amended Complaint asserts four claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) an Eighth Amendment claim based on Defendants Andres and Miller's alleged failure to protect Holloway from an assault by another inmate on December 22, 2022; (2) an Eighth Amendment claim based on Defendants Andres and Miller's alleged use of excessive force against Holloway on December 22, 2022; (3) an Eighth Amendment claim based on the denial of medical care and decontamination after Andres and Miller deployed oleoresin capsicum (O.C.) spray against Holloway on December 22, 2022; and (4) a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on an allegedly false misconduct charge issued against Holloway following the December 22, 2022 incident. Although unclear, the Amended Complaint can also be construed to assert a claim or claims based on Defendants' alleged violations of DOC policies and an Eighth Amendment claim based on the conditions of Holloway's confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”). Holloway seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. He has sued all Defendants in their individual and official capacities.

Defendants have moved to dismiss (1) all claims against them in their official capacities; (2) all claims against Defendant Superintendent Irwin based on his lack of personal involvement in any actionable conduct; (3) any claim based on alleged violations of DOC policy; and (4) Holloway's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. See ECF Nos. 25, 26. Holloway has filed a response and brief in opposition to the motion. ECF Nos. 32, 33.

B. Factual Allegations

The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint and accepted as true for purposes of the Defendants' motion to dismiss. Holloway arrived at SCI-Forest on December 20, 2022. Two days later, on December 22, 2022, Corrections Officer Andres instructed Holloway to pack up his belongings because he was being moved to a different cell. ECF No. 23, ¶¶ 2-4. While he was moving his property, Holloway was assaulted by another inmate “right in front of' Andres and Miller. Id., ¶ 4. Andres and Miller opened his cell door which allowed the other inmate to enter and punch Holloway. Id., ¶¶ 4-6. During this altercation, Andres sprayed Holloway in the face with O.C. spray, which incapacitated him and allowed the other inmate to continue the assault. Holloway was then taken to the RHU and placed in solitary confinement where he did not receive any immediate medical treatment or any means to decontaminate from his exposure to the O.C. spray. Id., ¶ 7.

That same day, Defendants issued Holloway a DC-141 Part 1 misconduct report. Id., ¶ 17. Hearing Examiner Fiscus conducted a hearing on the misconduct report on December 30, 2022. Fiscus dismissed the misconduct charge without prejudice and Holloway remained in the RHU. Id., ¶ 19. Then, on January 14, 2023, Holloway was issued a new misconduct report DC-141 Part 1, which was also referred to the Hearing Examiner. Holloway alleges that C.O. Keeley, Sergeant Andres, and C.O. Miller re-wrote the misconduct report DC-141 Part 1 with a different staff member's version and based on falsified documents. Id. Holloway was found guilty of the misconduct on January 20, 2023. As a consequence, he was sanctioned to fifteen days in solitary confinement. Id., ¶ 20.

C. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all factual allegations of the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

While a complaint does not require detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts alleged in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).

Finally, because Holloway is proceeding pro se, his Amended Complaint will be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read his pro se pleading to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it will do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).

D. Discussion and Analysis

1. All claims for money damages against Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed with prejudice because they are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Holloway's Amended Complaint names all Defendants in both their individual and official capacities and seeks an award of compensatory and punitive damages against each Defendant. To the extent Holloway seeks such monetary relief against the Defendants in their official capacities, his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which proscribes actions for money damages in the federal courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities. See Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle. 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (state agencies); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (state employees acting in their official capacity). The DOC is a department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. As such, it and its agents and employees in their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from monetary damages. See Brown v. Smith, 2019 WL 2411749 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 2019). Because all Defendants are DOC employees who acted within the scope of their employment, Holloway's claims for monetary relief against them in their official capacities should be dismissed with prejudice.

2. All claims against Defendant Irwin should be dismissed based on lack of personal involvement or insufficiency of factual allegations to support the claim.

A defendant faces liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if he had “personal involvement” in the deprivation of the plaintiff s constitutional rights. See Swint v Oliver, 2024 WL 2327980, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 2319787 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2024) (citing Gould v. Wetzel, 2013 WL 5697866, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2013)). This means that each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit ... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 200...