Holman v. State of Indiana

24 F.Supp.2d 909

Steven J. HOLMAN, and Karen L. Holman, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF INDIANA and Indiana Department of Transportation, Defendant.

No. 1:97 CV 0178.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

December 1, 1998.

Christopher C. Myers, Myers and Geisleman, Fort Wayne, IN, for plaintiffs.

Sabra A. Weliever, Theresa A. Stevens, Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, Chief Judge.

This matter is before this court upon its request for further briefing from the parties concerning the court's previous ruling, dated September 8, 1997, granting Defendants, State of Indiana ("State") and Indiana Department of Transportation's ("INDOT") (collectively, the "defendants") Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs Title VII sexual harassment claims. In that Order, the court determined that because both plaintiffs were alleging sexual harassment by the same supervisor, they both, as a matter of law, could not prove that the alleged harassment occurred "because of sex." Plaintiffs, Karen and Steven Holman (collectively, "plaintiffs" or "the Holmans"), filed a motion to reconsider this court's Order on the basis of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). On September 23, 1998, this court entered an order denying plaintiffs motion for reconsideration with respect to the argument that Oncale altered the court's prior ruling. However, in reviewing the motion for reconsideration, several cases came to the court's attention which contained language in support of the plaintiffs' argument that both plaintiffs could maintain a cause of action for sexual harassment. At this juncture, the court determined that its prior Order should be taken under advisement pending further briefing by the parties on the issue. On September 30, 1998 plaintiffs filed their supplemental brief in support of their motion to reconsider. Subsequently, on October 22, 1998 defendants filed their supplemental brief to which plaintiffs responded with their cross brief on October 29, 1998. Briefing was completed on November 2, 1998 after defendants filed their cross-brief. Thus, the court shall now reconsider its prior Order.

APPLICABLE STANDARD

The court begins by noting that "motions to reconsider are not ill-founded step-children of the federal court's procedural arsenal, but rather effective yet quite circumscribed methods of `correct[ing] manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.'" In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F.Supp. 1403 (S.D.Ind.1994) quoting Keene Corp. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F.Supp. 656, 665-66 (N.D.Ill.1982). A court is neither obligated nor foreclosed from reconsidering its prior decisions. In matters involving interlocutory orders, such as motions to dismiss, or matters that have not been taken to judgment or determined on appeal, the Seventh Circuit has made clear that the district courts have the discretion to reconsider their decisions at any time. Cameo Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Percy, 800 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir.1986). Accordingly, the court notes that it has ample authority for reconsidering its previous order on defendants' motion to dismiss.

A motion to dismiss challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted only if the plaintiffs could prove no set of facts, consistent with their complaint and attachments, upon which the defendants could be liable. Pickrel v. City of Springfield, Ill, 45 F.3d 1115, 1118 (7th Cir.1995); 65 F.3d 664. Documents attached to the complaint can be considered by the district court, particularly where the documents are referenced throughout the complaint. See Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir.1995).

"When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint ... its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). "A complaint ... should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In determining the propriety of dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court "must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff." Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463 (7th Cir.1991). See also Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Education, 811 F.2d 1030, 1032-33 (7th Cir.1987). The purpose of the motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint and not to decide the merits. Triad Assoc., Inc. v. Chicago Housing Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir.1989). "If it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint which would entitled them to relief, dismissal is inappropriate." Perkins, 939 F.2d at 466. Further, the court must "construe pleadings liberally, and mere vagueness or lack of detail does not constitute sufficient grounds for a motion to dismiss." Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir.1985). Keeping this standard in mind, the court proceeds to reconsider defendants motion to dismiss.

APPLICABLE FACTS

Plaintiffs instituted the present action alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 arising out of their employment relationship with the defendants. The Holmans are husband and wife and, at all times relevant to their complaint, were employed by the defendants as maintenance workers. (Complaint, ¶¶ s 4(a), 6(a)). Both plaintiffs reported to Gale Uhrich ("Uhrich"), a male shop foreman. (Complaint, ¶¶ s 4(a), 6(b)). Plaintiff, Karen Holman, alleges that Uhrich sexually harassed her by "touching her body, standing too closely to her, asking her to go to bed with him and making sexist comments and otherwise making Plaintiff work in a sexually hostile work environment." (Complaint, ¶ 4(b)). In addition, she contends that as a result of her refusal to perform the acts requested by Uhrich, he negatively altered her evaluations and otherwise retaliated against her for protesting his harassing behavior. (Complaint, ¶ 4(c)). Karen Holman also asserts a claim that she has been denied equal pay for equal work. (Complaint, ¶ 4(d)).

In the same complaint, Plaintiff, Steven Holman, alleges that Uhrich also sexually harassed him by "grabbing his head while asking for sexual favors." (Complaint, ¶ 6(b)). When Steven Holman refused such requests, he alleges that Uhrich retaliated by unlocking his locker and throwing away his belongings. (Complaint, ¶ 6(c)). In addition, Steven Holman claims that he suffered retaliation from Uhrich due to his wife's filing internal discrimination charges against Uhrich. (Complaint, ¶ 6(c)).

DISCUSSION

I. Previous Order on Motion to Dismiss

In the court's initial ruling on defendants motion to dismiss, the court resolved the unique issue of whether both the Holmans, as a matter of law, could maintain sexual harassment claims where they both suffered harassment of a sexual nature by the same individual. First, the court noted that the gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the plaintiff suffered discrimination "because of sex." Considering the facts as alleged in the instant case, the court determined that because the acts of the alleged harasser in this case were equally harassing to both plaintiffs, neither could prove that the alleged harassment occurred "because of sex." In support of this conclusion, the court cited Pasqua v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir.1996), which held that "harassment that is inflicted without regard to gender, that is, where males and females in the same setting do not receive disparate treatment, is not actionable because the harassment is not based on sex." Pasqua, 101 F.3d at 517. As a result, because Uhrich accorded the Holmans like treatment, the court determined that both the Holmans could not maintain claims of sexual harassment. The court now revisits this issue in light of the additional case authority and briefs submitted by the parties.

II. Reconsideration of Original Order

From the outset, the court is reminded that a motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and does not decide the claims on the merits. Triad Assoc., Inc. v. Chicago Housing Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir.1989). Thus, regardless of whether the Holmans have alleged solid or weak claims, the question posed to this court is whether the claims, as pled by plaintiffs, state a claim for relief. Upon reexamining the issue, the court concludes that plaintiffs do not state a claim for relief.

An employee asserting a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment must prove the following: (1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-73, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). At issue in the present case is whether plaintiffs meet the third requirement, i.e., that the harassment is based on sex.

The "based on sex" element has increasingly been placed...