Holmes v. Colvin

LORI S. HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Case No. 13-CV-00179 (VEB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

December 18, 2014

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

In March of 2004, Plaintiff Lori S. Holmes applied for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social Security denied the applications.

Plaintiff, represented by Dana C. Madsen, Esq., commenced this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (Docket No. 5).

On June 3, 2014, the Honorable Rosanna Malouf Peterson, Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (Docket No. 22).

II. BACKGROUND

The procedural history may be summarized as follows:

On March 31, 2004, Plaintiff applied for SSI benefits and DIB. (T at 58, 139-41, 593-96).¹ The applications were denied initially and on reconsideration and Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). On June 27, 2007, a hearing was held before ALJ Richard S. Say. (T at 49).

On July 16, 2007, ALJ Say issued a written decision denying the applications and finding that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act. (T at 55-72). The Social Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on July 31, 2009. (T at 7-10). Plaintiff sought judicial review in August of2009 by filing a Complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. (Holmes v. Astrue, 09-CV-257).

On June 17, 2009, while her District Court appeal was pending, Plaintiff filed new applications for benefits. Those applications were denied on October 28, 2010, following a hearing. (T at 677-99). Plaintiff filed a third set of benefit applications on December 22, 2010. (T at 668-71).

On January 14, 2011, the Honorable Cynthia Imbrogno, United States Magistrate Judge, issued an Order granting Plaintiff summary judgment and remanding the matter for further proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). (Docket No. 31, in case number 09-CV-257)(T at 713-29). On October 14, 2011, the Appeals Council issued an Order vacating the original hearing decision, consolidating all three sets of applications, and remanding the consolidated application to the ALJ for further proceedings. (T at 668-71).

A further administrative hearing was held on April 17, 2012, before ALJ R.J. Payne. (T at 1124-71). On April 30, 2012, ALJ Payne issued a decision denying the applications for benefits. (T at 638-54). ALJ Payne's decision became the Commissioner's final decision on March 19, 2013, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (T at 629-31).

On May 13, 2013, Plaintiff, acting by and through her counsel, timely commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. (Docket No. 6). The Commissioner interposed an Answer on January 3, 2014. (Docket No. 16).

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on May 5, 2014. (Docket No. 21). The Commissioner moved for summary judgment on September 19, 2014. (Docket No. 34). Plaintiff filed a reply brief on October 17, 2014. (Docket No. 38).

For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's motion is granted, Plaintiff's motion is denied, and this case is closed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sequential Evaluation Process

The Social Security Act ("the Act") defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a plaintiff shall be determined to be under a disability only if any impairments are of such severity that a plaintiff is not only unable to do previous work but cannot,considering plaintiff's age, education and work experiences, engage in any other substantial work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9^th Cir. 2001).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step one determines if the person is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If so, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If not, the decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether plaintiff has a medially severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).

If plaintiff does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which compares plaintiff's impairment with a number of listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, plaintiff is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourthstep, which determines whether the impairment prevents plaintiff from performing work which was performed in the past. If a plaintiff is able to perform previous work that plaintiff is deemed not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) is considered. If plaintiff cannot perform past relevant work, the fifth and final step in the process determines whether plaintiff is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of plaintiff's residual functional capacity, age, education and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987).

The initial burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9^th Cir. 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9^th Cir. 1999). The initial burden is met once plaintiff establishes that a mental or physical impairment prevents the performance of previous work. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the Commissioner to show that (1) plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful activity and (2) a "significant number of jobs exist in the national economy" that plaintiff can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9^th Cir. 1984).

B. Standard of Review

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold a Commissioner's decision, made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9^th Cir. 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9^th Cir. 1999). "The [Commissioner's] determination that a plaintiff is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence." Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9^th Cir. 1983)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n 10 (9^th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9^th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence "means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(citations omitted). "[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence" will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebreeze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9^th Cir. 1965). On review, the Court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9^th Cir. 1989)(quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9^th Cir. 1980)).

It is the role of the Commissioner, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9^thCir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9^th Cir. 1987). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9^th Cir. 1987).

C. Commissioner's Decision

ALJ Payne found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 1, 2002, the amended alleged onset date, and met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2006. (T at 644). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome status-post release surgery, right knee osteoarthritis status-post arthroscopy, and lumbar spine arthritis were "severe" impairments under the Act. (Tr. 644-47).

However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments set forth in...