Holmes v. Miss. Dep't of Corrs.

1

EMMA JACKSON HOLMES PLAINTIFF v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al. DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-48-KHJ-MTP

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division

September 1, 2023

ORDER

KRISTI H JOHNSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants Pelicia Hall and Jeworski Mallett's [32] Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part for the following reasons.

I. Background

This case arises from Plaintiff Emma Holmes's claim that the Mississippi Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) wrongfully detained her for longer than her sentence. See Mem. Supp. Pl.'s Resp. [36] at 3. On January 30, 1989, a grand jury indicted Holmes in Grenada County Mississippi, for the sale of a controlled substance. Am Compl. [28] ¶ 14. Holmes alleges the Grenada County Sheriff's Office arrested her for that crime on March 13, 1989, and she remained in jail until she bonded out on July 24, 1989. Id. ¶ 15. She claims the Sheriff's Office detained her again on January 3, 1990, and she remained in their custody until her trial. See id. ¶ 16; [36] at 1-2. After a jury found her guilty, the Grenada County Circuit Court sentenced her to 30 years in MDOC custody.^[1][28] ¶ 17; [37-5].

After her sentencing, MDOC received a report from the Grenada County Circuit Clerk showing that Holmes had only been detained since April 21, 1990. [28] ¶ 18; [37-5]. That report did not include Holmes's alleged confinement from March 13 to July 24, 1989, or from January 3 to April 20, 1990. See id. Based on that report, MDOC credited Holmes 300 days toward her sentence, setting a tentative discharge date of April 21, 2020. [28] ¶ 19; [32-2] at 1.

Holmes further alleges that, in October 2009, MDOC “stamped [as] received” a “jail time allotment sheet” from the Grenada County Sheriff's Office detailing her confinement before April 21, 1990. [28] ¶ 20. In June 2016, Holmes contacted MDOC's Records Department about her jail time credit and gave them a copy of the jail time allotment sheet. Mem. Supp. Defs.' Mot. [33] at 2; [36] at 2. She told MDOC that she was missing credit for her confinement before April 21, 1990. [36] at 2. MDOC contacted the Grenada County Sheriff's Office to verify Holmes's claim, but Linda Evans from the Sheriff's Office responded that she could not locate Holmes's records and thought they might have been destroyed. [28] ¶ 21; [32-3].

On March 20, 2017, Holmes filed an administrative remedy request with MDOC, again asking for her missing credit. [28] ¶ 22. MDOC rejected that request as untimely. [28] ¶ 22. In January 2018, Holmes sent a letter about her missing credit along with a copy of her jail allotment sheet to Pelicia Hall. [28] ¶ 23; [37-7]. One of Hall's subordinates responded that Holmes's jail allotment sheet did not match MDOC's records and that MDOC had addressed the issue when it contacted the Grenada County Sheriff's Office in June 2016. See [28] ¶ 24; [37-8]. In October 2019, Holmes submitted a final administrative request regarding her missing jail time credit, but MDOC did not process the request because the “matter ha[d] already been rejected.” [28] at 25; see also [28] ¶¶ 24-26.

Holmes was released from prison on April 13, 2020. [28] ¶ 27. She alleges that if MDOC had given her credit for her incarceration before April 21, 1990, she would have served 10,958 days in prison. [36] at 3. But because MDOC did not include that time, she was incarcerated for 11,193 days-235 days longer than her sentence. id.; [28] ¶ 28.

After her release, Holmes sued Hall and Jeworski Mallett in their individual and official capacities.^[2]See [28]. Hall was the Commissioner for MDOC from 2017 to 2019, and Mallett was the Director of Records from 2013 to 2020. id. ¶¶ 10-11. Holmes brings her claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her overdetention violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. id. ¶ 53. She alleges that Hall and Mallett were deliberately indifferent in failing to adopt policies and procedures to prevent her over-detention and failing to adequately train and supervise MDOC staff to prevent her over-detention. id. ¶¶ 36-43. She also claims that Hall and Mallett are directly responsible for her overdetention because they were aware of the risk of her over-detention but did nothing about it. See id. ¶¶ 39, 43. She seeks monetary damages, including lost wages, attorney's fees, and punitive damages. id. ¶¶ 56-59.

II. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material' if, under the applicable substantive law, ‘its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.'” Patel v. Tex. Tech Univ., 941 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010)). “An issue is ‘genuine' if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Jones v. United States, 936 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). All facts are construed in the non-movant's favor. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

III. Analysis

Hall and Mallett move for summary judgment on four grounds: (1) Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) bars Holmes's § 1983 claim; (2) Mississippi's three-year statute of limitations bars Holmes's claim; (3) sovereign immunity precludes Holmes's official capacity claims; and (4) Hall and Mallett are entitled to qualified immunity as to Holmes's individual capacity claims. See [33] at 6-11.

A. Heck v. Humphrey

Hall and Mallett first argue that Heck v. Humphrey bars Holmes's § 1983 claim. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). They contend that because Holmes's claim is tied to her sentence calculation, it would invalidate the duration of her incarceration. [33] at 6 (citing Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2021)). Holmes counters that Heck does not bar her claim because she does not challenge her underlying conviction or the validity of her sentence. [36] at 10. Rather, she alleges only that she was held longer than her valid sentence. See id. at 8-10 (citing Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177 (5th Cir. 2022)).

Holmes is correct. Under Heck, “a state prisoner seeking monetary damages cannot proceed under § 1983 if success on those claims would ‘necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.'” Colvin, 2 F.4th at 497 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87). But “[t]he Heck defense ‘is not . . . implicated by a prisoner's challenge that threatens no consequence for his conviction or the duration of his sentence.'” Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 190 (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004)), petition for cert. filed sub nom. LeBlanc v. Crittindon, No. 22-1171 (U.S. May 31, 2023). Accordingly, a challenge based exclusively on the actions and procedures that led to a prisoner's overdetention for an unchallenged conviction or sentence does not implicate Heck. Hicks v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 595 F.Supp.3d 463, 472 (M.D. La. 2022); McNeal v. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., No. 18-736, 2020 WL 798321, at *9-10 (M.D. La. Feb. 18, 2020); Traweek v. Gusman, 414 F.Supp.3d 847, 858-60 (E.D. La. 2019).

Indeed, Holmes does not challenge her conviction or sentence; she challenges the procedures and actions that led to her over-detention. In attempting to apply Heck to Holmes's case, Hall and Mallett “emphasize form over substance, begin from a faulty assumption, and ignore a critical component of Heck that is absent here.” Traweek, 414 F.Supp.3d at 859. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not bring a § 1983 claim if it would “render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. It reasoned that allowing such claims would “permit a collateral attack on the conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit.” id. at 484. That is not the case here because Holmes's success in this action would not invalidate her conviction or 30-year sentence. See Traweek, 414 F.Supp.3d at 859.

The constitutional violation Holmes advances is that she was imprisoned for 235 days after the expiration of her admittedly valid sentence; she “does not take issue with [her] criminal judgment of conviction or the sentence rendered.” Id. “Therefore, the reasoning underlying Heck's favorable termination prerequisite is simply not implicated.” Id. Heck does not apply in this case.

B. Statute of Limitations

Hall and Mallett argue that the statute of limitations bars Holmes's claim. They contend the statute of limitations started to run when Holmes received the jail time allotment sheet in 2009 because she then “knew or had reason to know that her sentence was not calculated properly.” [33] at 7. Holmes counters that the statute of limitations started to run either on August 22, 2019-the date she alleges she should have been released-or April 13, 2020-the date she was released. [36] at 12.

There is no federally prescribed statute of limitation for § 1983 claims. Heilman v. City of Beaumont, 638 Fed.Appx. 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2016). “Instead ‘the statute of limitations . . . is determined by the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state.'” id. (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001)). “The applicable Mississippi statute of limitations period is three years.” Whittington v. City of McComb, No. 5:15-CV-52, 2016 WL 8223427, at *3 (S.D.Miss. Nov. 23, 2016) (citing Gates v. Walker, 865 F.Supp. 1222, 1230 (S.D.Miss. 1994)), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL...