Holodnak v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union

TIFFANY HOLODNAK, Plaintiff, v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-3250 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

November 30, 2021

Re Document 7, 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 7) AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 14)

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Tiffany Holodnak brings this action against her former employer, Defendant Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”), for alleged violations of the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. SEIU has moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Having considered the parties' memoranda, the motion is denied as to the FMLA claims and granted as to the Title VII claim.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND^[1]

Holodnak started working at SEIU on April 9, 2018, as a Human Resources Manager. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9, ECF No. 12. Until July 2019, Leslie Edmond was Holodnak's direct supervisor. Id. ¶ 11. Edmond allegedly harassed Holodnak because Holodnak was a “single mother” with “small children.” Id. ¶ 14. This included commenting that having children would interfere with Holodnak's job responsibilities, criticizing Holodnak for taking leave to tend to her children when they were sick, and not allowing Holodnak to telework while commenting that telework is not for childcare. Id. ¶¶ 15-18. Colleagues without children were not subjected to such comments. Id. ¶ 19.

In June 2019, Holodnak requested, and was granted, leave to care for her ailing father. Id. ¶ 22. The day before Holodnak returned to work, Marc Goumbri became her new supervisor. Id. ¶ 24. “Upon her return, Mr. Goumbri told Plaintiff that he would deny any and all of Plaintiff's future leave requests if she did not ask and get a response from him first, even if the leave was designated under FMLA.” Id. ¶ 26. This “threat discouraged Plaintiff from using her future leave.” Id. ¶ 28.

In August 2019, during her children's summer break, Holodnak's childcare plans fell through. Id. ¶ 29. Holodnak notified her department and Goumbri that she needed to stay home to take care of her children. Id. ¶ 30. Upon her return to work, Goumbri “again threatened to discipline Plaintiff for taking leave.” Id. ¶ 32.

“Following Mr. Goumbri's threats, ” Holodnak told SEIU's Deputy General Counsel that Goumbri was discriminating against her due to her gender and familial responsibilities, and also discouraging her from exercising her FMLA rights via threats.^[2] Id. ¶¶ 38-39. Goumbri became aware of Holodnak's complaint about him, after which he excluded Holodnak from meetings, took away “major aspects of her job duties, ” and in mid-September 2019 moved her to a small office that was farther away from her team. Id. ¶¶ 40, 42-43, 45. Holodnak again complained to the Deputy General Counsel about Goumbri. Id. ¶ 44.

On October 15, 2019, despite receiving positive feedback on her performance, Goumbri terminated Holodnak from her position.^[3] Id. ¶ 46. Holodnak had a large amount of vacation days accrued at the time of her termination because she feared exercising her rights to take time off, and SEIU withheld payout for these days. Id. ¶¶ 47-48.

On October 18, 2019, Holodnak saw her doctor, who remarked that Holodnak's health had declined, recommended hospitalization, and “strongly recommend[ed]” that Holodnak go on FMLA leave due to her lab results. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. Holodnak did not take FMLA leave because she was “deterred” by Goumbri's earlier comments. Id. ¶ 37.

After her termination, Holodnak filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge, followed by the EEOC conducting an investigation and providing a Notice of Right to Sue. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Holodnak then filed her complaint with this Court on November 10, 2020. See Compl., ECF No. 1. SEIU moved to dismiss on March 5, 2021. See Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 7. Holodnak filed an amended complaint on May 5, 2021. See Am. Compl. SEIU moved to dismiss the amended complaint on June 6, 2021, and the motion is fully briefed. See Mem. Supp. Def. SEIU's Mot. Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. (“Mem.”), ECF No. 14; Pl.'s Resp. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. (“Opp'n”), ECF No. 15; Reply Supp. Def. SEIU's Mot. Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. (“Reply”), ECF No. 16. The first motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7) is denied as moot.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint” under that standard; it asks whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This means that a plaintiff's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A court need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true, see id., nor must a court presume the veracity of legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. However, a court considering a motion to dismiss presumes that the complaint's factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000).

“In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may ‘consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.' When the plaintiff alleges the filing of an administrative charge, that charge may be deemed incorporated into the complaint and the court can consider it on a motion to dismiss.” Greer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the D.C., 113 F.Supp.3d 297, 304 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation omitted) (quoting EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).

IV. ANALYSIS

The complaint contains three counts: (I) FMLA interference; (II) FMLA retaliation; and (III) Title VII discrimination. Am. Compl. at 7-10. For Count I, SEIU argues that the alleged facts do not show conduct that interfered with the exercise of Holodnak's FMLA rights. Mem. at 5-8. For Count II, SEIU argues that the alleged facts cannot show causation between protected activity and adverse employment action. Id. at 8-10. For Count III, SEIU argues that Holodnak failed to exhaust administrative remedies and failed to allege discrimination of a type protected by Title VII. Id. at 10-14. For the reasons given below, the Court concludes that SEIU has not demonstrated that Counts I or II fail to state a claim, but also that Holodnak indeed failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

A. FMLA-Interference

SEIU's first argument is that Holodnak's complaint fails to state a claim for FMLA interference. The Court disagrees. The FMLA makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). “To prevail on an FMLA interference claim, a plaintiff must show (1) employer conduct that reasonably tends to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of FMLA rights, and (2) prejudice arising from the interference.”^[4] Waggel v. George Washington Univ., 957 F.3d 1364, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

SEIU's motion addresses two alleged statements by Goumbri, but it is only necessary to address the first because that allegation alone supports a plausible claim of interference. Holodnak alleges that, “[u]pon her return” from leave in June and July 2019 to care for her ailing father, “Goumbri told Plaintiff that he would deny any and all of Plaintiff's future leave requests if she did not ask and get a response from him first, even if the leave was designated under FMLA.” Am. Compl. ¶ 26. This statement allegedly “discouraged Plaintiff from using her future leave, to include FMLA, out of fear of discipline or termination.” Id. ¶ 28. This included Holodnak deciding not to take FMLA leave despite her doctor “strongly recommending” that she do so based on a decline in her health. Id. ¶ 36. SEIU's argument is that this statement cannot constitute interference because it “is entirely consistent with the FLMA.” Mem. at 6; see also Reply at 3 (“[S]imply informing or reminding an employee of her obligation to request FMLA leave in advance is not an action that interferes with an employee's decision to request leave.”).

Drawing all factual inferences in favor of Holodnak, this statement would “reasonably tend[] to interfere with, restrain or deny the exercise of” Holodnak's FMLA rights. Waggel, 957 F.3d at 1376. Goumbri's statement does not accurately describe the law. As SEIU acknowledges in its brief, “[i]f the leave is unforeseeable, notice is . . . required ‘as soon...