Holtman v. Saul

441 F.Supp.3d 586

Scott HOLTMAN, Plaintiff,

v.Andrew M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Case No. 3:18-cv-00848

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

Filed February 26, 2020

Michael Patrick Williamson, Michael P. Williamson, Attorney at Law, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.

Bert Coleman, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, Kansas City, MO, Mercedes C. Maynor-Faulcon, U.S. Attorney's Office, Nashville, TN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

ALETA A. TRAUGER, United States District Judge Plaintiff Scott Holtman brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of his application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act. On August 16, 2019, the magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (Doc. No. 16), recommending that the decision of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") be affirmed and that the plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 12) be denied. The plaintiff has filed timely Objections (Doc. No. 25), to which the SSA has responded (Doc. No. 27).

For the reasons discussed herein, the court finds that the Commissioner failed to properly apply the treating physician rule and that the magistrate judge erred as a matter of law in finding that failure to be harmless. The court also concludes that the treating physician's opinion should have been given controlling weight and that the opinion that the plaintiff was incapable of full-time work of any kind during the period of disability is effectively uncontradicted in the record. Because evidence of disability is strong and there is very little evidence to the contrary, the court will reject the R&R, grant the plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, reverse the SSA's decision, and order an immediate award of benefits, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Holtman filed his application for DIB on July 8, 2016, alleging disability beginning on September 22, 2006. (Doc. No. 8, Administrative Record ("AR") 243.¹ ) The application was denied initially (AR 150) and on reconsideration (AR 157). After a hearing on February 5, 2018, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Angele Pietrangelo issued a decision unfavorable to the plaintiff on April 4, 2018. (AR 34–47.)

The ALJ found that Holtman last met the insured status requirements of Title II of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2009 and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of September 22, 2006 through his last-insured date. (AR 38, 39.) The ALJ accepted as a factual matter that Holtman suffers from severe impairments, including "major depressive disorder (MDD), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and substance addiction disorder." (AR 40.) She found that the plaintiff's mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, did not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.04, 12.06, or 12.15. The ALJ rejected the plaintiff's treating psychiatrist's assessment that the plaintiff's condition precluded full-time work and, instead, determined that the plaintiff, through the date last insured, had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a full range of light work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: limited to performing only simple, routine tasks; limited to no contact with the general public, only occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors; and able to adapt to only gradual, infrequent workplace changes." (AR 41.)

The ALJ found that the plaintiff has past relevant work that was "a composite of bicycle repair...and a sales person, sporting goods," but that the demands of this work exceeded his RFC. (AR 45.) Nonetheless, based on the RFC and the testimony of a qualified vocational expert ("VE") at the hearing, and considering the plaintiff's age, education, and work experience, the ALJ concluded that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the plaintiff could have performed during the disability period, including the jobs of "packager, hand" [sic], material handler, inspector and hand packager, and house cleaner. (AR 46.) The ALJ therefore concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant time frame.

The Appeals Council denied review on August 9, 2018 (AR 1), making the ALJ's decision the final Agency decision.

The plaintiff filed his Complaint initiating this action on September 7, 2018. (Doc. No. 1.) The SSA filed a timely Answer (Doc. No. 7), denying liability, and a complete copy of the Administrative Record (Doc. No. 8). On November 21, 2018, the plaintiff filed his Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record and supporting Memorandum, arguing that the ALJ violated the treating physician rule set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) and that her determination that the plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant time frame was not supported by substantial evidence. He also argued that substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that a substantial number of jobs that he could perform existed in the national economy. (Doc. Nos. 12, 13.) The SSA filed a timely Response (Doc. No. 14), and the plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. No. 15). On August 16, 2019, the magistrate judge issued her R&R (Doc. No. 16), recommending that the plaintiff's motion be denied and that the SSA's decision be affirmed.

Now before the court are the plaintiff's Objections to the R&R (Doc. No. 25), which largely concern the magistrate judge's disposition of his claim that the ALJ did not properly apply the treating physician rule. The SSA has responded (Doc. No. 27). The plaintiff filed a Reply. (Doc. No. 30.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation regarding a dispositive pretrial matter, the district court must review de novo any portion of the report and recommendation to which a proper objection is made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)(C) ; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) ; United States v. Curtis , 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2001) ; Massey v. City of Ferndale , 7 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 1993). Objections must be specific; a general objection to the R&R is not sufficient and may result in waiver of further review. Miller v. Currie , 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). In conducting its review of the objections, the district court "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

In social security cases under Title II or Title XVI, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and, as such, entitled to benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c), 405(h). The court's review of the decision of an ALJ is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence. Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 811 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009) ); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive."). The substantial evidence standard is met if a "reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion." Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

In addition, an agency's violation of its own procedural rules requires reversal either upon a showing that "the claimant has been prejudiced on the merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the agency's procedural lapses. " Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). A regulation "intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals" "bestows a ‘substantial right’ on parties before the agency" and must be strictly followed. Id. (citations omitted). As discussed below, the so-called treating physician rule (or treating source rule), embodied in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), confers a substantial right, and an ALJ's failure to comply with it generally requires reversal. Wilson , 378 F.3d at 548.

III. THE TREATING PHYSICIAN RULE

"The Commissioner has elected to impose certain standards on the treatment of medical source evidence." Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 710 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Cole v. Astrue , 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011) ). Medical opinions are to be weighed by the process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Generally, a treating-source opinion must be given "controlling weight" if two conditions are met: (1) the opinion "is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques"; and (2) the opinion "is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If the ALJ finds, based on these criteria, that a treating-source opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, then the ALJ must weigh the opinion based on the length, frequency, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship, id. , as well as the treating source's area of specialty and the degree to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and supported by relevant evidence, id. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6). Even if the treating physician's opinion is not given controlling weight, "there remains a presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, that the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to great deference." Hensley v. Astrue , 573 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Social Sec. , 486 F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 2007) ).

If the treating source's opinion is not given controlling weight, the ALJ must weigh the opinion in light of several factors. See 20...