Holton v. Henon

1

ROBERT HOLTON, Plaintiff, v. BOBBY HENON, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-2228

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

March 9, 2022

MEMORANDUM

CHAD F. KENNEY, J.

In October 2018, Plaintiff Robert Holton's property was removed from land the City of Philadelphia (the “City”) alleged that it owned. The property removal was pursuant to a cease operations order issued by the City Department of Licenses and Inspections (“L&I”) based on numerous L&I violations. Throughout this case, Mr. Holton has maintained that at the time of removal he owned the land the property was removed from, and that, accordingly such removal was an illegal “taking” of his land in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Count II, Fifth Amendment Violation). The facts alleged by Mr. Holton underlying this takings claim, however, have transformed substantially to make them fit the reality of the record as it developed, which consequently had the effect of completely undermining some of his own, basic claims to the land that he had originally made, as well as his additional conspiracy claim that was predicated on the facts initially alleged. (Count I, Civil Conspiracy).

For the vast majority of the lengthy dispute over the land from which Mr. Holton was removed, Mr. Holton maintained that he owned the land at issue by deed. In accordance with this long-held assertion, in his Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Holton specifically alleges that he was removed from the land he owned outright by deed. Then, despite proceeding deep into this case with that assertion as the basis of his takings claim, well after the close of discovery (and as it became evident that the land Mr. Holton was removed from was not within the metes and bounds of any land owned by Mr Holton via deed), Mr. Holton recast his takings claim to argue that he was removed from land that he obtained through adverse possession. Indeed, in his two-page Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Mr. Holton appears to entirely abandon the argument that he was removed from land he owns by deed, and instead moves forward solely on a theory of adverse possession. Most recently, the day before Oral Argument was heard before this Court regarding the pending summary judgment motion, Mr Holton once again, proffering novel facts, substantially modified the basis of his takings claim, asserting that the City removed him from the land because it blocked ingress and egress from the disputed land which also blocked him from ingress and egress to his duly deeded land that is contiguous to the disputed land. The record establishes, however, that he has ingress and egress to his duly deeded land.

Mr. Holton also contends in the Second Amended Complaint that Defendants Bobby Henon, ^[1] Darin L. Gatti, ^[2] and Edward Jefferson^[3] conspired against him to deprive him of his Fifth Amendment Constitutional rights by way of the taking through the nefarious manipulation of lot lines and issuance of falsified L&I violations.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 74) and Plaintiff's Affidavit and Response in Opposition (ECF Nos. 79, 80). For the reasons set forth below, this Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 74) as to all counts. An appropriate order will follow.

I.BACKGROUND

In or around 1990, Mr. Holton began working on an auto scrap yard owned and operated by non-party Albert Buoncristiano.^[4] ECF No. 79 ¶ 2.

In 1994, Mr. Holton began leasing the scrap yard business and the land upon which the business was operating from Mr Buoncristiano. Id. ¶ 4.

On November 23, 2004, Mr. Holton purchased and obtained the deed (the “Holton Property Deed”) to two separate parcels of land (collectively, the “Holton Property”) from Mr. Buoncristiano, which he asserts he believed encompassed the entirety of the land upon which the scrap yard was operating at that time. Id. ¶¶ 4-5; ECF No. 74 Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“SUMF”) ¶ 1.

Prior to Mr. Holton's purchase of the Holton Property, in 2004, Mr. Buoncristiano requested and received a site plan of the Holton Property (the “Holton Property Survey Plan”) from the City of Philadelphia Fifth Survey District, which provided the metes and bounds of the two parcels of land, identified therein as Lot A and Lot B. ECF No. 74 SUMF ¶3; Id. Ex. B. The metes and bounds of these two distinct parcels of land are also specified within the Holton Property Deed but are labeled Premises A^[5] and Premises B therein rather than Lot A and Lot B; counterintuitively, Premises A corresponds with Lot B, and Premises B corresponds with Lot A.^[6]ECF No. 74 SUMF ¶¶ 2-7; Id. Ex. A; Id. Ex. B.

There is no current dispute that Mr. Holton is the owner of the Holton Property as identified by the metes and bounds specified within the Holton Property Deed. ECF No. 74 SUMF at p. 4. And there is likewise, no dispute that Mr. Holton continues to operate his scrap yard business on the Holton Property and that he has two modes of ingress and egress to and from the Holton Property both of which remain accessible and are not the subject of this suit. ECF No. 98 at 15:17-21.

There is, however, this dispute over the ownership of a separate portion of land located to the west of Holton Property Premises A, known as 4087 Richmond Street^[7] (“4087 Richmond”). ECF No. 74 SUMF ¶ 11; Id. at p. 4; ECF No. 79 ¶ 9.

On or around December 19, 1951, through eminent domain and in accordance with a City Council Ordinance, the City obtained legal title to the land subject to this dispute, 4087 Richmond, in connection to its creation of a right-of-way (the “Frankford Creek Right-of-Way”). ECF No. 74 SUMF ¶ 11; Id. at p. 4; ECF No. 79 ¶ 9. Defendants point out the City still has legal title to the land, while Plaintiff contends that he acquired the land through adverse possession. ECF No. 79 ¶ 9.

The disputed parcel of land, 4087 Richmond, is located to the west of the Holton Property Premises A and spans approximately from the center of former Balfour Street, which is the western boundary of Premises A of the Holton Property (as set forth in the Holton Property Deed) to Richmond Street, a public road further west. See infra Figure 1; see also ECF No. 74 ¶¶ 8, 13; Id. Ex. D; Id. Ex. A; Id. Ex. B (describing the western boundary of Premises A of the Holton Property as extending “to a point in the center line of former Balfour Street”).

In his Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Holton specifically alleged that pursuant to the Holton Property Deed, he owned a parcel of land “bounded by Richmond Street to the west, Delaware Avenue to the east, Conrail to the south and the Frankford Creek to the north, ” which facially includes the portion of the Frankford Creek Right-of-Way identified as 4087 Richmond. ECF No. 21 ¶¶ 8, 16; ECF No. 74 Ex. B. The record subsequently established that this in fact is not the case.

The Holton Property, as set forth in the Holton Property Deed, however, does not actually include 4087 Richmond within its metes and bounds. Id. Ex. B. At this point in the litigation, Mr. Holton appears to have abandoned the argument that he owns 4087 Richmond via deed and is instead moving forward on a theory of adverse possession. See generally ECF No. 80.

For further clarification and by-way of providing a visual to this simple property dispute, Figure 1 (below) depicts the relevant boundaries. See infra Figure 1. In Figure 1, the red line indicates former Balfour Street (the western boundary of Premises A of the Holton Property). See infra Figure 1; see also ECF No. 74 ¶ 13; Id. Ex. G. To the right of the red line, Figure 1 shows what is identified by the Holton Property Deed as Premises A extending to its eastern boundary of former Carbon Street. See infra Figure 1; see also ECF No. 74 Ex. B. To the left of the red line, Figure 1 depicts the piece of land known as 4087 Richmond, which extends approximately east to west from former Balfour Street (the red line) to Richmond Street (shown on the far-left side of the diagram). See infra Figure 1; see also ECF No. 74 Ex. G.

(Image Omitted)

Figure 1^[8]

Both parties agree that at some point, the scrap yard business began to access and use the land outside the metes and bounds of the Holton Property (as specified by the Holton Property Deed), crossing the western boundary of Premises A (i.e., former Balfour Street) and entering on to the Frankford Creek Right-of-Way by way of 4087 Richmond, to some degree. ECF No. 74 SUMF ¶ 10; Id. Ex. F, Answer to Interrogatory No. 5; ECF No. 79 ¶ 2-5. Plaintiff Holton claims that since the time he began working for Mr. Buoncristiano, as early as 1990, the scrap yard business used the “entire parcel” of 4087 Richmond but has not obtained a survey of this land or otherwise provided any specific metrics by which the “entire parcel” can be identified. ECF No. 79 ¶ 2.

In connection with Mr. Holton's use of 4087 Richmond the City did not commence ejectment proceedings. Instead, the L&I inspected 4087 Richmond on March 2, 2017, and issued several L&I Violations to Mr. Holton. ECF No. 74 SUMF ¶¶ 15-17; Id. Ex. I. According to Defendants, City-owned 4087 Richmond was not zoned for the business Mr. Holton was operating, nor did Mr. Holton have the proper licenses to operate such business, as he did not have legal title to the land. Id.

In relation to these L&I Violations, a Notice of Intent to Cease Operations and Order was issued by L&I, which was scheduled to take effect April 12, 2017, unless the violations were rectified. ECF No. 74 Ex. J. Plaintiff Holton appealed the L&I Violations to the L&I Review Board (the “B...