Honcik v. Norman Cnty.

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James W. Honcik, Appellant, v. Norman County, Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A23-1821

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

July 1, 2024

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Norman County District Court File No. 54-CV-22-231

Craig E. Johnson, Johnson, Mottinger & Greenwood, PLLP, Fargo North Dakota (for appellant)

Thomas H. Schaefer, Erstad & Riemer, P.A., Minneapolis Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.

Jesson, Judge ^[*]

Justin Wilhelm, a snowplow driver for respondent Norman County, drove his snowplow through an intersection without stopping. Wilhelm did not see appellant James Honcik's car approaching when he did so. The car and the plow collided.

Honcik sued Norman County for negligence. He argued that the intersection was clear of ice and snow, so Wilhelm was required to stop at the stop sign like all other drivers. Wilhelm claimed that he proceeded through the intersection to maintain proper speed to clear a snowdrift on the other side of the intersection. The district court granted the county's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that Wilhelm's action was discretionary and thus protected under the official immunity doctrine. Honcik appeals.

Because the undisputed material facts, taken in the light most favorable to Honcik, establish that any claimed negligence originated from Wilhelm's discretionary decision-making, we affirm.

FACTS

On the cold, clear Monday morning of Valentine's Day 2022, Wilhelm was clearing snowdrifts for Norman County after the county dispatched its fleet of snowplows to clear snowdrifts and icy conditions created on roads by strong winds over the weekend. By 8:30 a.m., Wilhelm had cleared both directions of Highway 39. He then began clearing an intersecting road, Highway 4.

When Wilhelm approached the controlled intersection of Highway 4 and Highway 39, he saw a snowdrift on the side of the road near the stop sign past the intersection. He intended to proceed through the intersection without stopping-and with the wing blade of the plow down-so that he could effectively throw snow and clear the drift. The snowplow's lights were engaged. Generally, the county affords its snowplow drivers the discretion to determine the most effective way to clear the roads. It has no explicit policy requiring snowplow drivers to stop at stop signs.

Wilhelm slowed the snowplow as he neared the intersection to determine if it was safe to proceed through the intersection without stopping. But Wilhelm did not see Honcik's car approaching. Wilhelm stated that Honcik must have been in his blind spot. When the snowplow entered the intersection without coming to a stop, Honcik's car struck the snowplow's side wing blade. Honcik was injured in the accident.

Honcik filed a negligence claim against Norman County. He asserted that Wilhelm negligently operated the snowplow and Wilhelm's negligence is attributable to the county. Norman County moved for summary judgment, arguing that Wilhelm was engaged in a discretionary act that is protected by official immunity. The district court granted the county's summary judgment motion. Honcik appeals.

DECISION

When we review a grant of summary judgment, we determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law. St. Matthews Church of God & Christ v. State Farm Fire & Cas Co., 981 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Minn. 2022). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Our review of a district court's summary-judgment dismissal of a claim based on immunity is de novo. Id. And the party asserting official immunity-here, Norman County-has the burden to show facts which establish immunity. Podruch v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 674 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Minn.App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 2004).

Common-law official immunity protects government officials from being sued for taking discretionary actions in the course of their duties. Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 1998). Generally, official immunity extends to the government employer vicariously. Id. To determine whether official immunity applies, we look to "(1) the conduct at issue; (2) whether the conduct is discretionary or ministerial and, if ministerial, whether any ministerial duties were violated; and (3) if discretionary, whether the conduct was willful or malicious." Vassallo ex rel. Brown v. Majeski, 842 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Minn. 2014).

Here, the parties agree that the conduct in question is Wilhelm's failure to stop at the stop sign. Honcik does not argue that Wilhelm's conduct was willful or malicious. Nor does Honcik dispute that Wilhelm's immunity-if it exists-extends to Norman County. Accordingly, the issue before us is whether Wilhelm's conduct was discretionary or ministerial.

A discretionary duty "involves more individual professional judgment that necessarily reflects the professional goal and factors of a situation." Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 490-91 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). But the mere existence of some freedom of choice does not render a "simple and definite" act discretionary as a matter of law. Williamson v. Cain, 245 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Minn. 1976). We distinguish between these simple acts and truly discretionary ones by analyzing the "nature, quality, and complexity" of both the act and the decision-making process that precedes the act. Schroeder v. St. Louis County, 708 N.W.2d 497, 507-08 (Minn. 2006).

By contrast, a ministerial duty involves an "absolute, certain, and imperative" requirement which arises from "fixed and designated facts." Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). Ministerial duties can arise from government protocols that direct a sufficiently narrow standard of conduct. Id. at 659. These protocols encompass any standard that the employee is bound to follow, including statutes, ordinances, and unwritten practices. Id. at 659, 662 n. 11. In short, a protocol creates a ministerial duty when it defines acceptable conduct so narrowly that independent action is "neither required nor desired." Id. at 655, 659.

Applying these principles to the snowplowing context, Minnesota caselaw seeks to avoid "deterring snowplow drivers from exercising their judgment when making the difficult decisions that may arise in the often-hazardous activity of snow removal." Shariss v. City of Bloomington, 852 N.W.2d 278, 283 (Minn.App. 2014). For example, in In re Alexandria Accident, a driver, plowing a median he determined to be a hazard, inadvertently created whiteout conditions which led to a crash that killed seven people. 561 N.W.2d 543, 545-46 (Minn.App. 1997), rev. denied (Minn. Jun. 26, 1997). The driver was subject to a policy that recommended drivers delay plowing a shoulder if the snow is not hazardous and plowing could cause visibility problems. Id. at 546. We held that the driver's decision to plow was discretionary because the policy authorized him to "assess the existing conditions and rely on his judgment to determine the best time and manner for plowing," and he did so in choosing to plow the median. Id. at 549.

But snowplow drivers are not cloaked with official immunity when engaged in ministerial tasks. In Shariss, we held that a snowplow operator who was blocking traffic while waiting in line to dump snow was not entitled to official immunity for backing into the path of another car. 852 N.W.2d at 280, 283-84. The snowplow driver intended to follow the "standard operating procedure" of not blocking traffic. Id. at 283. We reasoned that reversing the snowplow in this context was a "simple and definite" job, especially compared to the hazardous and often discretionary task of "snow-removal operations." Id.

As both parties note, we have applied these rules to similar facts in nonprecedential opinions, which we consider for their persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). In one case, we concluded that a snowplow driver's decision to cross into oncoming traffic was ministerial: he did so only because the snowplow "took off to the left" without explanation, and he did not make "decisions regarding speed, time, and manner of plowing." Fernow v. Gould, No. A10-223, 2010 WL 3463694, at *3 (Minn.App. Sept. 7, 2010) (quotation omitted). In contrast, in another case we held that a snowplow driver was entitled to immunity when he crossed over to plow the other side of a highway because, even though he was not actively plowing, crossing over was "part of the larger act of operating a plow, an activity that includes multiple discretionary decisions." Gustafson v. Semmer, No. A09-1201, 2010 WL 608017, at *2 (Minn.App. Feb. 23, 2010).

Applying the principles in these cases to the facts before us, we conclude that Wilhelm's decision to proceed through the stop sign without stopping was discretionary.

Here Norman County gave snowplow drivers broad discretion in operating their snowplows. Snowplow drivers throughout Minnesota are exempt from general traffic regulations "while actually engaged in work upon the highway." Minn. Stat. § 169.035, subd. 1(a) (2022). Nonetheless, Norman County could have required snowplow drivers to follow traffic statutes. It did not. See Thompson v. City of Minneapolis, 707 N.W.2d 669, 674-75 (Minn. 2006) (internal protocols can create ministerial duty). Instead, the county authorized snowplow drivers to "exercise professional judgment and discretion" in determining "the best means and methods" to clear the roads. One method the county authorized is proceeding through a stop sign without stopping if it is safe to do so.^[1...