Hopkins v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.

BRIAN HOPKINS, LIANA HOPKINS, and SEAN HOPKINS, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION a/k/a AMTRAKand MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Defendants.

08-CV-2965 (NGG) (RML)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

April 29, 2016

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.

Before the court are the parties' respective pre-trial motions in limine. (See Pls.' Mot. in Lim. to Preclude Electric Chair Evidence (Dkt. 81); (Pls.' Mot. in Lim. to Preclude Various Hearsay Items (Dkt. 82); Pls.' Mot. in Lim. to Exclude Evidence of Brian Hopkins's Comparative Negligence (Dkt. 83); Not. of Defs.' Omnibus Mot. in Lim. (Dkt. 84); Pls.' Mot. in Lim. to Exclude Evidence Concerning Brian Hopkins's Knowledge of Electrical Danger (Dkt. 87); Pls.' Mot. in Lim. to Preclude State Case Pleadings (Dkt. 88); Pls.' Mot. in Lim. to Exclude Evidence of Brian Hopkins's Drinking and Marijuana Use (Dkt. 89); Pls.' Mot. in Lim. to Exclude Text Messages and Phone Records (Dkt. 90); Defs.' Mot. in Lim. to Preclude Testimony of Michael Morse from the Liability Phase of Trial (Dkt. 99).)

For the reasons stated below, the court holds as follows:

• Plaintiffs' motion to preclude electric chair evidence (Dkt. 81) is GRANTED. (Seeinfra Part III.A.3.)

• The court RESERVES ruling on Plaintiffs' motion to preclude various hearsay items (Dkt. 82). (Seeinfra Part III. A.2.)

• Plaintiffs' motion to exclude evidence of Brian Hopkins's comparative negligence (Dkt. 83) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Seeinfra Part III.A.1.ii.a.)

• Defendants' omnibus motion (Dkt. 84) is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and RESERVED in part. (Seeinfra Part III.B.)

• Plaintiffs' motion to exclude evidence concerning Brian Hopkins's knowledge of electrical danger (Dkt. 87) is DENIED. (Seeinfra Part III.A.1.ii.b.)

• Plaintiffs' motion to preclude state case pleadings (Dkt. 88) is GRANTED. (Seeinfra Part III. A.4.)

• Plaintiffs' motion to exclude evidence of Brian Hopkins's drinking and marijuana use (Dkt. 89) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Seeinfra Part III.A.1.ii.c.)

• Plaintiffs' motion to exclude text messages and phone records (Dkt. 90) is DENIED. (Seeinfra Part III.A.1.ii.d.)

• Defendants' motion to preclude testimony of Michael Morse from the liability phase of trial (Dkt. 99) is DENIED. (Seeinfra Part III.B.9.)

I. BACKGROUND

The court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts, but will briefly describe the facts that are relevant to these motions. The court refers to its Summary Judgment Decision for additional factual background. (See Summ. J. Mem. & Order ("Summary Judgment Decision") (Dkt. 58) at 1-6.)

In the early morning of July 9, 2006, Plaintiff Brian Hopkins¹ was extremely intoxicated. (Id. at 2, 3.) At approximately 4:00 a.m., Hopkins climbed on top of a train parked at South Station in Boston. (Id. at 2.) Although witnesses saw Hopkins in South Station, no witness saw Hopkins climb on top of the train. (Id. at 3.) Hopkins himself has no memory of the events of the night. (Id.) While on top of the train, Hopkins came into contact with an electrified catenarywire, resulting in a severe shock. (Id.) The train upon which Hopkins was found was not scheduled to leave the station until the early afternoon. (Id. at 4.)

South Station is operated by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("MBTA"), although the National Railroad Passenger Corp. ("Amtrak") energizes and operates the electric rails that run through the station. (Id. at 3.) It is Amtrak operating procedure to leave catenary wires energized at all times unless work requires the power to be turned off. (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, Amtrak regularly trains its workers regarding catenary wire safety. (Id.) South Station is patrolled by Amtrak police officers at various times but there is no officer specifically assigned to the station. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion in Limine

"The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow the trial court to rule in advance of trial on the admissibility and relevance of certain forecasted evidence." Gorbea v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., No. 11-CV-3758 (KAM), 2014 WL 2916964, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2014) (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984); Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1996); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. L.E. Myers Co. Grp., 937 F. Supp. 276, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). "Evidence should be excluded on a motion in limine only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds." United States v. Paredes, 176 F. Supp. 2d 179, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). "[C]ourts considering a motion in limine may reserve decision until trial, so that the motion is placed in the appropriate factual context." Jean-Laurent v. Hennessy, 840 F. Supp. 2d 529, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 937 F. Supp. at 287). Further, a district court's ruling on a motion in limine is preliminary and "subject to change when the case unfolds." Luce, 469 U.S. at 41.

B. General Rules of Admissibiliry

Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides that "[r]elevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible." Fed. R. Evid. 402. Thus, "unless an exception applies, all '[r]elevant evidence is admissible.'" United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235, 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 402). Rule 401 provides that "[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 401. The Second Circuit has characterized this relevance standard as "very low." See White, 692 F.3d at 246 (quoting United States v. A1-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 176 (2d Cir. 2008)). Indeed, "[t]o be relevant, evidence need not be sufficient by itself to prove a fact in issue, much less to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 132 (2d Cir. 2010).

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. "[W]hat counts as the Rule 403 'probative value' of an item of evidence, as distinct from its Rule 401 'relevance,' may be calculated by comparing evidentiary alternatives." Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997). In short, Rule 403 requires "the district court [to] make a conscientious assessment of whether unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value" with regard to each piece of proffered evidence. A1-Moavad, 545 F.3d at 160 (quoting United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curium)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs' Motions

1. Evidence of Hopkins's Alleged Recklessness

Plaintiffs have filed a number of motions seeking to exclude from trial evidence relating to Hopkins's conduct and state of mind on the night of the incident. (See Pls.' Mot. in Lim. to Exclude Evidence of Brian Hopkins's Comparative Negligence ("Comparative Negligence Motion") (Dkt. 83); Pls.' Mot. in Lim. to Exclude Evidence Concerning Brian Hopkins's Knowledge of Electrical Danger ("Electrical Danger Motion") (Dkt. 87); Pls.' Mot. in Lim. to Exclude Evidence of Brian Hopkins's Drinking and Marijuana Use ("Past Alcohol Use Motion") (Dkt. 89); Pls.' Mot. in Lim. to Exclude Text Messages and Phone Records ("Text Messages and Phone Records Motion") (Dkt. 90).) Broadly, Plaintiffs argue in each motion that evidence of Hopkins's conduct and state of mind is not relevant, because Massachusetts law does not provide for a comparative recklessness defense. (See, e.g., Comparative Negligence Motion at 2 ("[T]here is no concept of comparative recklessness under Massachusetts Law.").) Plaintiffs further argue that, under Massachusetts law, Defendants are barred from arguing that Hopkins's recklessness was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. (Id. at 3-5.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs contend that evidence concerning Hopkins's actions and thoughts on the night of the accident are simply irrelevant.²

Defendants disagree. They argue that Hopkins's actions and state of mind on the night of the accident are relevant for three purposes. First, Defendants argue that a plaintiff's recklessness is a bar to recovery under Massachusetts law. (See Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.' Mots. in Lim. ("Defs.' Opp'n") (Dkt. 97) at 4-7.) Second, Defendants argue that Hopkins's evidence ofrecklessness is relevant to show that Hopkins recklessness was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. (Id. at 7-8.) Third, Defendants argue that Hopkins's state of mind is relevant to show that the overhead wire was an open and obvious danger, and, therefore, no warning was required. (Id. at 8-9.)

The court largely agrees with Defendants. For the reasons explained below, evidence of Hopkins's conduct and state of mind on the night of the incident is relevant to show (1) Hopkins's recklessness, (2) Hopkins's role in causing the incident, and (3) the obviousness of the danger of the live catenary wire. (See infra Parts III.A.i.a-c.) However, certain proffered evidence is nonetheless inadmissible because it is unduly prejudicial. (See infra Part III.A.ii.)

i. Legal Principles

a. Recklessness as a Bar to Recovery under Massachusetts Law

Plaintiffs argue that "there is no concept of comparative recklessness under Massachusetts Law." (Comparative Negligence Motion at 2.)³ Defendants disagree; they contend that "[a] plaintiff whose conduct is in reckless disregard of his own safety is barred from recovery against a defendant whose reckless disregard of the plaintiff's safety is a legal cause of the plaintiff's harm." (Defs.' Opp'n...