Horizon House, Inc. v. E. Norriton Twp., CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-1252

HORIZON HOUSE, INC., Plaintiff, v. EAST NORRITON TOWNSHIP, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-1252

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

April 17, 2020

DuBois, J.

MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of plaintiff Horizon House, Inc.'s attempt to establish a "Community Home" for disabled residents in defendant East Norriton Township. Plaintiff was denied a Use and Occupancy permit after defendant's Zoning Officer and Zoning Hearing Board determined that plaintiff's proposed use fell within the Zoning Ordinance's definition of a "Group Home," which necessitated satisfying additional conditions. On January 31, 2019, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, asserting claims of disparate impact and disparate treatment under the Fair Housing Amendments Act ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and for denial of reasonable accommodation under the ADA and FHAA. Presently before the Court is defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

The facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint are as follows. Plaintiff, Horizon House, Inc., is a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation that owns and operates properties that provide residential services for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities. Am. Compl. ¶ 3. Among the residential services operated by plaintiff are "Community Homes for Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities," which are licensed and regulated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. ¶ 5.

On December 10, 2018, plaintiff signed an agreement to purchase a single-family detached dwelling located at 2921 Stoney Creek Road in East Norriton Township, Pennsylvania. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff plans to use the house as a Community Home for up to three disabled people. Id. ¶ 36. The Stoney Creek Road property is located within a zoning district designated as "BR-1" by defendant's Zoning Ordinance. Id. ¶ 23. Permitted uses in a BR-1 district include a "single-family detached dwelling." East Norriton, Pennsylvania, Zoning Ordinance [hereinafter ZO] § 205-24.¹ The term "family" is defined under the Ordinance as:

Any number of individuals related by blood or marriage, including adopted children, foster children or minor children under the legal custody of an adult, living together as a single nonprofit housekeeping unit and doing their cooking on the premises on a single cooking facility; including two gratuitous guests. Family shall exclude, however, occupants of a club, fraternity house, lodge, residential club or rooming house. Family shall be deemed to include unrelated persons with disabilities living together as a functional family equivalent.²

Id. § 205-5.

In contrast, "Group Homes" are only permitted by special exception in a BR-1 district. Id. § 205-21. A "Group Home" is defined under the Ordinance as:

A residential facility used as living quarters by any number of unrelated persons requiring special care, specifically designed to create a residential setting for the mentally and physicallyhandicapped. The individuals may be either transient or permanent residents. Any number of handicapped persons, as defined in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act f 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, have the right to occupy a dwelling unit in the same manner and to the same extent as any family unit.

Id. § 205-5. In order to obtain a special exception, a Group Home must satisfy certain conditions—it must have a fire sprinkler system, a fire alarm system, a minimum of four off-street parking spaces, at least one staff person in the home at all times, and the owner must provide to defendant a description of the disability of each resident. Id. § 205-21. These are the conditions about which plaintiff complains. Am. Compl. ¶ 31.

On December 4, 2018, the previous owner of the Stoney Creek Road property applied to defendant for a Use and Occupancy Permit pursuant to its sale agreement with plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 41. In response, defendant's Zoning Officer denied the permit, concluding that plaintiff's intended use for the house was a Group Home. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff subsequently communicated with defendant's Zoning Officer and Solicitor, who confirmed defendant's position that plaintiff's proposed use was considered a Group Home and that plaintiff was required to obtain a special exception. Id. ¶ 44.

On March 8, 2019, plaintiff submitted an application with defendant for a Certificate of Occupancy, as required by the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services before plaintiff could move the residents into the Stoney Creek Road property. Id. ¶ 48. Plaintiff's application was denied on March 13, 2019. Id. ¶ 50. Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action and filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Document No. 2) on March 25, 2019.

On May 9, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Document No. 7).³ The case was subsequently stayed byOrder dated June 11, 2019, to allow plaintiff to seek a hearing before defendant's Zoning Hearing Board. The case remained stayed until December 16, 2019, when plaintiff reported that the Board had denied plaintiff's requested relief (Document No. 19).

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on January 31, 2020 (Document No. 22). Count I of the Amended Complaint alleges disparate impact under the FHAA, ADA, and RA. Count II alleges disparate treatment under the FHAA, ADA, and RA. Count III alleges denial of reasonable accommodation under the FHAA and ADA.

On February 14, 2020, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Document No. 24). Plaintiff responded on March 13, 2020 (Document No. 29). On March 20, 2020, defendant filed a Reply (Document No. 30).

The Motion is thus ripe for decision.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Liou v. Le Reve Rittenhouse Spa, LLC, No. CV 18-5279, 2019 WL 1405846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2019). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. In assessing the plausibility of a plaintiff's claims, a district court first identifies those allegations that constitute nothing more than mere "legal conclusions" or "naked assertion[s]." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 564 (2007). Such allegations are "not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S.at 679. The Court then assesses "the 'nub' of the plaintiff['s] complaint—the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation[s]"—to determine whether it states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 680. "In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).

"[I]f a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, a court may dismiss a claim with prejudice based on "bad faith or dilatory motives, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failures to cure the deficiency by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment." Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993).

IV. DISCUSSION

Courts apply the same analysis to claims brought under the FHAA, ADA, and RA. See Sharpvisions, Inc. v. Borough of Plum, 475 F. Supp. 2d 514, 521 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 2007) ("Because all of these laws provide bases for challenging disability-based housing discrimination, the legal analysis under the [FHAA] is therefore equally applicable to plaintiff's [ADA and RA] claims."). Accordingly, the Court will confine its analysis to the FHAA.

The FHAA prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental, or otherwise making unavailable or denying, "a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap" and requires "reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). Courts have identified "three different types of claims against municipal land useauthorities under the FHAA": (1) disparate treatment, (2) disparate impact, and (3) failure to make reasonable accommodations. Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 448 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002).

In its Motion to Dismiss, defendant contends that plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state plausible claims for disparate treatment, disparate impact, and denial of reasonable accommodations. Mot. Dismiss 16-25. The Court will address each argument in turn.

A. Disparate Treatment

Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot establish a claim for disparate treatment because the Ordinance's definition of "family" provides "a special allowance for individuals with disabilities" to live as a "functional family equivalent" that is not available to unrelated, non-disabled individuals. Mot. Dismiss 20-21. The Court disagrees.

To state a claim for disparate treatment under the FHAA, a plaintiff must allege either that "a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor behind the...