Horn v. Goodman

60 N.E.3d 922

406 Ill.Dec. 371

Michael HORN, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Reverend Norman GOODMAN, Holy Family Catholic Church, and The Catholic Diocese of Peoria, a Religious Corporation, Defendants (Holy Family Catholic Church and the Catholic Diocese of Peoria, Defendants–Appellees).

No. 3–15–0339.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Aug. 24, 2016.

Timothy J. Freiberg (argued), of Law Offices of Frederic W. Nessler & Associates, of Springfield, for appellant.

Craig L. Unrath (argued), Timothy L. Bertschy, and Brad W. Keller, all of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, for appellees.

OPINION

Presiding Justice O'BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff Michael Horn brought a personal injury action against defendants Reverend Norman Goodman, Holy Family Catholic Church, and the Catholic Diocese of Peoria, alleging that he was sexually abused as a minor by Goodman, who served as his parish priest in the 1990s. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that Horn's claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations and that he failed to allege facts sufficient to invoke the discovery rule. Horn appealed. We reverse and remand.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On July 30, 2012, plaintiff Michael Horn filed a multicount complaint against defendants Reverend Norman Goodman, Holy Family Catholic Church, and the Catholic Diocese of Peoria. The complaint alleged assault and battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (counts I through III) against Goodman and negligent hiring, negligent retention/supervision, and negligent entrustment/breach of fiduciary duty/ respondeat superior (counts IV through VI) against Holy Family and against the Diocese (counts VII through IX).

¶ 4 The complaint alleged that Goodman engaged in sexual conduct with Horn, who was born November 26, 1978, between 1991 and 1994, when he was between 13 and 15 years old. Horn further alleged that the abuse caused him injuries, including confusion, and to develop the symptoms of psychological disorders, such as shame, guilt, self-blame, depression, repressed memory, suppressed memory, and disassociation. Horn also alleged that the psychological conditions occurred before he turned 18 and caused him to not remember the abuse, or recognize or recall the connection between his psychological issues and Goodman's abuse.

¶ 5 Holy Family and the Peoria Diocese (collectively the Diocese) and Goodman filed section 2–619.1 motions to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2–619.1 (West 2012) ). Goodman and the Diocese argued that Horn failed to allege facts sufficient to support his claims and that his claims were time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations in the 1994 version of the childhood sexual abuse provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter referred to as the sexual abuse statute) (735 ILCS 5/13–202.2 (West 1994) ). The trial court granted the motions to dismiss without prejudice, finding the claims were time-barred and that Horn did not allege facts sufficient to invoke the discovery rule or to support his argument that the limitations period was tolled as a result of fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel.

¶ 6 Horn filed an amended complaint that mirrored the original complaint but added new allegations of repressed and suppressed memory, fraudulent concealment, and equitable estoppel. The additional allegations included that Horn suppressed and repressed memories of the abuse before he turned 18 in 1998, and until 2011, during which time Horn was unable to recognize the sexual abuse was wrong or harmful or that he had been injured as a result of the abuse, “due to the fact that he had blocked it out of his memory and had repressed and suppressed any memory of the abuse taking place,” and that he only recognized his injuries when the memories returned in 2011. The amended complaint also added an allegation that Goodman and the Diocese were aware of the abuse and remained silent about it; that Goodman threatened that there would be adverse consequences were Horn to tell anyone about the abuse; and that the Diocese, by its silence, attempted to convince Horn that the sexual abuse was normal and not wrong, harmful, or injurious.

¶ 7 At the time the amended complaint was filed, Goodman had died, and his estate was substituted and then voluntarily dismissed. The Diocese again filed a section 2–619.1 motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted with prejudice. The court found Horn's allegations did not meet the specific pleading requirements to invoke the discovery rule as set forth in Softcheck v. Imesch, 367 Ill.App.3d 148, 305 Ill.Dec. 425, 855 N.E.2d 941 (2006), and Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill.2d 603, 244 Ill.Dec. 918, 727 N.E.2d 217 (2000), and that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to establish either fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel. Horn appealed.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, we must determine whether the trial court erred when it granted the Diocese's motion to dismiss. Horn submits that dismissal was improper, arguing the trial court erred in holding that the 2003 amendment to the sexual abuse statute (Pub. Act 93–356, § 15 (eff. July 24, 2003) (amending 735 ILCS 5/13–202.2 )) did not apply retroactively and preserve his claim, that the limitations period was not tolled through fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel, and that his allegations of repressed and suppressed memories were insufficient to invoke the discovery rule.

¶ 10 A section 2–619.1 allows a party to file a combined motion under sections 2–615 and 2–619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code). 735 ILCS 5/2–615, 2–619, 2–619.1 (West 2012). A section 2–615 motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint. 735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2012). A section 2–619 motion admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint but asserts an affirmative matter defeating the claim. 735 ILCS 5/2–619 (West 2012). When reviewing a 2–619.1 motion, we accept all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences from those facts as true. Davidson v. Gurewitz, 2015 IL App (2d) 150171, ¶ 9, 400 Ill.Dec. 689, 48 N.E.3d 1129. This court interprets the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Sierra Club v. Office of Mines & Minerals, 2015 IL App (4th) 140405, ¶ 23, 390 Ill.Dec. 798, 29 N.E.3d 1068. We review a section 2–619.1 dismissal de novo. Schloss v. Jumper, 2014 IL App (4th) 121086, ¶ 15, 381 Ill.Dec. 694, 11 N.E.3d 57.

¶ 11 The 1994 version of the sexual abuse statute provided a two-year statute of limitations, which began to run when the victim turned 18 or within two years of his or her discovery of the abuse and the resulting injury. 735 ILCS 5/13–202.2 (West 1994). It deleted the statute of repose that had been included in the original version of the statute that was enacted in 1991. See Pub. Act 86–1346, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1991) (adding 735 ILCS 5/13–202.2 ). In 2003, the sexual abuse statute was again amended, this time to include a limitations period of 10 years, or 5 years after the abuse and injury are discovered. Pub Act 93–356, § 15 (eff. July 24, 2003) (amending 735 ILCS 5/13–202.2 ). Also added to the 2003 version was an expanded explanation of the discovery rule. Pub Act 93–356, § 15 (eff. July 24, 2003) (amending 735 ILCS 5/13–202.2(b) ). Currently, and at the time Horn filed his complaint, the sexual abuse statute provides for a 20–year statute of limitations. 735 ILCS 5/13–202.2 (West 2014).

¶ 12 Section 13–202.2 codified the common law discovery rule for cases involving childhood sexual abuse. Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill.2d 603, 608–09, 244 Ill.Dec. 918, 727 N.E.2d 217 (2000). A limitations period begins to run under the common law discovery rule when the party who is seeking relief knows or should reasonably know that the injury exists and that it was wrongfully caused. Parks v. Kownacki, 193 Ill.2d 164, 176, 249 Ill.Dec. 897, 737 N.E.2d 287 (2000) (quoting Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill.2d 407, 415, 58 Ill.Dec. 725, 430 N.E.2d 976 (1981) ). Adults are charged with knowledge that sexual contact between adults and children is harmful and wrong, and causes injury. Softcheck v. Imesch, 367 Ill.App.3d 148, 156, 305 Ill.Dec. 425, 855 N.E.2d 941 (2006). Whether the discovery rule applies is generally a question of fact but may be determined as a matter of law when the answer is clear from the pleadings. Clay, 189 Ill.2d at 609–10, 244 Ill.Dec. 918, 727 N.E.2d 217.

¶ 13 Where a cause of action is fraudulently concealed by the liable person, the party entitled to the knowledge has five years after he or she discovers the cause of action to file a complaint. 735 ILCS 5/13–215 (West 2012). To establish that the limitation period should be tolled based on fraudulent concealment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant engaged in affirmative acts or representations intended to “lull or induce” the plaintiff to fail to discover his claim, (2) knowing them to be false, (3) intending to deceive and (4) actually deceiving the plaintiff, and (5) upon which the plaintiff detrimentally relied. Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 406 Ill.App.3d 1119, 1154, 347 Ill.Dec. 753, 943 N.E.2d 43 (2011) (quoting Smith v. Cook County Hospital, 164 Ill.App.3d 857, 862, 115 Ill.Dec. 811, 518 N.E.2d 336 (1987) ; Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill.2d 1, 18, 319 Ill.Dec. 319, 885 N.E.2d 999 (2007) ). Silence by a person who is in a fiduciary relationship or position of trust with a plaintiff may constitute fraudulent concealment. Wisniewski, 406 Ill.App.3d at 1155, 347 Ill.Dec. 753, 943 N.E.2d 43.

¶ 14 To support a claim of equitable estoppel sufficient to toll a limitation period, a plaintiff must show that (1) the other parties misrepresented or concealed material facts, (2) they knew at the time of making the representations that they were not true, (3) the party who is claiming estoppel did not know the representations were untrue when they were made and relied on the...